

## RESEARCH ARTICLE

# National glorification and attachment differentially predict support for intergroup conflict resolution: Scrutinizing cross-country generalizability

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## Abstract

Research on national identity distinguishes between national glorification and attachment. We tested whether glorification and attachment differentially predicted support for military and diplomatic conflict resolution strategies (CRS) in response to international conflicts. Using data collected in seven countries (Australia, United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Israel, China; total  $N = 1784$ ), we investigated whether glorification and attachment can be equivalently measured (using tests of measurement invariance) and whether their relationships with CRS were generalizable across countries. The results revealed metric, but not scalar, measurement invariance of the two-factor structure of national identification across six countries, excluding China. Among these six countries, glorification predicted more support for military CRS, whereas attachment predicted more support for diplomatic CRS. Our study is novel in scrutinizing the cross-cultural generalizability of the bi-dimensional model of national identification. Implications for studying national identification and intergroup conflict cross-culturally are discussed.

## KEYWORDS

conflict resolution, culture, intergroup conflict, measurement invariance, national identification

## 1 | INTRODUCTION

One persistent challenge for understanding international conflicts and their resolution lies in the complex roles of individuals' identification with their national groups. On the one hand, group identification has long been argued to have conflict-enhancing effects (see Roccas & Elster, 2012, for a review). Research has repeatedly demonstrated that the more strongly people identify with their own group, the more likely they are to adopt attitudes and beliefs that help trigger, perpetuate or exacerbate intergroup conflicts (e.g., Castano et al., 2002; Li et al.,

2020; Noor et al., 2008). On the other hand, complete dissociation from one's group does not appear to contribute to restoring positive intergroup relations. Individuals who do not perceive their group membership as a meaningful component of their self-identity are unlikely to experience group-based emotions conducive to reconciliation (e.g., collective guilt) or support restorative actions (e.g., victim compensation) on behalf of their group (e.g., Branscombe & Miron, 2004; Doosje et al., 1998; Shuman et al., 2018).

To reconcile the seemingly paradoxical intergroup consequences of identification, Roccas et al. (2006) proposed a bi-dimensional model,

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distinguishing between national glorification and national attachment. In different countries and various conflict contexts, a growing body of research has utilised the corresponding self-report measure of identification, investigating the divergent roles of glorification and attachment in predicting reactions to intergroup conflicts (e.g., Leidner et al., 2010; Leidner & Castano, 2012; Li et al., 2016, 2018; Selvanathan & Leidner, 2020). No research to date, however, has used rigorous statistical techniques, such as measurement invariance testing, to scrutinize how generalisable the bi-dimensional conceptualisation of identification is across different national and cultural contexts.

In the present research, we examined whether glorification and attachment had differential relationships with support for military versus diplomatic conflict resolution strategies (CRS). Most importantly, we systematically tested the generalisability of these associations across several countries, including Australia, China, France, Germany, Israel, the United States and the United Kingdom. Laying the foundation for meaningful cross-cultural comparisons, we evaluated the measurement invariance of the glorification and attachment subscales, which were originally developed in Hebrew in Israel (Roccas et al., 2006). In cross-cultural research, analysis of measurement invariance is crucial as it evaluates whether the construct underlying the scale, in our case national identification, is equivalently measured in different national and cultural contexts, and, as a consequence, whether cross-cultural differences in relationships and mean scores can be unequivocally attributed to differences in the underlying construct.

## 2 | GLORIFICATION, ATTACHMENT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

According to the bi-dimensional model of identification (Roccas et al., 2006, 2008), national identification has two interrelated, and yet distinct, facets: glorification and attachment. National glorification refers to the tendency to hold overly positive evaluations of one's national ingroup, particularly when it is compared to other groups (*superiority*), as well as the tendency to respect and adhere to ingroup norms, traditions, symbols, and authorities in an unquestioning manner (*deference*). National attachment, on the other hand, refers to emotional attachment to one's ingroup and perceived importance of group membership as part of the self-concept (*importance*), as well as willingness to contribute to the ingroup (*commitment*). Given that both glorification and attachment tap into the overarching concept of identification, they partially overlap and are positively correlated with each other (Roccas et al., 2006). While glorification and attachment further consist of two subdimensions each, the majority of past research using this conceptual framework has not empirically distinguished between these subdimensions, and has treated identification as a bi-dimensional construct (e.g., Leidner, 2015; Leidner & Castano, 2012; Leidner et al., 2010; Li et al., 2016, 2018, 2020; Roccas et al., 2006). In the current research, therefore, we follow this theoretical and empirical approach and focus on the bi-dimensional structure of identification.

In a variety of intergroup contexts, research has demonstrated that national glorification is a powerful predictor of defensive, hostile

intergroup attitudes and even support for intergroup violence. High levels of glorification, for example, are associated with more resentment towards the outgroup (Uluğ et al., 2021), stronger denial of collective guilt and responsibility for the ingroup's moral wrongdoings (Bilali, 2013; Roccas et al., 2006), less third-party support for genocide intervention (Leidner, 2015), more moral disengagement from ingroup-committed harm and subsequent resistance to justice measures (Leidner et al., 2010; Li et al., 2021), and a shift from endorsing violence-condemning towards violence-legitimizing moral principles when evaluating ingroup-committed violence (Leidner & Castano, 2012). In the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, glorification was also found to promote a desire for retributive justice, which in turn predicted support for non-normative collective action (Selvanathan & Leidner, 2020).

While the link between glorification and ingroup-defensive tendencies is relatively well understood, less is known about the role of attachment in intergroup conflict. Some of the above-mentioned research showed that attachment either did not significantly predict intergroup outcomes or had the opposite effects compared to those of national glorification (Leidner, 2015; Leidner et al., 2010; Leidner & Castano, 2012; Li et al., 2016, 2018; Roccas et al., 2006; Rovenpor et al., 2016; Selvanathan & Leidner, 2020). In the context of prisoner abuses by American soldiers against Iraqis, Leidner et al. (Study 1; 2010) found for example that whereas Americans' glorification of the United States predicted stronger dehumanisation of Iraqi victims and less support for justice measures, attachment predicted less outgroup dehumanization and stronger support for justice. In addition to the link between glorification and retributive justice, Selvanathan and Leidner (2020) showed that attachment promoted restorative justice, which in turn predicted support for normative collective action. Other studies, however, have not consistently found a link between attachment and various intergroup outcomes (Leidner, 2015; Leidner & Castano, 2012; Li et al., 2016, 2018; Rovenpor et al., 2016), or only measured glorification but not attachment (Bilali, 2013; Uluğ et al., 2021).

When understanding the implications of national identification, support for different CRS are of particular importance. Preliminary evidence suggests that individuals who strongly glorified their national ingroup were particularly sensitive to threat posed by intergroup conflict and, as a result, preferred military strategies to resolve conflicts (Li et al., 2016; see also Li et al., 2018). Low glorifiers, on the contrary, preferred diplomatic or peaceful CRS in response to perceived threat (Rovenpor et al., 2016). These studies, however, did not find any significant association between attachment and support for CRS.

To provide a systematic outlook on the destructive or constructive roles that glorification and attachment play in intergroup conflicts, we adopted a multi-country approach to examine whether they differentially predicted support for military or diplomatic approaches to conflicts. We expected that national glorification should predict stronger support for military CRS, whereas national attachment should predict stronger support for diplomatic CRS. By comparing these relationships across different countries, the current research also provides for the first time a test of the cross-national generalisability of glorification and attachment in the context of intergroup conflict.

### 3 | MEASURING NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION ACROSS DIFFERENT COUNTRIES

The majority of the prior research using the bi-dimensional scale of national identification has been conducted in the United States with American participants (Bilali, 2012; Leidner et al., 2010, 2018; Leidner & Castano, 2012; Li et al., 2016, 2018; Rovenpor et al., 2016). Originally, however, the scale was developed in Israel with Jewish Israeli participants (Roccas et al., 2006; Sagiv et al., 2012). Its use in other countries has been more infrequent, for example in the United Kingdom (Leidner et al., 2010) and Serbia (Li et al., 2018), and among other populations such as Turks studying in the United States (Bilali, 2013), Arab Israelis (Selvanathan & Leidner, 2020) and Armenians (Uluğ et al., 2021). Theoretically, the psychological consequences of glorification and attachment—for example, attitudes towards different CRS—are thought to generalize across national and cultural contexts. No research, however, has directly evaluated the generalizability of this bi-dimensional model of identification and the cross-cultural invariance of its measurement. It therefore remains unknown how findings regarding national glorification and attachment can be compared across countries or cultures. Without establishing measurement invariance, comparisons across contexts with regard to correlates of glorification and attachment remain ambiguous, as results could be attributed to differences in measurement properties.

Laying the foundation for cross-national comparisons, we examined three levels of measurement invariance of the bi-dimensional identification scale. First, configural invariance indicates that the overall two-factor structure of identification holds up similarly across all countries. Second, metric (or weak) invariance indicates that differences in individuals' responses to each item reflect individual differences in the underlying construct in the same way across countries. Finally, scalar (or strong) invariance indicates that manifest scores correspond to the same scores on the latent construct across countries. The demonstration of metric invariance is a prerequisite for meaningful comparisons of relationships between variables across countries. In addition, when scalar invariance is established, mean scores can be unequivocally compared across countries. In cross-cultural research, however, scalar invariance often cannot be assumed because of differences between cultures in response tendencies or in meaning assigned to items (He & van de Vijver, 2012). In the present research, establishing metric invariance of our measures was of primary importance, as our cross-national comparisons of the relationships of attachment and glorification, respectively, with CRS the required metric but not scalar invariance.

### 4 | THE PRESENT RESEARCH

As a first step of testing the cross-national generalizability of the bi-dimensional conceptualization of identification, we collected data in Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany. We selected these countries for two main reasons. First, the similarities among them, especially with regard to contemporary foreign relations,

allowed us to have identical measures of conflict resolution. In all five countries, participants responded to a conflict scenario regarding Iran's nuclear programme and indicated how they would like their respective country to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons: either by military intervention or by diplomacy. While these countries have different relationships with Iran, the threat of Iran's nuclear development is a realistic and central issue for the international community and all five countries in the present research have taken active roles in dealing with the threat. Using the same scales and conflict scenarios allowed us to test for the measurement invariance of both the predictor (i.e., attachment and glorification) and outcome (i.e., support for diplomatic and military CRS) variables, thus maximising the validity of cross-national comparisons. Second, despite the similarities among these countries, they differed on a number of dimensions such as history of international conflict, level of involvement in the conflict with Iran, and military spending and capability. All of these are meaningful dimensions for cross-national comparisons regarding national identification and conflict resolution.

As an extension, we additionally pooled data from two separate projects in Israel and China, which had similar measures of national identification and CRS, albeit situated in different conflict contexts (i.e., Israeli–Palestinian conflict and cross-strait relations). Our samples therefore covered populations from a diverse set of countries. Although the methodological and contextual differences between the projects prevented us from testing for measurement invariance for the CRS scales among all seven countries, the two additional datasets provided the opportunity to further examine the generalizability of the relationships between national identification and support for CRS. We included data from Israel because the scales were first developed and validated using Israeli samples, but also because of the region's unique history with conflicts. Given that the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is often considered one of the world's most intractable conflicts (Vered & Bar-Tal, 2017), investigating the implications of glorification and attachment for CRS is highly relevant for this context. Moreover, a comparison between countries not immersed in violent conflicts and a country undergoing an intractable conflict can provide further insights into the generalizability of the relationship between national identification and CRS preferences.

To our knowledge, no research to date has extended the bi-dimensional model of identification to East Asian societies, which are more frequently characterized by collectivist cultures (compared to Western societies). Cross-cultural research has distinguished between two types of collectivism: horizontal and vertical (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). Whereas horizontal collectivism emphasizes equality, sociability and interdependence, vertical collectivism emphasises compliance with ingroup authorities and leaders. Vertical collectivism, therefore, corresponds well to the deference sub-facet of glorification (see also Roccas et al., 2008). Since vertical collectivism is particularly pronounced in East Asian cultures (Gannon & Pillai, 2015), being strongly attached to one's country that emphasizes loyalty and conformity might also imply relatively high levels of glorification (especially with respect to the deference sub-dimension). It is thus important to examine whether East Asians also meaningfully distinguish between

attachment and glorification as two facets of national identification and, if so, whether they differentially predict support for CRS. In the present research, we aimed to address this question by testing the relationship between national identification and support for CRS among Chinese citizens, in the context of the cross-strait relations, or the conflict between mainland China and Taiwan, which has been characterized by limited contact, tensions, and increasing threat of military engagement in recent years.

With the pooled dataset, we were able to (1) scrutinise the measurement invariance of the attachment and glorification scales across all seven countries, (2) directly examine (i.e., using multigroup analyses) whether their associations with CRS were similar or different across Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany, where CRS was measured with the same scales, and (3) separately test the associations between identification and CRS in Israel and China. Our selection of countries allowed us to evaluate the measurement and psychological functions of attachment and glorification across different regions in the world, including North America, Australia, Europe, East Asia and the Middle East. Importantly, the selected countries vary on multiple dimensions, such as culture, language, national military capacity, absence or presence of a violent conflict, as well as the level of current involvement in conflict. Thus, the current study makes two primary contributions to the literature. First, it scrutinizes the extent to which the two-dimensional conceptualization of national identification generalizes across different countries. Second, it systematically examines the divergent implications of glorification and attachment for conflict resolution in different intergroup contexts.

## 5 | METHOD

### 5.1 | Participants

The study was carried out as part of three projects involving cross-country studies on international conflicts. Participants were adults from Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany (Project 1; Watkins, Li, Allard, & Leidner, 2021), Israel (Project 2) and China (Project 3). All study materials, data and R script are available at [https://osf.io/mh7ct/?view\\_only=19a78626feae42df82a444a7fe97dba7](https://osf.io/mh7ct/?view_only=19a78626feae42df82a444a7fe97dba7). The data collection procedure in each country is described in the [Supplementary Materials](#). Table 1 displays the sample characteristics.

As the study was part of three larger projects that aimed to address multiple research questions, we did not carry out a priori power analyses for the current research questions. The sample sizes, however, were determined a priori and preregistered for Project 1 (Watkins et al., 2021). To assess the minimum effect size that the study was able to detect given the obtained sample sizes, we conducted sensitivity power analyses for all countries. Using G\*Power (Erdfeider, Faul, & Buchner, 1996), the analyses showed that, for linear multiple regression analyses (using F tests) with two predictors, the effect sizes required to achieve 80% power ( $\alpha = .05$ ) ranged from  $r = .14$  (in the German sample) to  $r = .21$  (in the Australian sample) across the seven countries.

### 5.2 | Measures

In all countries except Israel, responses were measured on visual analogue scales from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). In Israel, responses were measured on 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 9 (*strongly agree*) scales. To keep the scales consistent, we converted all 9-point scales to 7-point scales by linear transformation ( $\text{New score} = 0.75 \times \text{original score} + 0.25$ ).

#### 5.2.1 | National attachment and glorification

We used a shortened version of Roccas et al.'s (2006) scales of national attachment and glorification. In Israel and China, the studies used the original 16-item scale of national identification. To be consistent with the other countries, only the eight items from the shortened version were included in the data analyses. The eight items were identical across countries, except for one glorification item that was modified for France and Germany.

*Attachment* was measured with two items tapping into the importance of participants' country to their identity ('Being [American]<sup>1</sup> is an important part of my identity'; 'It is important for me to contribute to my nation') and two items tapping into their commitment to their country ('I am strongly committed to [the U.S.]; 'When I talk about [the U.S.] I usually say "we" rather than "they"'). *Glorification* was measured with two items tapping into participants' belief in the superiority of their country over other countries ('Relative to other nations, we are a very moral nation'; 'Other nations can learn a lot from us') and two items tapping into deference ('It is disloyal for [Americans] to criticize [the U.S.]; 'There is generally a good reason for every rule and regulation made by our national authorities').

In the non-English speaking countries, bilingual researchers translated the survey from English into the local languages and resolved any difference among them. In France and Germany, there was consensus among the researchers that the concept of national authority had acquired a specific meaning associated with right-wing extremism. To avoid a potential item bias (van de Vijver & Poortinga, 1997), the glorification item about deference to national authorities was adapted in these two countries to focus on deference to national values and traditions ('It is important to teach our children to respect [French/German] values and traditions'). Although the wordings are different from the original item, adherence to group values and traditions is a core aspect of glorification, capturing the 'deference' sub-dimension (Roccas et al., 2006, 2008).

#### 5.2.2 | Diplomatic and military CRS

To measure support for diplomatic and military approaches to resolving international conflicts, participants in Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany first read a short description of Iran's nuclear programme (see [Supplementary Materials](#) for the full

<sup>1</sup> The terms in brackets changed depending on participants' country.

**TABLE 1** Sample demographics

Country	Language	Sample size	Age	Gender (female)	Citizen	Political orientation <sup>a</sup>	Education <sup>b</sup>	Race/ethnicity <sup>c</sup>
Australia	English	146	31 (18–71)	45%	99%	3.40 (1.63)	2.08 (1.00)	80% White
USA	English	289	34 (18–78)	47%	99%	3.67 (2.19)	1.93 (.97)	76% White
UK	English	268	37 (18–70)	64%	100%	4.11 (1.76)	2.75 (1.28)	80% White
France	French	271	41 (18–77)	65%	98%	4.53 (1.77)	5.38 (1.32)	N/A
Germany	German	329	49 (18–81)	50%	99%	4.51 (1.57)	3.10 (1.73)	N/A
Israel	Hebrew	181	40 (18–64)	50%	100%	5.67 (1.84)	N/A	Jewish
China	Mandarin Chinese	300	20 (18–23)	58%	100%	N/A	2.96 (.26)	Chinese

<sup>a</sup>Political orientation was reported on a scale from 1 = *very liberal* to 9 = *very conservative*.

<sup>b</sup>In Australia and the United States, education was reported on the following scale: 1 = High School, 2 = Bachelor Degree, 3 = Master Degree, 4 = Doctorate, 5 = Professional Degree (e.g., JD/MD). In the United Kingdom, 1 = secondary school, 2 = A-Levels, 3 = Bachelor Degree and so on. Meanwhile, 5.38 in France corresponds to an average of some college (DUT or BTS) and a Bachelor degree, whereas 3.10 in Germany corresponds to somewhere between a High School Diploma (Abitur) and a Bachelor degree. 2.96 in China corresponds to an average of a Bachelor degree. There was also an 'other' option, which was coded as 'missing' for the present analyses.

<sup>c</sup>Race/ethnicity was only measured in Australia, USA, and UK, with an open-ended question ("Which ethnicity or race do you consider yourself?"). For historical reasons, demographic data on race or ethnicity are usually not collected in France or Germany.

In Israel, only Jewish Israelis were recruited, and participants additionally indicated whether they lived in urban or rural areas (79% urban areas). In China, participants were recruited from a public university, where fewer than 5% of the students were from ethnic minorities.

description). They then reported their opinion on how their country should maintain its relationship with Iran and prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Five statements captured *diplomatic* means of dealing with the issue (e.g., 'The best way to resolve the problem of Iran's nuclear programme is through frequent communications with Iran'). Five statements captured *military* means of dealing with the issue (e.g., '[The U.S.] would be justified in making war on Iran if Iran does not give up its nuclear ambitions'). We measured diplomatic and military approaches separately because support for war and support for diplomacy may be separate dimensions (rather than opposite poles on one dimension; Bizumic et al., 2013).

In Israel and China, participants indicated their support for CRS regarding the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the cross-strait relations between mainland China and Taiwan, respectively. Given the different nature of these two conflicts and that these two datasets came from two separate projects, the items were worded differently in these two countries. In Israel, four items measured support for diplomacy (e.g., 'Israel should send diplomats to the Palestinian authority to negotiate peace deals that serve the interests of both sides') and four items measured support for military approaches (e.g., 'Israel should send military forces to the Palestinian territory to settle the dispute'). In China, three items measured support for diplomacy (e.g., 'The cross-strait tensions can only be resolved by negotiations') and two items measured support for military approaches (e.g., 'If the Taiwan independence movement continues to grow, using military force to resolve the conflict would eventually be inevitable').

### 5.3 | Analytical approach

As a preparatory step, we first conducted multi-group confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) of the identification and CRS scales, respec-

tively. The main goal of the CFAs was to compare a two-factor model to a one-factor model for both scales in order to establish the most parsimonious model with acceptable model fit across countries.

Building on the results of the factorial structure, we tested for measurement invariance using multi-group CFAs in R. We conducted analyses of measurement invariance for national identification among all seven countries, and for CRS among Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany, as they belonged to the same project with the same CRS measures. Three levels of statistical equivalence were evaluated. First, we tested configural invariance by specifying the same factor structure for all groups, and all factor loadings and intercepts were freely estimated in each country. Second, we tested for metric invariance, where factor loadings were constrained to equality across groups, while the intercepts were allowed to vary freely. Finally, we tested for scalar invariance, where both factor loadings and item intercepts were constrained to be equal across groups.

To evaluate model fit, we relied on Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA, acceptable fit < .08; Browne & Cudeck, 1992), Standardized Root Mean Square (SRMR, acceptable fit < .08) and Comparative Fit Index (CFI, acceptable fit > .95; Hu & Bentler, 1999). As the Chi-square statistic has been shown to be highly sensitive to sample size (e.g., Cheung & Rensvold, 2002; Kang et al., 2016), we did not use it as an indicator. Following the recommendations by Chen (2007), we relied on CFI, RMSEA, and SRMR to assess changes between models. According to Chen (2007), when sample size is adequate (total  $N > 300$ ) and sample sizes are equal across the groups, a change of < -.010 in CFI, supplemented by a change of < .015 in RMSEA or a change of < .030 in SRMR, would indicate metric invariance. Moreover, a change of < -.010 in CFI, supplemented by a change of < .015 in RMSEA or a change of .010 in SRMR would indicate scalar invariance.

Among the samples from Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany, if metric invariance is established for



both measures of identification and CRS, it would be meaningful to compare the relationships between the two sets of latent variables (i.e., attachment/glorification and diplomatic/military CRS) across these countries. Multi-group structural equation modelling (SEM) was used to compare the relationships among the latent variables across countries.

Given that the studies in Israel and China employed items pertaining to different conflict scenarios to measure CRS, measurement invariance cannot be tested meaningfully in a multi-group CFA with the data from these countries. Nevertheless, to explore whether the patterns of relationships between the facets of identification and those of CRS were similar in Israel and China, we conducted separate SEMs in these two countries.

## 6 | RESULTS

### 6.1 | Preliminary analyses

We first tested missing data patterns with the nonparametric test of homoscedasticity (R package *MissMech*; Jamshidian et al., 2014). Across countries, the assumption of missing values being completely at random (MCAR) could be retained,  $p = .198$ . In France and Israel, several identification items had more than 5% of missing data (highest missing rates: 7.7% in France, 8.8% in Israel), which is typically considered non-negligible (Schafer, 1999). We employed multiple imputation using the predictive mean matching method (PMM; 10 imputed datasets and 50 iterations) using the 'mice' package in R (Van Buuren & Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 2020).

#### 6.1.1 | Factorial structure

By means of multi-group CFA<sup>2</sup> across all seven countries, we tested a two-factorial model of glorification and attachment against a one-factorial model with all items loading on a common factor of identification. In both multi-group CFAs, all parameters were set to be freely estimated, with the exception that the first item loading for each factor was set to 1 for identification purposes. The two-factor model yielded an acceptable fit, CFI = 0.957, RMSEA = 0.088, SRMR = 0.045, whereas the one-factor model did not, CFI = 0.873, RMSEA = 0.150, SRMR = 0.085. We thus used the two-factor model in the subsequent analyses. Inspecting estimated model parameters in the two-factor model, we found that one item intended to measure glorification ('It is disloyal for [Americans] to criticize [the U.S].') was not reliably related to the latent glorification factor. In each of the seven countries, the standardized factor loading of this item was consistently lower than its standardized error variance (see Supplementary Analysis 1). For this reason, we decided to drop this item from all subsequent analyses. The new two-factor model presented an acceptable fit, CFI = 0.963, RMSEA = 0.096, SRMR = 0.038.

For completeness, we also tested a four-factor model, distinguishing between the sub-facets of attachment (importance and commitment) and glorification (superiority and deference). Due to the use of shortened scales with only two items per facet, however, the model did not converge. The four-factor model was thus not considered further in the subsequent analyses.

For the CRS scales, we conducted a multi-group CFA for the five countries where the CRS items were identical, and separate CFAs in Israel and China. Again, we tested a two-factorial model of diplomatic and military CRS against a one-factorial model with all CRS items loading onto one factor. All parameters except the first item loading for each factor were set to be freely estimated. In all seven countries, a two-factor model of diplomatic and military CRS yielded an acceptable fit, whereas a one-factor model did not (see Supplementary Analysis 2 for the model fit comparisons). Factor loadings and error variances for the two-factorial model are displayed in Supplementary Analysis 1.

Descriptive statistics, internal consistency and bivariate correlations for attachment, (three-item) glorification, diplomatic CRS and military CRS are displayed in Tables 2 and 3.

### 6.2 | Measurement invariance of national identification

We first tested the configural invariance of the two-factor model of national identification. Across all seven countries, whereas RMSEA indicated a less-than-acceptable fit, CFI and SRMR showed acceptable to excellent fit (Table 4). We then proceeded to test the metric invariance of the scales. The change in CFI, however, was above the cut-off, indicating a violation of metric invariance. When we inspected the model fit for each country, China contributed the most to the overall Chi-square. The modification indices for the metric model also suggested that the model fit would be significantly better if some of the factor loadings were freed in China (see Supplementary Analysis 3). We therefore tested for measurement invariance across six countries, excluding China (Table 4). The configural model again presented an acceptable fit, and importantly, the changes in CFI, RMSEA, and SRMR were all below the recommended cut-offs for metric invariance. Having achieved metric invariance across the six countries, we then tested for scalar invariance. The changes in the three model fit indices were all above the recommended cut-offs, indicating a lack of scalar invariance. These results indicated that the glorification and attachment scales were weakly, but not strongly, invariant across six countries, excluding China.

### 6.3 | Relationships between identification and support for conflict resolution

#### 6.3.1 | Australia, USA, UK, France and Germany

Because conflict resolution was measured with the same items in Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and

<sup>2</sup> We also conducted exploratory factor analyses for identification and CRS scales. The results are reported in Supplementary Analysis 4.

**TABLE 2** Means, standard deviations and internal consistencies (IC; Cronbach's Alpha Coefficients) of identification and CRS subscales in each country

Country	Attachment		Glorification		Diplomatic CRS		Military CRS	
	M (SD)	IC	M (SD)	IC	M (SD)	IC	M (SD)	IC
Australia	5.21 (1.11)	.82	4.19 (1.15)	.72	5.86 (.74)	.80	2.43 (1.13)	.91
USA	5.00 (1.48)	.88	4.19 (1.15)	.75	5.66 (1.03)	.83	2.96 (1.53)	.93
UK	5.32 (1.26)	.88	4.48 (1.15)	.75	5.56 (.87)	.84	3.01 (1.29)	.89
France	5.17 (1.31)	.88	4.92 (1.09)	.71	5.49 (1.08)	.88	2.70 (1.36)	.92
Germany	4.98 (1.42)	.89	4.94 (1.14)	.75	5.65 (.97)	.81	2.59 (1.42)	.90
Israel	6.24 (1.16)	.86	5.20 (1.36)	.77	5.03 (1.88)	.95	3.72 (1.94)	.94
China	6.10 (.86)	.87	5.15 (.92)	.53	3.77 (1.30)	.76	5.41 (1.58)	.67

Note: All scales ranged from 1 to 7.

Germany, we tested for measurement invariance of the CRS scales across these countries. Following the same procedure as above, we were able to establish metric, but not scalar, invariance of the CRS scales (see Supplementary Analysis 5). Having established metric invariance for the measures of national identification and support for CRS in these five countries, we were able to test whether (1) attachment and glorification differentially predicted support for diplomatic and military CRS, respectively, and (2) the differential relationships between the two modes of identification and CRS were invariant across countries. We carried out SEMs with factor loadings fixed to equality across countries.

In the SEM, glorification and attachment were entered as latent predictors, and diplomatic and military CRS as latent outcome variables. The regression weights were restricted to equality across countries. This model had an acceptable fit, CFI = 0.951, RMSEA = 0.061, SRMR = 0.081. We also tested a model with unconstrained, freely estimated regression weights. The model fit was slightly better compared to the model with equal regression weights (CFI = 0.955, RMSEA = 0.059, SRMR = 0.060), but the difference was small in magnitude ( $\Delta$ CFI = 0.004,  $\Delta$ RMSEA = 0.002,  $\Delta$ SRMR = 0.021). Given that the more restricted model had a similarly acceptable fit, we followed Kline's (2015) recommendation that a more restricted model should be favoured over a more complex model.

Factor loadings for the measurement model are reported in Table 5. The regression weights in the restricted model indicated that, invariantly, attachment significantly predicted stronger support for diplomatic CRS, whereas glorification significantly predicted stronger support for military CRS. The path from attachment to military CRS and the path from glorification to diplomatic CRS were not significant. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported in Table 6.

### 6.3.2 | Israel and China

As the last step, we explored the relationships of attachment and glorification with CRS in Israel and China. We decided to explore these relationships in China, despite the lack of metric invariance in the identification scales between China and the other countries.

Note that this limits the comparability of relationships between these countries.

Because support for CRS was measured with different conflict scenarios and items in different conflict contexts in Israel and China than in the other countries, we conducted separate SEMs in these two countries. Again, glorification and attachment were entered as latent predictors and CRS as latent outcomes. Factor loadings and variances, as well as error variances are reported in Table 5. In Israel, whereas SRMR indicated an acceptable fit, CFI and RMSEA did not, CFI = 0.935, RMSEA = 0.098, SRMR = 0.056. The pattern of regression coefficients was, however, largely consistent with those for the five countries as reported above (Table 6). Whereas attachment predicted stronger support for diplomatic CRS, glorification predicted stronger support for military CRS. Additionally, glorification predicted weaker support for diplomatic CRS.

The model fit for China was similar to Israel, CFI = 0.917, RMSEA = 0.089, SRMR = 0.061. In China, however, none of the regression paths was significant (Table 6).

## 7 | DISCUSSION

The goals of the current research were twofold. As our main goal, we examined whether glorification and attachment differentially predicted support for military versus diplomatic CRS, and the extent to which these relationships would generalize across countries. To ensure that such cross-cultural comparisons are meaningful, we assessed the measurement invariance of a short version of the bi-dimensional scale of national identification across seven countries that differ in multiple dimensions important for cross-cultural comparisons regarding national identity and conflict resolution, such as language, culture, conflict history and military capability.

### 7.1 | Measurement invariance of national identification scales

Across all seven countries, we established configural invariance of the bi-dimensional identification scales, indicating that the overall

**TABLE 3** Manifest bivariate correlations, separately for each country

Country	1	2	3
<b>Australia</b>			
1. Attachment			
2. Glorification	.44***		
3. Diplomatic CRS	.29***	-.02	
4. Military CRS	.00	.13	-.55***
<b>USA</b>			
1. Attachment			
2. Glorification	.61***		
3. Diplomatic CRS	-.01	-.14*	
4. Military CRS	.35***	.52***	-.46***
<b>UK</b>			
1. Attachment			
2. Glorification	.50***		
3. Diplomatic CRS	.08	-.05	
4. Military CRS	.17**	.33***	-.45***
<b>France</b>			
1. Attachment			
2. Glorification	.59***		
3. Diplomatic CRS	.22***	.31***	
4. Military CRS	-.07	.05	-.41***
<b>Germany</b>			
1. Attachment			
2. Glorification	.62***		
3. Diplomatic CRS	.16**	.11*	
4. Military CRS	.20***	.21***	-.40***
<b>Israel</b>			
1. Attachment			
2. Glorification	.35***		
3. Diplomatic CRS	.23**	-.17*	
4. Military CRS	.13	.27***	-.50***
<b>China</b>			
1. Attachment			
2. Glorification	.54***		
3. Diplomatic CRS	.05	.02	
4. Military CRS	.37***	.26***	-.43***

\* $p < .050$ , \*\* $p < .010$ , \*\*\* $p < .001$ ; CRS: Conflict Resolution Strategies.

two-factor structure of identification holds well for all seven countries, and is superior to a one-factor model. The identification scales, however, were neither metrically nor scalarly invariant, indicating that the factor loadings and item intercepts were not equivalent across these seven countries. A closer inspection of the model fit in each country suggested that the lack of metric invariance was mainly due to the misfit of the model in China. Indeed, across six of the seven countries

(excluding China), we were able to establish metric invariance of the identification scales.

Achieving metric invariance across all countries except China shows that in the Chinese sample, some items did not load onto glorification or attachment in the same manner or with similar magnitude as in the other six countries. The modification indices (Supplementary Analysis 3) suggested that two of the four attachment items may have cross-loaded onto glorification. This observation is consistent with our speculation that attachment and glorification might not be easily distinguished in cultures that value highly deference and loyalty (e.g., vertically collectivist cultures). Clearly, such a speculation needs to be tested systematically in future cross-cultural research.

The current findings raise caution for using the same scales to measure national identification in different countries. First, not all items captured the latent constructs that they were intended to capture, especially in China. Second, even in countries that are typically considered to share similar cultures (e.g., WEIRD countries; Henrich et al., 2010), participants did not endorse the identification items to the same extent, but showed diverging response tendencies, as demonstrated by the lack of scalar or strong invariance across the six Western countries. The lack of scalar invariance indicates that we cannot meaningfully interpret differences in group means of glorification or attachment between countries.

Despite these limitations in administering the same scales in different national and cultural contexts, our results also show that the scales were metrically invariant across most countries. This property allowed us to further explore the generalizability of the downstream implications of attachment and glorification for attitudes towards CRS. It also provides a foundation for future research exploring the inter-group correlates and consequences of national identification from a cross-cultural perspective.

## 7.2 | Implications for conflict resolution

Among the five countries (Australia, USA, UK, France and Germany) where the scales for both the predictor and outcome variables were metrically invariant, we found differential relationships between attachment and glorification on the one hand, and support for diplomatic and military CRS on the other. In the context of the conflict with Iran, attachment predicted stronger support for diplomacy, whereas glorification predicted stronger support for military CRS. Importantly, these relationships generalized across these five countries. A similar pattern emerged in Israel in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, such that attachment promoted diplomacy, whereas glorification promoted military CRS. In addition, glorification predicted less support for diplomacy. It should be noted that the  $R^2$ s for diplomatic and military CRS (Table 6) indicated that only a small to medium portion of the variances in each DV was explained by national glorification and attachment. This is not surprising, however, considering that group identification is only one of the many psychological mechanisms explaining intergroup outcomes.



**TABLE 4** Model fit comparisons between different invariance models for national identification across all seven countries<sup>a</sup> and across six countries<sup>b</sup>

Model	CFI	RMSEA	SRMR	$\Delta$ CFI	$\Delta$ RMSEA	$\Delta$ SRMR	Decision
<b>Seven countries</b>							
M1: Configural invariance	.963	.096	.038	-	-	-	-
M2: Metric invariance	.939	.106	.069	-.023	.010	.031	Reject
M3: Scalar invariance	.746	.187	.107	-.123	.059	.038	Reject
<b>Six countries (without China)</b>							
M1: Configural invariance	.967	.091	.042	-	-	-	-
M2: Metric invariance	.962	.086	.053	-.005	-.005	.011	Accept
M3: Scalar invariance	.849	.153	.100	-.113	.068	.047	Reject

<sup>a</sup>Australia, UK, USA, France, Germany, Israel and China.

<sup>b</sup>Australia, UK, and USA, France, Germany and Israel.

Taken together, these findings provide the first cross-cultural evidence for the divergent implications of national attachment and glorification for intergroup conflict. One exception was China, where neither glorification nor attachment predicted support for CRS. The non-significant relationships between identification and CRS might be due to measurement issues (as indicated by the lack of metric invariance for identification), or differences in the relationships themselves, or peculiarities of the conflict with Taiwan. Regarding the conflict, China was the only country where participants preferred military over diplomatic CRS (Table 2). Future research in similar cultural contexts can therefore benefit from paying particular attention to the psychometric properties of measures of national identification (e.g., inspecting the factorial structure) when interpreting their correlates with other psychological constructs. It can also benefit from selecting a variety of conflict contexts to further explore the implications of attachment and glorification for conflict resolution.

Overall, our findings echo the previous research that has repeatedly demonstrated the detrimental role of glorification in intergroup conflict (e.g., Li et al., 2016; Li et al., 2018; Rovenpor et al., 2016). The current research also enhances the understanding of the role of attachment in conflict. Prior research has either only measured glorification but not attachment (Bilali, 2013; Uluğ et al., 2021), or produced rather mixed findings regarding the conflict implications of attachment (e.g., Leidner, 2015; Leidner et al., 2010; Li et al., 2016; Rovenpor et al., 2016). One potential conclusion drawn from the mixed findings is that whereas glorification is a robust and consistent predictor of negative intergroup outcomes, the role of attachment in intergroup relations is more variable, depending on the intergroup context and outcome of interest. In the current study, we focused on preferences for different CRS as the outcome, and provided cross-national evidence (with the exception of China) for a positive link between national attachment and support for diplomatic CRS. While it remains to be tested whether the observed constructive role of attachment in conflict would generalise to other contexts and other intergroup outcomes, our methodological approach has several advantages that raise our confidence in a valid estimation of a positive link between attachment and preferences for diplomacy. First, our use of multiple regressions ensured

that attachment and glorification were always considered simultaneously when predicting CRS. In other words, our results revealed the unique relationship between attachment and CRS while controlling for glorification, and vice versa. Second, we used attachment and glorification as latent rather than manifest factors when predicting CRS, which produced more accurate estimates by taking into account measurement errors. Finally, the cross-national approach, while limited in its selection of countries and contexts, serves as an important initial step towards addressing the issue of generalizability in previous research.

Group identification has long been argued to initiate, sustain, or even exacerbate conflicts (e.g., Roccas & Elster, 2012). Our research, however, suggests that a lack of emotional commitment to one's country would also not promote diplomatic CRS. In other words, certain types of identification (i.e., attachment without glorification) may actually be needed—in some intergroup contexts, at least—to motivate support for peaceful solutions to conflicts. This insight therefore contributes to the intergroup literature by challenging the widely accepted notion that strong identification generally plays a negative role in intergroup relations, and by presenting a more nuanced understanding of this critical construct. Our results also highlight the importance of considering both facets of group identification in tandem to arrive at a comprehensive account of the link between group identity and conflict resolution.

In addition to the clear links between glorification and military CRS and between attachment and diplomacy, the results did not reveal consistent relationships between attachment and military CRS or between glorification and diplomacy. In Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany, these relationships were non-significant, whereas exploratory analyses in Israel suggested that glorification predicted less support for diplomatic CRS. In line with previous research (Bizumic et al., 2013; Li et al., 2016), the current data provided further evidence that diplomatic and military CRS were distinct from each other, rather than representing polar opposites of the same construct. The negative relationship between glorification and support for diplomacy in Israel, as we speculate, could potentially be due to the specific policy implications of diplomatic CRS in the

**TABLE 5** Unstandardized and standardized factor loadings for the measurement models<sup>a</sup> (standard errors are in parentheses)

Country	Unstd. Loading (SE)	Std. Loading (SE)				
		Australia	USA	UK	France	Germany
<b>Australia, USA, UK, France, Germany</b>						
<b>Attachment</b>						
Item1	1.00	.76 (.03)	.81 (.02)	.83 (.02)	.83 (.02)	.82 (.02)
Item2	.91 (.03)	.67 (.04)	.82 (.02)	.82 (.02)	.84 (.02)	.84 (.02)
Item3	1.10 (.03)	.86 (.03)	.92 (.01)	.91 (.02)	.87 (.02)	.86 (.02)
Item4	.83 (.03)	.67 (.04)	.68 (.03)	.71 (.03)	.65 (.03)	.69 (.03)
<b>Glorification</b>						
Item2	1.00	.63 (.05)	.72 (.03)	.75 (.03)	.66 (.03)	.71 (.03)
Item3	1.12 (.05)	.70 (.05)	.79 (.03)	.76 (.03)	.64 (.03)	.71 (.03)
Item4	1.05 (.05)	.60 (.05)	.65 (.03)	.64 (.03)	.67 (.04)	.70 (.03)
<b>Diplomatic CRS</b>						
Item1	1.00	.83 (.03)	.78 (.02)	.78 (.02)	.85 (.02)	.78 (.02)
Item2	.80 (.05)	.35 (.03)	.47 (.03)	.47 (.03)	.51 (.03)	.51 (.03)
Item3	.95 (.03)	.68 (.04)	.75 (.03)	.74 (.03)	.82 (.02)	.64 (.03)
Item4	1.08 (.03)	.77 (.03)	.83 (.02)	.81 (.02)	.87 (.02)	.87 (.02)
Item5	1.04 (.03)	.72 (.04)	.74 (.03)	.81 (.02)	.87 (.02)	.73 (.02)
<b>Military CRS</b>						
Item1	1.00	.71 (.03)	.76 (.02)	.76 (.02)	.74 (.02)	.79 (.02)
Item2	.97 (.04)	.63 (.03)	.70 (.02)	.66 (.03)	.77 (.02)	.67 (.02)
Item3	1.15 (.03)	.89 (.02)	.88 (.01)	.82 (.02)	.87 (.02)	.87 (.02)
Item4	1.12 (.03)	.95 (.01)	.91 (.01)	.86 (.02)	.91 (.01)	.88 (.01)
Item5	1.20 (.04)	.87 (.02)	.91 (.01)	.89 (.02)	.90 (.01)	.85 (.02)
<b>Israel</b>						
<b>Attachment</b>						
Item1	1.00			.82 (.03)		
Item2	1.00 (.08)			.86 (.03)		
Item3	1.12 (.08)			.90 (.02)		
Item4	.66 (.09)			.54 (.060)		
<b>Glorification</b>						
Item2	1.00			.80 (.05)		
Item3	1.11 (.13)			.79 (.05)		
Item4	.83 (.11)			.62 (.06)		
<b>Diplomatic CRS</b>						
Item1	1.00			.96 (.01)		
Item2	.98 (.04)			.94 (.01)		
Item3	1.00 (.05)			.88 (.02)		
<b>Military CRS</b>						
Item1	1.00			.92 (.02)		
Item2	1.05 (.05)			.94 (.01)		
Item3	.87 (.06)			.80 (.03)		
Item4	.98 (.05)			.88 (.02)		
<b>China</b>						

(Continues)

TABLE 5 (Continued)

Country	Unstd. Loading (SE)	Std. Loading (SE)
<b>Attachment</b>		
Item1	1.00	.76 (.03)
Item2	1.59 (.10)	.91 (.02)
Item3	1.66 (.10)	.92 (.02)
Item4	.82 (.09)	.56 (.04)
<b>Glorification</b>		
Item2	1.00	.52 (.06)
Item3	1.57 (.26)	.55 (.06)
Item4	1.39 (.24)	.51 (.06)
<b>Diplomatic CRS</b>		
Item1	1.00	.76 (.04)
Item2	.58 (.07)	.58 (.05)
Item3	.98 (.09)	.82 (.04)
<b>Military CRS</b>		
Item1	1.00	.69 (.05)
Item2	1.28 (.15)	.73 (.05)

<sup>a</sup>Results are based on the multi-group SEM for Australia, UK and USA, France and Germany, and separate SEMs for Israel and China. In the multi-group SEM, factor loadings were restricted to equality across countries.

Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Diplomacy in this context is associated with territorial compromise and acceptance of the two-state solution (Hirschberger et al., 2016). Whereas high glorifiers in the other five countries might perceive relatively little harm in their own country's diplomatic negotiations with Iran, highly glorifying (Jewish) Israelis may strongly oppose compromises on territories that carry religious and cultural significance to them.

### 7.3 | Limitations and future directions

The current study has several limitations. First, we dropped one of the four items intended to measure glorification due to its low reliability. Potentially, the low factor loading of this item might be attributed to our use of a shortened version of the original identification scales. Even though the psychometric properties of the three-item scale of glorification were acceptable (in terms of factor loadings, error variances and internal consistencies) in six out of seven countries, the internal consistencies of the attachment scale were higher in all countries. This suggests that the items intended to capture attachment might be more homogeneous compared to those intended to capture glorification. For future research, it seems recommendable to employ the original 8-item scale for measuring glorification as a potentially more heterogeneous construct.

Second, the studies in Israel and China employed different study designs and different measures of CRS. Moreover, due to the different sampling approaches (see [Supplementary Materials](#)), the Chinese sample was on average younger than the samples in the other countries.

While adding these two countries expanded the geographical diversity of our samples, these differences could serve as additional explanations for the lack of measurement invariance of national identification across all seven countries. The use of different conflict scenarios and CRS scales in Israel and China also precluded the possibility of testing their measurement invariance and directly comparing the relationships between them and identification in a single SEM across all samples. It thus remains unclear whether the items equivalently captured military and diplomatic CRS across all countries. The diversity in the conflict scenarios, however, also comes with an important advantage as it allowed us to explore whether the findings would generalize to different kinds of conflict settings. The unique negative relationship between glorification and support for diplomacy in Israel and the lack of relationship between both facets of identification and CRS in China speak to the need to extend conflict research to diverse geopolitical settings in future work.

It is also worth noting that while the use of the same conflict scenario and CRS items in the main project allowed us to also scrutinize the invariance of the outcome variables, this methodological approach inevitably limited the extent to which we can generalise the conclusions to other conflict contexts. Moreover, the tension with Iran over its nuclear programme arguably carries different significance to the five countries, with the United States being the most involved in the conflict.<sup>3</sup> Nonetheless, Iran's nuclear programme has been a realistic

<sup>3</sup> The data collection took place after the United States withdrew from the Iran Nuclear Deal. While the withdrawal had intensified the conflict between the United States and Iran, it was unclear whether or how it might have affected the relationships between glorification and attachment on the one hand, and support for different CRS on the other.

**TABLE 6** Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis, covariances, and R Squared (for CRS)<sup>a</sup>

Country	Diplomatic CRS	Military CRS	Covariance
<b>Australia</b>			
Attachment	.15*** (.04)	-.08 (.04)	
Glorification	-.08 (.05)	.49*** (.07)	
Attachment ~~ Glorification			.51***
Diplomatic ~~ Military CRS			-.40***
R <sup>2</sup>	.04	.14	
<b>USA</b>			
Attachment	.15*** (.04)	-.08 (.04)	
Glorification	-.08 (.05)	.49*** (.07)	
Attachment ~~ Glorification			1.17***
Diplomatic ~~ Military CRS			-.61***
R <sup>2</sup>	.02	.14	
<b>UK</b>			
Attachment	.15*** (.04)	-.08 (.04)	
Glorification	-.08 (.05)	.49*** (.07)	
Attachment ~~ Glorification			.70***
Diplomatic ~~ Military CRS			-.50***
R <sup>2</sup>	.03	.13	
<b>France</b>			
Attachment	.15*** (.04)	-.08 (.04)	
Glorification	-.08 (.05)	.49*** (.07)	
Attachment ~~ Glorification			.84***
Diplomatic ~~ Military CRS			-.69***
R <sup>2</sup>	.02	.08	
<b>Germany</b>			
Attachment	.15*** (.04)	-.08 (.04)	
Glorification	-.08 (.05)	.49*** (.07)	
Attachment ~~ Glorification			.96***
Diplomatic ~~ Military CRS			-.56***
R <sup>2</sup>	.02	.09	
<b>Israel</b>			
Attachment	.58*** (.14)	.01 (.15)	
Glorification	-.50** (.13)	.42** (.14)	
Attachment ~~ Glorification			.46***
Diplomatic ~~ Military CRS			-1.48***
R <sup>2</sup>	.15	.077	
<b>China</b>			
Attachment	-.33 (.34)	.36 (.21)	
Glorification	.41 (.50)	.41 (.32)	
Attachment ~~ Glorification			.25***
Diplomatic ~~ Military CRS			-.64***
R <sup>2</sup>	.011	.24	

<sup>a</sup>Results are based on the multi-group SEM for Australia, UK and USA, France and Germany, and separate SEMs for Israel and China. In the multi-group SEM, regression weights were restricted to equality across countries.

~~: Covariance; \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ ; All intercepts were 0.

threat to all five countries and they have been close allies in relevant international negotiations, which ensured the validity of the CRS measures.

Third, while we aimed to expand the geographical focus of prior research to non-Western countries, our sample included only one East Asian country. It thus remains an open question whether the observed measurement issue in China and the speculation that glorification and attachment might overlap to a larger extent would generalize to other cultures characterized by vertical collectivism. It would be beneficial for future research to sample from a larger number of countries that vary systematically on this key cultural dimension. Such a multi-national approach would provide further insights into the bi-dimensional model of glorification and attachment, and also contribute to our understanding of CRS from a cross-cultural perspective.

Finally, the samples included in the current study were not nationally representative, which limits our ability to generalize the findings to the national populations. Relatedly, while the samples in Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom included sizable racial or ethnic minorities, those groups were not large enough to allow us to statistically test whether they similarly distinguished between attachment and glorification, or whether these two facets of national identification also differentially predicted their support for CRS, as compared to the majority groups. Future research is therefore warranted to examine whether the bi-dimensional conceptualization of national identification and its implications for conflict resolution are generalizable to minority groups.

## 8 | CONCLUSIONS

The current research makes an important contribution to the intergroup and the cross-cultural literature. As a basis for future cross-cultural research, it established that the basic two-dimensional structure of national identification was metrically invariant across countries, except China. Importantly, generalised across diverse international contexts, attachment and glorification differentially predicted endorsement of diplomatic versus military CRS. These findings reveal that whereas certain facets of ingroup identification can initiate, sustain or exacerbate intergroup conflict, others may be necessary for peaceful conflict resolution. This work therefore has the potential to inspire future cross-cultural research on intergroup conflicts and the complex role of group identification.

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## CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

## ETHICS STATEMENT

The research adheres to the ethical guidelines specified in the APA Code of Conduct as well as authors' national ethics guidelines. We obtained consent from all participants prior to their inclusion in the research.

## DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

All study materials, data, and R script are available at [https://osf.io/mh7ct/?view\\_only=b6a58bc7b431420ba02d4188edb9e822](https://osf.io/mh7ct/?view_only=b6a58bc7b431420ba02d4188edb9e822)

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## SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Additional supporting information can be found online in the Supporting Information section at the end of this article.

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