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BY-NC-ND 4.0 license Open Access Published by De Gruyter 2020

16. Maverick: Experimentally Testing a Conjecture of the Antitrust Authorities

From the book Advances in the Sociology of Trust and Cooperation

Christoph Engel and Axel Ockenfels
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110647495-016
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Abstract

Antitrust authorities all over the world are keen on the presence of a particularly aggressive competitor, a “maverick”. Yet there is a lack of theoretical justification. One plausible determinant of acting as a maverick is behavioral: the maverick derives utility from acting competitively. We test this conjecture in the lab. In a pretest, we classify participants by their social value orientation. Individuals who are rivalistic in an allocation task indeed bid more aggressively in a laboratory oligopoly market. This disciplines incumbents. We conclude that the existence of rivalistic attitudes may justify antitrust policies that protect mavericks.

© 2020 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Munich/Boston
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From the book
Advances in the Sociology of Trust and Cooperation
Advances in the Sociology of Trust and Cooperation

Chapters in this book (26)

Frontmatter
Contents
1. Complementary Studies on Trust and Cooperation in Social Settings: An Introduction
Part I: Theoretical Contributions
2. Institutional Design and Human Motivation: The Role of Homo Economicus Assumptions
3. Rational Choice Theory, the Model of Frame Selection and Other Dual-Process Theories. A Critical Comparison
4. Too Simple Models in Sociology: The Case of Exchange
5. Rational Exploitation of the Core by the Periphery? On the Collective (In)efficiency of Endogenous Enforcement of Universal Conditional Cooperation in a Core-Periphery Network
6. Reputation Effects, Embeddedness, and Granovetter’s Error
7. Robustness of Reputation Cascades
8. Organized Distrust: If it is there and that Effective, Why Three Recent Scandals?
9. Polarization and Radicalization in the Bounded Confidence Model: A Computer-Aided Speculation
10. Local Brokerage Positions and Access to Unique Information
11. Who Gets How Much in Which Relation? A Flexible Theory of Profit Splits in Networks and its Application to Complex Structures
Part II: Experimental Tests
12. Social Identity and Social Value Orientations
13. Does Money Change Everything? Priming Experiments in Situations of Strategic Interaction
14. Social Norms and Commitments in Cooperatives – Experimental Evidence
15. Rational Choice or Framing? Two Approaches to Explain the Patterns in the Fehr-Gächter-Experiments on Cooperation and Punishment in the Contribution to Public Goods
16. Maverick: Experimentally Testing a Conjecture of the Antitrust Authorities
17. Cooperation, Reputation Effects, and Network Dynamics: Experimental Evidence
18. Comparing Consequences of Carrots and Sticks on Cooperation in Repeated Public Good Games
Part III: Field Studies
19. A Sociological View on Hierarchical Failure: The Effect of Organizational Rules on Exchange Performance in Buyer- Supplier Transactions
20. Organizational Innovativeness Through Inter-Organizational Ties
21. A Transaction Cost Approach to Informal Care
22. Trust is Good – Or is Control Better? Trust and Informal Control in Dutch Neighborhoods – Their Association and Consequences
23. Religious Diversity and Social Cohesion in German Classrooms: A Micro-Macro Study Based on Empirical Simulations
Notes on the Editors and Contributors
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