

Europe and North America), the concern for face remains nevertheless relevant, even if expressed in a more understated way.

The consolidation of psychology research on the social self and social identity has opened up new contexts of relevance for the dynamics of face and face-work, calling on a modified model of face and politeness that breaks free from the straitjacket of cognitivist psychology. Another exciting development is the emergence of indigenous psychologies from Asia and Africa which, instead of testing Western formulations, may develop their own analytical models and constructs to make true crosscultural comparison possible.

Future of Face Research

For all the criticism of ethnocentrism that their model has generated, Brown and Levinson's work can boast an unmatched and continuing level of interest within the field of linguistic politeness research. Twenty years on, new insights from social and cultural psychology point in the direction of a culture-situated, dynamic understanding of face that gives consideration to other factors such as personal values, one's own self-concept, self-identity in various groupings, role expectations, and normative constraints (Earley, 1997: 95–97). After years of established disciplinary research in politeness, especially in anthropology and linguistics, face is becoming a privileged topic for interdisciplinary research. In addition, its cultural sensitivity calls for more international collaborative research if its sociocultural and philosophical roots are to be uncovered for further comparative analysis.

On a more abstract level, one could imagine face as a bridging concept between interpersonal interaction and social order in the sense that face, at the micro-level of verbal and nonverbal behavior,

encapsulates and dynamically displays the manifestations of (macro-level) cultural values. Situated discourse would thus become the epistemological locus where observation and interpretation of face and face-work take place as within their most expressive environment. Alongside psychologists, anthropologists, and sociologists, in future social theorists may be called upon to explore a powerful construct that thus far has occupied but not yet exhausted the endeavors of most politeness scholars.

See also: Durkheim, Emile (1858–1917); Goffman, Erving (1922–1982); Intercultural Pragmatics and Communication; Politeness.

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Factivity

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Factivity is a semantic property of certain predicates, factive predicates, which take an embedded S-structure, preferably a *that* clause, as subject or object. The *that* clause of a factive predicate P is presupposed to be true when P is the main lexical predicate of a main clause (directly under a speech

act of assertion, question, wish, command, etc.). Examples of factive predicates with factive object clauses are *know*, *realize*, and *have forgotten*. Usually the so-called affective factives are included, such as *regret*, *deplore*, and *be delighted*. (*Un*)*forgivable*, *pity*, and *regrettable* are predicates with factive subject clauses. Thus, *What a pity that she has left* presupposes that she has left. And *He hasn't forgotten that Jack played a trick on him* (with presupposition-preserving *not*) presupposes that Jack played a trick on him.

Sometimes a predicate may take a sentential subject as well as a sentential object clause. Such double-complementation predicates are invariably factive with respect to their subject clause. For example, a sentence such as *That the butler had blood on his shirt suggested that he was the murderer* presupposes that the butler had blood on his shirt. This is a general, and so far unexplained, property of verbs that take double complementation.

Factive verbs are intensional in that they block substitution *salva veritate* of coreferential terms: *Luke realizes that the Morning Star is uninhabited* does not have the same truth conditions as *Luke realizes that the Evening Star is uninhabited*.

Some predicates are ‘antifactive,’ in that they induce a presupposition of the falsity of the embedded *that* clause. For example, *be under the illusion* is an antifactive predicate (likewise for the German *wähnen*, used by Frege (1892: 47) in the first modern observation of factivity).

In modern times, factivity was brought to the attention of the linguistic world by Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971), who pointed out that factivity is

not only a semantic but also a syntactic property, as factive predicates share a number of syntactic properties, in particular the impossibility of Subject Raising from the embedded clause, and the possibility of replacing *that* with the complex NP *the fact that*. The only exception is the prototypical factive verb *know*, which behaves syntactically as a nonfactive verb. This problem may be solved by assuming that *know* has lexically incorporated the NP *the fact* as part of its object clause, reducing the complex NP *the fact that* to the simple complementizer *that*.

See also: Extensionality and Intensionality; Lexical Conditions; Presupposition.

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Canon Falc'hun was born in 1909 into a peasant family of North Finistère so he was a native speaker of Breton. He went to Lesneven College (or ‘*petit-séminaire*’) and prepared for priesthood in the Grand-Séminaire of Quimper. Soon after his ordination, he asked his bishop for authorization to go to Paris to study phonetics and Celtic studies. A researcher in the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique from 1939 on, he became a lecturer (1944) and Professor of Celtic (1952) in the Arts Faculty of Rennes. When Brest University was founded, he transferred there, which was near his own birthplace. From the age of 20 he suffered from tuberculosis, which obliged him to interrupt his work for long periods several times. He died in January 1991.

During his stay in Paris, Falc'hun recorded his own Breton language and studied its sounds with various instruments. He became particularly interested in ‘initial mutations’ in Breton, together with the exact pronunciation of consonant groups. His phonetic observations were also interpreted phonologically under the influence of M.-L. Sjoestedt-Jonval (Professor of Irish in the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes), who had written a thesis on the phonology of Kerry Irish. According to Falc'hun, Breton consonants are divided into strong (*fortes*) and soft (*douces, lenes*), in 12 pairs. In a stressed syllable (that is, in the penultimate for most of the dialects), a strong consonant always follows a short vowel, and a soft consonant follows a long vowel. The initial mutation, called ‘lenition’ (voicing of voiceless stops, spirantization of voiced stops, etc.), is based on the opposition between strong and soft consonants: in the case of resonants, the strong variants are softened by the ‘lenition.’ This mutation occurs in every context where the word would have been originally preceded by a word with a vocalic ending: the following initial consonant has been assimilated to the vowel,