Preface

The human personality is a sacred thing; one dare not violate it nor infringe its bounds, while at the same time the greatest good is in communion with others.

(Durkheim 1915: 299)

The reissue of ‘Universals in language usage: politeness phenomena’ over a decade after it was written perhaps calls for some explanation, especially as, for economy of production, we have had to minimize revisions to a new introduction and bibliography. One reason is that we believe the issues addressed there (and originally, or at least most influentially, by Goffman 1967, 1971) have a perennial importance, for they raise questions about the foundations of human social life and interaction. For example, in the original introduction to this work, Goody (1978a: 12) notes how the phenomena we review below seem to require an enormously complex kind of reflexive reasoning about other agents’ desires, and she suggests that this reasoning, with its roots in interpersonal ritual, ‘may be fundamental in an evolutionary sense to social life and human intelligence’. She goes on to suggest (1978a: 15), in the context of a discussion of ‘joking relations’, that it is the essence of these that they carry the ‘presumption of non-threatening intention’. From a gross ethological perspective, perhaps we can generalize somewhat: the problem for any social group is to control its internal aggression while retaining the potential for aggression both in internal social control and, especially, in external competitive relations with other groups (Maynard-Smith, in press). In this perspective politeness, deference and tact have a sociological significance altogether beyond the level of table manners and etiquette books (Goffman 1971: 90); politeness, like formal diplomatic protocol (for which it must surely be the model),
presupposes that potential for aggression as it seeks to disarm it, and makes possible communication between potentially aggressive parties. But how? Goffman suggests that it is through the diplomatic fiction of the virtual offence, 'or worst possible reading', of some action by A that potentially trespasses on B's interests, equanimity or personal preserve (1971: 138ff). By orienting to the 'virtual offence', an offender can display that he has the other's interests at heart. Equally, a failure to orient to the virtual offence counts as a diplomatic breach. Thus is constructed a precise semiotics of peaceful vs aggressive intentions (where the measure of precision is sometimes in fractions of a second – see, e.g., Davidson 1984), which in assigning such momentous significance to what are often trivial substantive acts requires a constant vigilance over the manner in which social interaction is conducted. This semiotic system is then responsible for the shaping of much everyday interaction and, in so shaping it, constitutes a potent form of social control.

But although issues of politeness raise sociological speculations of this scale, they also touch on many other interests and many other fields. The time at which this essay was first written was particularly propitious, for it witnessed the beginning of a confluence of interests in linguistics, anthropology and 'micro'-sociology. Since then signifiant advances have been made in the study of language use and social interaction. Issues bearing upon politeness have emerged as being of central interest in sociolinguistics, pragmatics, applied linguistics, social psychology, conversation analysis and anthropology, generating an enormous body of research bearing directly on our thesis. In this introduction we shall try to spell out these issues, evaluating recent work (but necessarily selectively) and its bearing on our original essay (see also the review essay by Lavandera, in press).

We shall not in this introduction summarize our thesis: this is done on pp. 59ff. [of Politeness.] We need only say here that the original essay attempts to show in considerable detail how certain precise parallels in language usage in many different languages can be shown to derive from certain assumptions about 'face' – individuals' self-esteem. We phrase the derivation in terms of three main strategies of politeness, 'positive politeness' (roughly, the expression of solidarity), 'negative politeness' (roughly, the expression of restraint) and 'off-record (politeness)' (roughly, the avoidance of unequivocal impositions), and claim that the uses of each are tied to social determinants, specifically the relationship between speaker and addressee and the potential offensiveness of the message content. If this account is even approximately along the right lines, we believe it has important implications for a number of issues and disciplines. Some of these we address at length in sections 7 and 83 of the essay, but let us highlight here the sorts of implications we believe it has for the disciplines concerned.

In the case of sociolinguistics, the theory argues for a shift in emphasis
from the current preoccupation with speaker-identity, to a focus on dyadic patterns of verbal interaction as the expression of social relationships; and from emphasis on the usage of linguistic forms, to an emphasis on the relation between form and complex inference. Further, interest in cultural detail, as in the ethnography of speaking, should be supplemented with attention to crosslinguistic generalizations. In the case of linguistic pragmatics a great deal of the mismatch between what is ‘said’ and what is ‘implicated’ can be attributed to politeness, so that concern with the ‘representational functions’ of language should be supplemented with attention to the ‘social functions’ of language, which seem to motivate much linguistic detail; applications of linguistics, whether to second-language learning or to inter-ethnic communication difficulties, need to pay proper attention to these essential ‘social functions’. The implication for sociology and anthropology is, first and most generally, that more attention should be given to the interactional basis of social life, if only to aid progress at other analytical levels – this because the area offers significant links across the divide between ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ levels of sociological analysis (Gal 1983). Second, the possibility of the reduction of ‘ritual’ to principles of rational action ought to be challenging to the Durkheimian thesis of the irreducibility of social facts. Third, politeness universals, together with their cultural skewings, suggest the need for a different kind of comparative sociology, attuned to just this sort of interplay, and alive to the possibility of interesting ethological underpinnings to human cultural elaborations.

These core issues and implications are still very much alive, and this introduction reviews some recent work that has a bearing on at least some of them and on the details of our account of politeness phenomena. In section 1.0 we attend to challenges to the general Gricean framework in which the theory is couched; in 2.0 we reassess some of our claims in the light of new evidence; in 3.0 we review a number of fields in which there happens to have been a great deal of work that has a bearing on our thesis; and in 4.0 we turn to directions for future research. However, in this discussion we must perforce presuppose familiarity with the framework developed in this book, and readers may prefer to return to this review after reading the body of the text.

1.0 General Framework

1.1 Gricean Framework

The original essay presumes that Grice’s theory of conversational implicature and the framework of maxims that give rise to such implicatures is essentially correct. (See pp. 94–5 [of Politeness] for a sketch of this framework, and discussion in Levinson 1983: ch. 3.) Naturally, such an
important theory has been subject to a number of attempts at revision. Horn (1984), for example, suggests that Grice’s four maxims, together with their nine sub-maxims, can in fact be reduced to three: retaining Quality and the first maxim of Quantity (his Q), the rest can be subsumed within an enlarged Relevance maxim (his R). Detailing a series of conflicting requirements based on Q and R, Horn suggests that our negative politeness is based on R-implicatures (‘hint, don’t say more than is necessary’), while positive politeness is based on Q-implicatures (‘say as much as required’), with a consequent tension between the two strategies. More radical still is the Sperber and Wilson attempt (1986; see also Wilson and Sperber 1981) to reduce all the maxims to one super-maxim of Relevance, which is less of a maxim (on their view) than a natural human propensity to maximize the informational value of environmental stimuli. On this view, implicatures of politeness would presumably arise in the same way that all implicatures do; namely, on the assumption that what the speaker said was relevant (maximized information pertinent to the context), certain (polite) presumptions would have to be made.

There are places in which the original essay relies on the classical Gricean formulation, for example in the discussion of the ‘off-record’ strategies in section 5.5 [of Politeness]. However, the only essential presumption is what is at the heart of Grice’s proposals, namely, that there is a working assumption by conversationalists of the rational and efficient nature of talk. It is against that assumption that polite ways of talking show up as deviations, requiring rational explanation on the part of the recipient, who finds in considerations of politeness reasons for the speaker’s apparent irrationality or inefficiency. In any case, we do not believe that these recent modifications of the Gricean programme are wholly successful, and specifically do not consider that wholesale reduction of the maxims has been well motivated (see Levinson, in press).

Another recent proposal by Leech (1983), in a quite contrary spirit, suggests that the Gricean framework of maxims should be proliferated: the field of linguistic pragmatics is the study of goal-directed linguistic behaviour, and this is governed by a ‘textual rhetoric’ and an ‘interpersonal rhetoric’, each constituted by a set of maxims. Thus within the ‘interpersonal rhetoric’ we find not only Grice’s Cooperative Principle (CP), with all the maxims in their traditional form, but also a Politeness Principle (PP), with six (or more) maxims of Tact, Generosity, Approbation, Modesty, etc. (Leech 1983: 16, 132). That the CP and PP are coordinate principles is shown, he claims, by the fact that, without the PP, the CP would make erroneous predictions – the PP explains why, despite the maxims of Quality and Quantity, people sometimes quite appropriately say things that are false or less informative than is required (pp. 80–1).

There are a number of reasons for resisting this line of argument. One is that, if we are permitted to invent a maxim for every regularity in language
use, not only will we have an infinite number of maxims, but pragmatic theory will be too unconstrained to permit the recognition of any counter-examples. A second is that the distribution of politeness (who has to be polite to whom) is socially controlled: it is not as if there were some basic modicum of politeness owed by each to all; in contrast, language usage principles of the Gricean sort do indeed generally obtain, principled exceptions though there are. Another reason is more pertinent to this book: every discernable pattern of language use does not, eo ipso, require a maxim or principle to produce it. The Gricean maxims are not merely statements of regular patterns in behaviour; they are background presumptions, which by virtue of that special status are robust to apparent counter-evidence. Thus a partial answer to a question does not typically undermine the presumption of cooperation; it is more likely to be interpreted as (say) implicating inability to meet the requisite canons of factual information. In other words, the assumption of cooperative behaviour is actually hard to undermine: tokens of apparent uncooperative behaviour tend to get interpreted as in fact cooperative at a ‘deeper level’. Now if politeness principles had maxim-like status, we would expect the same robustness: it should, as a matter of fact, be hard to be impolite. Instead, when one said ‘Shut your mouth’ or the like, we would expect an attempt to construct an inference of the sort: ‘The speaker has broken the maxim of Tact (or some such subprinciple); however, given the Politeness Principle, we must assume that the speaker is in fact following the PP; the only way to preserve this assumption is to assume that he is not in a position to observe the maxim of Tact, say, because he is in a hurry; it is clear that we can work this out; therefore he P-implicates that he is in a hurry.’ We take this to be a reductio, and an argument against setting up politeness principles as coordinate in nature to Grice’s cooperative Principle (see also Kasher [1986]).

Our own position, as developed below, is that Grice’s CP (however it is finally conceptualized) is of quite different status from that of politeness principles. The CP defines an ‘unmarked’ or socially neutral (indeed asocial) presumptive framework for communication; the essential assumption is ‘no deviation from rational efficiency without a reason’. Politeness principles are, however, just such principled reasons for deviation. Linguistic politeness is therefore implicated in the classical way, with maximum theoretical parsimony, from the CP. It is true, however, that polite motivations for such deviations perhaps have a special status in social interaction by virtue of their omin-relevance. Nevertheless, this omin-relevance does not endow them with the presumptive nature enjoyed by the CP: politeness has to be communicated, and the absence of communicated politeness may, ceteris paribus, be taken as absence of the polite attitude. (And, incidentally, the specific phenomena motivating every one of Leech’s six politeness maxims were discussed and, it seems to us, quite adequately accounted for by our more parsimonious apparatus.)
In our model, then, it is the mutual awareness of ‘face’ sensitivity, and the kinds of means–ends reasoning that this induces, that together with the CP allows the inference of implicatures of politeness. From the failure to meet the maxims at face value, plus the knowledge of face-preserving strategies, the inferences are derived. However, recent work does suggest that this model is somewhat under-described. Instead of deriving the details of linguistic form directly from face-preserving strategies as we attempt, it may be better to let the mechanisms of generalized conversational implicature get us halfway, as it were. We can do this by showing how the details of the linguistic forms, and specifically their semantic structure, invite certain general inferences independently of face considerations (see Atlas and Levinson 1981; Leech 1983: 159ff; Levinson 1983: 122ff; and Sperber and Wilson 1986: ch. 4); we can then let face considerations take us to the more specific polite implicatures. Let us take an example from Leech (1983: ch. 7): why are the following, construed as offers, increasingly polite?

(1) Will you have anything to eat?
(2) Will you have something to eat?
(3) Won’t you have anything to eat?
(4) Won’t you have something to eat?

Leech’s argument goes very roughly as follows. The ‘negative polarity’ form anything indicates non-factuality, and is therefore the normal quantifier required in polar questions (as in (1) and (4)), because a question, like a negative statement, does not presume the factual status of the proposition (or propositional function) expressed. In contrast, the ‘positive polarity’ item something (as in (2) and (4)) does presume factuality, and therefore forces a more complex analysis for the logical forms of sentences like (2) and (4) – as indicated by the following informal rendition of the contrast between (1) and (2):

(1’) I ask whether you will eat anything.
(2’) I ask whether it is a fact that you will eat something.

Here (2’) includes a proposition (‘it is a fact that p’) about a proposition (‘p’), without thereby adding much in the way of semantic content; there is therefore (Leech argues 1983: 166–71) a Manner implicature to the presumption that the embedded proposition (‘you will eat something’) is actively entertained in the context.³ On the assumption that the speaker entertains this proposition, he is presuming what is (supposedly) beneficial to the addressee, and given that to so presume is polite, the speaker in using (2) is being more polite than he would be by use of (1) with its simpler logical form.
In a similar way Leech gives an account of how the negative (3) is still more polite than the positive (1). As long noted, a negative statement is in general relatively uninformative; therefore, by the maxim of Quantity, we seek an explanation for the use of a negative statement, usually finding the explanation in the use of the negative to deny the positive, where the latter is entertained in the context. The polite interpretation of the question in (3) would appear to go thus: the speaker questions the addressee’s denial of the speaker’s implied assumption (entertained in the context) that the addressee will have something to eat. Thus the speaker attributes polite denial to the addressee, while giving him a chance to change his mind: the implicated import of the sentence may be glossed ‘I hope and expect you to have something to eat, but now it appears you will not have anything to eat; is this really so?’ (Leech 1983: 110). Sentence (4) of course compounds the polite implicatures from the use of the positive polarity something and the negative form (although there is more to it than that, as Leech 1983: 170 details). Again, generalized conversational implicature will get us part of the way to the polite interpretation, while specific assumptions about the nature of polite behaviour (in these examples, the nature of polite offers) will get us the rest.

Whatever the merits of this particular argument, the general line of account seems correct. However, it is clear that the ways in which morpho-syntactic options reflect differing semantic structures, which in turn induce contrastive implicatures, is exceedingly complex, and is likely to be the focus of a great deal of future work in linguistic pragmatics, work which in turn should throw considerable light on the details of the linguistic expression of politeness.

1.2 Intention and Strategies

Our framework presupposes the other great contribution by Grice, namely his account of the nature of communication as a special kind of intention designed to be recognized by the recipient (1971). That account itself presupposes that what agents do is related systematically to their intents, and thus that intentions of actors are reconstructable by observers or recipients of actions. The systematic relation is presumed to be given by some rational means–ends reasoning, of the sort sketched in 3.1.3 and 4.2 of the essay below.

Clearly such a framework begs a great number of questions, and it has been challenged on grounds as different as conceptual impossibility, psychological implausibility and cultural bias. Let us take these one by one. The conceptual difficulties with such a theory of communication centre on the apparently infinite regress involved in a recipient of a message trying to figure out what its sender reckoned the recipient would reckon the speaker would reckon (and so on, ad infinitum) the recipient might infer from the communicative behaviour in question. There have, since Grice’s original
essay, been various attempts to solve this philosophical puzzle, especially as it involves establishing the shared background of mutual knowledge on which the inference of communicative intention seems to rely (see, e.g., Schiffer 1972). Sperber and Wilson (1982, 1986) argue that some weaker concept of mutual manifestation will be sufficient to preserve the essence of the Gricean account.

As for the psychological implausibility of all this, Clark and Carlson (1982a, 1982b) have energetically defended the model, arguing that the regressive reasoning is finessed by simple heuristics. After all, the idea that ego has a model of alter’s beliefs about ego, and about ego’s beliefs about alter’s beliefs about ego, etc., seems altogether likely, up to some point. Further succour for the Gricean view may be given by recent work in artificial intelligence [AI], which has shown that, again up to a point, a machine may be programmed to take such factors into account, and that doing so lends naturalness to a verbal interchange between man and machine (see, especially, Allen 1983). The details of these AI programs offer some support for our sketch of the kinds of reasoning that might be involved: the programs contain inference rules that instantiate some of the most distinctive properties of the Kenny Logic we employed (compare Allen’s ‘nested planning rule’, 1983: 124, with p. 88 [of Politeness]). However, despite these attempts to show the plausibility and practicality of the Gricean account of communication, there is one very basic problem that has not been properly attended to. Our account, like these others, basically suggests that understanding is a matter of reconstructing speakers’ communicative intentions, and that this is done by running a logic of practical reasoning ‘backwards’ as it were. The essential problem here is a logical one: no logical system, including Kenny Logic, offers any way of going from conclusions back to premises — they are not symmetrical systems. Thus, even if we had a perfected system of means–ends reasoning, it would remain a conceptual mystery how we are able to reconstruct other agents’ intentions from their actions (Levinson 1985). Yet that we do so, or attempt to do so, is hardly open to question, and is presupposed by at least some uses of the term ‘strategy’, including ours (whatever its unclarities; see Riley 1981). And in the sense of that term in which people can be seen to be doing something before doing, or in order to do, something else, there is a great range of subtle evidence from conversation analysis of the routine use of strategy (Heritage 1981; Pomerantz 1980; Davidson 1984; Drew 1984; Levinson 1985; also work on ‘pre-sequences’, reviewed in Levinson 1983: 345ff).

We turn finally to the charge of cultural bias in the Gricean account of communication, and in our own emphasis on rational sources for behaviour. We foresaw this charge (p. 58 [of Politeness]), seeing that we appeared to be making the same sort of (alleged) error that economists make when looking at economic systems as divorced from the 'irrational-
ities' of social values (see, e.g., Sen 1979). Our defence still seems to us adequate: if we make the assumption of rationality, and the behavioural facts then tally, there must be something right about it. However, the a priori critique has now been joined by a line of counter-argument based on detailed ethnographic and sociolinguistic findings. In a number of recent studies of Pacific island societies, it has been claimed that cultural notions of personhood are sufficiently different to make the Western emphasis on the intentional agent of very dubious application there (Ochs 1984; Duranti 1983b, 1985; Rosaldo 1982; see also discussion in Schegloff, in press). These cultural ideas are then claimed to show up in the details of linguistic behaviour: thus Ochs (1984) claims that because Samoans do not share our Western emphasis on personal intentions, Samoans do not normally 'other-correct' (i.e. correct other speakers by guessing what they are trying to say; see Schegloff et al. 1977 for the relevant distinctions). She goes on to claim that the Gricean view of communication is nothing but our own folk theory canonized as philosophy (Ochs 1984: 335; see also Candlin 1981). Independently, Rosaldo (1982) attributes the absence of a speech act of promising among the Ilongots (a tribal group of the Philippines) to a lack of interest in personal sincere intentions (as opposed to public undertakings, expressed by oaths); this she claims undermines the cross-cultural applicability of Searle's speech act formulations, with their 'undue emphasis upon the speaker's psychological state' (p. 227). In both these societies, the emphasis appears to be on what is literally said, rather than on what might have been intended or implicated, and on the social consequences of what is said. The implication of these arguments is not merely that no inferences about politeness could be cross-culturally valid, but that there can be no universal framework of communication based on intention recognition.

It is hard to judge the import of these apparent ethnographic counter-examples to the Gricean framework. For example, Ochs (1984: 333) indicates that Samoan lower-status individuals (including all children) have to learn to take the perspective of higher-ranking individuals, and that surely would involve the attribution of intention: taking the perspective of others is indeed the heart of the Gricean account. At most, we think, these facts argue for a slight shift in emphasis in the relative importance of what is said vs what is implicated or attributed, a shift tied to the hoary sociological distinctions, variously conceived, between communities where positional status is emphasized and those where persons are treated as 'individuals'. Our particular claims will only be undermined by counter-examples of just the opposite kind from the Samoan facts, for example where only high-status individuals have to take account of the perspective of lower-status individuals; meanwhile, our framework successfully predicts the observed direction of perspective-taking, and does so partially on the basis of Gricean assumptions, which thus appear to survive the attack.
2.0 Reassessments

2.1 Some Reservations

It is natural that we should ourselves now have some reservations about certain aspects of the theory or its presentation, which we now record.

First, there are some obvious ways in which the presentation is, in places, somewhat dated. One of these is due to the fact that the frameworks of grammatical analysis now favoured are very different from the transformational framework that we are presupposing. However, this is mostly a matter of formulation, and does not affect our thesis in any appreciable way. Moreover, we may note that the Generative Semantics framework, long defunct, to which we refer occasionally below, had the great merit of directing serious attention to the relation between grammar and pragmatics, interests currently undergoing revival, sometimes with direct reference to the sorts of issues raised in this book (see, e.g., Horn 1984).9

Another framework that we would now rely on less heavily is speech act theory. At the time of writing we took this theory to provide a basis for a mode of discourse analysis, as others of empirical bent had also done (see, e.g., Labov and Fanshel 1977; by the time the paper went to press we already had reservations, p. 232ff [of Politeness]). For many reasons, we now think this not so promising (see, e.g., Levinson 1983: 286ff); speech act theory forces a sentence-based, speaker-oriented mode of analysis, requiring attribution of speech act categories where our own thesis requires that utterances are often equivocal in force. The alternative is to avoid taking such categories as the basis of discourse analysis, choosing other more directly demonstrable categories as done in conversation analysis, and then to give a derivative account of the intuitions underlying speech act theory. For example, the notion of a ‘request’ can in part be characterized as an utterance-type occurring in certain recurrent types of sequences of utterances, a view that escapes some of the conceptual problems of ‘indirect speech acts’ (see, e.g., Levinson 1983: 356ff; for recent developments in conversation analysis see below *3.4 [of Politeness]). In any case, we recognized (in section 6.3 [of the previous edition of Politeness]) that ‘face-threatening acts’, or FTAs, need not be realized in sentence-like units, and the upshot of all this is that we must now acknowledge that the speech act categories that we employed were an underanalysed shorthand, but one which, were we to try again today, would still be hard to avoid.

We also have some methodological reservations to record. One area where we have been rightly taken to task is for mixing data of quite different kinds: ours was an unholy amalgam of naturally occurring, elicited and intuitive data (which would have mattered less if it had been more clearly distinguished). The state of the art in discourse analysis would hardly let us get away with this today. However, there were certain intrinsic
difficulties in obtaining clearly parallel data in three languages, and the data were not (on the whole) collected specifically with this project in mind. In addition, we had frequent recourse to other published materials, with distinct goals and methods of their own. Thus any cross-linguistic project of this scope and ambition is going to have to make do with less than fully adequate data. This does not make the lapse any less regrettable, and we record it with regret. As a matter of record, though, nearly all examples of dialogue came from naturally occurring tape-recorded speech, with just a few examples of English dialogue constructed for illustrative purposes. Where grammatical points were being made, elicited data from Tamil and Tzeltal were frequently employed, but even here extensive use was made of recorded examples. Naturally, we did not feel free to construct examples in languages we are not native speakers of.

Third, we now have some doubts about the precision and falsifiability of our model. Our theory takes the classical form of expectations derived from initial premises (cf. the ‘hypothetico-deductive method’). However, since the reasoning linking premises to expectations is a practical reasoning whose formal properties are (to say the least) not fully understood, there is room for considerable ‘slippage’, especially as we in fact relied on an intuitive sense of means–ends relationships between goals and utterance-types. Another problem is that if we take some face-redressive goal like ‘be pessimistic about the success of the FTA’, this suggests that an utterance like ‘You don’t want to pass the salt’ should be polite; that it is not, of course, is due to the fact that it attributes impolite desires to the addressee: in short, our system ‘over-generates’ and needs to be complemented with a set of ‘filters’ that check that a chosen utterance form has no impolite implicatures for other reasons (as outlined in *1.1 above), as in this case it does because of a rather complex reflexive reasoning that takes account of the implied presumptions about the addressee’s beliefs (see Leech 1983: 170). We are thus less sanguine now than we were about the possibility of real precision in this area because of the enormous complexities of the reasoning involved.

In a related way, we may have over-claimed about the ‘precision’ of our system as an ethnographic tool, a means of discovering the nature of social relationships in a culture. The method relies on our equation that the ‘gravity’ of an FTA is a function of the social relation between speaker and addressee on the one hand and the intrinsic face-threatening content of the FTA on the other (our ‘R’ factor). One problem here is that we underplay the influence of other factors, especially the presence of third parties, which we now know to have much more profound effects on verbal interaction than we had thought (see Bell 1984; Goffman 1981, on ‘footing’). Another problem is that to use the method as an ethnographic tool, one needs to know a lot about the particular cultural factors involved in the assignment of R-values; for example, one needs to know that asking where
someone is going is impolite in Tamil, we think because of cultural concepts of destiny. Without this knowledge, no computation of perceived social relationships from language usage is sound.

However, where R-factors and the influences of audiences are understood, and where generalizations are taken from sufficient instances of observed language usage, it is indeed possible to use the distribution of polite forms as a highly sensitive index of the distribution of social equality and inequality and intimacy and distance, as shown (we believe), for example, by Brown (1979, 1980) and Levinson (1982).

If our theory is perhaps less precisely articulated than we thought, the doubt may arise that it is in fact so loose that it makes claims verging on the vacuous, the unfalsifiable. Consider, for example, our prediction that an off-record strategy should be associated with large requests, or distant or elevated addressees. However, we note that utterances that have the ‘hint’-like nature of off-record utterances may be used in circumstances where no defensible alternative interpretation is available, i.e. they are in fact ‘on-record’, in which case they may occur with lesser requests or to less distant or elevated addressees. The problem here of course is that it is not so easy to verify empirically some notion like ‘having in context only one defensible interpretation’.

In any case, though we admit that there are areas of our theory that may be hard to test empirically, there is no doubt that the theory makes strong (perhaps overstrong) predictions: for example, the asymmetry of strategy choice between participants in asymmetrical social relationships of authority/subservience, and the exact nature of that asymmetry with more face-redressive strategies employed by the lower-rankng participant. Thus there would be many kinds of clear counter-examples to the theory, none of which seem to have been substantiated, although there have been a number of experimental results at least in part contrary to our predictions. We now turn to these, and to other considerations provoking reassessment of some of our particular claims.

2.2 Detailed Reassessments

There have been a number of reports of empirical tests of our specific claims, including some attempts to operationalize and quantify those claims, and there has been a great deal of detailed work on particular usage phenomena which we incorporated, often fairly cursorily, in positive and negative politeness strategies – work, for example, on honorifics, on speech acts of particular sorts, on use of grammatical features like the ‘vivid present’, the passive and dative, particles and evidentials, and on conversational uses of irony and metaphor. We will briefly assess a selection from this work in relation to modifications to our general and specific arguments.
2.2.1 Cultural Notions of ‘Face’

Central to our model is a highly abstract notion of ‘face’ which consists of two specific kinds of desires (‘face-wants’) attributed by interactants to one another: the desire to be unimpeded in one’s actions (negative face), and the desire (in some respects) to be approved of (positive face). This is the bare bones of a notion of face which (we argue) is universal, but which in any particular society we would expect to be the subject of much cultural elaboration. On the one hand, this core concept is subject to cultural specifications of many sorts – what kinds of acts threaten face, what sorts of persons have special rights to face-protection, and what kinds of personal style (in terms of things like graciousness, ease of social relations, etc.) are especially appreciated (see section 7.2 [of Politeness]). On the other hand notions of face naturally link up to some of the most fundamental cultural ideas about the nature of the social persona, honour and virtue, shame and redemption, and thus to religious concepts – points well made, for example, by Geertz’s (1960) description of Javanese religion.

Much can be found in traditional ethnographic description that bears on this field of concepts, and naturally it may be thought that our universalistic account is an inexcusable cultural denudation, or worse, ethnocentric projection. But our point is that despite the rich cultural elaborations, the core ideas have a striking familiarity. Take, for example, Yang’s (1945: 167-72) careful description of this conceptual domain in a Chinese village – he lists seven factors involved in losing or gaining face, each of which seems entirely in line with our own cultural assumptions, down to the same facial metaphor. Or, to take an example from the ethnography of speaking, where the focus has always been on cultural differences, Basso (1979), in a study of Western Apache Indian joking performances portraying Whitemen, says that ‘Whitemen and Apaches come to social encounters with conflicting ideas of what constitutes deferential comportment – ideas . . . ultimately grounded in conflicting conceptions of what it means to be a person and the kinds of actions that can discredit a person’s worth in public situations’ (1979: 64). However, perusal of his description of the details of Apache self-esteem and demeanour reveals little or nothing that conflicts with our universalistic distillation of face-wants into negative and positive face; Apaches differ from Whitemen not in their basic face-wants (for self-approval and freedom from imposition), but in definitions of who they want to attend to their positive face, and in the assessment of what constitute particularly threatening FTAs. So they see interaction in the manner of white American positive politeness, where behaviour appropriate to long-term intimates comes from semi-strangers, as irredeemably invasive of their person. (The same observation is made with respect to Athabaskans by Scollon and Scollon (1981), who found our framework of direct comparative utility.) Such cross-cultural conflicts grounded in different views
of what constitutes ‘good’ behaviour in interaction are precisely what our model was designed to accommodate (see *3.2).

It was, however, based in part on existing ethnographic descriptions of how different people elaborate notions of face, self-esteem, and personhood. Clearly, though, there is a need for more in the way of ethnographic descriptions of the ways in which people articulate face notions, rights to personal preserves, and how these affect daily life – how confrontations or shamings are managed, how people gossip (see Haviland 1977), how they clear their name from disparagement, and how face regard (and sanctions for face disregard) are incorporated in religious and political systems. A more specific issue, however, is whether our model collapses two kinds of politeness in an ethnocentric way. Harris (1984), for example, emphasizes the necessity of distinguishing between the institutional status-based requirements of face vs the more personal side of face which is involved in popular notions of tact and kindness to the personal, individual, feelings of others, a distinction which may partially correlate with on-record vs off-record forms of politeness. Attention to one aspect of face may be independent of attention to the other (so, for example, a doctor may be polite in informing his patient that he is dying, without being tactful, or vice versa).14 (Leech (1977, 1983) also makes this distinction, although quite differently, and we discuss this below.)

But it is not clear that our folk notion of tact is relevant in all societies. It perhaps reflects the bias of a culture obsessed with individual rights and wants, and so with tact (as, e.g., Wierzbicka 1985b claims). Rosaldo (1982), in a critique of speech act theory based on ethnography among the Philippine Ilongot, argues that the Ilongot do not interpret each others’ speech in terms of the expression of sincere feelings and intentions, but stress the expectations due to group membership, role structures, and situational constraints; her description suggests to us that Ilongot notions of politeness would minimize a component of tact. Such cultural differences doubtless exist and work down into the linguistic details of the particular face-redressive strategies preferred in a given society or group. Nevertheless, for the purposes of cross-cultural comparison developed here, we consider that our framework provides a primary descriptive format within which, or in contrast to which, such differences can be described.

Leech (1983) offers a somewhat different model for cross-cultural comparison of politeness strategies. He distinguishes ‘tact’ (1983: 109) from other modes of politeness on quite different lines, in terms of a maxim maximizing the benefit, and limiting the cost, to the addressee (which thus cross-cuts the categories of positive and negative politeness while capturing essential elements of both). He then contrasts a maxim of ‘tact’ (‘perhaps the most important kind of politeness in English-speaking society’ (1983: 107)) to maxims of generosity, modesty, approbation,
agreement and sympathy, and suggests that cross-cultural variability will lie in the relative importance given to one of these maxims vis-à-vis another (1983: 80). Thus he suggests that Japanese mores make it impossible to agree with praise by others of oneself, indicating that the maxim of modesty takes precedence in Japan over the maxim of agreement (1983: 136; but see Pomerantz 1978 for parallels in English). Only further cross-cultural work in this alternative framework will test its utility.  

2.2.2 P, D, R: Underanalysed?

In broad terms, research seems to support our claim that three sociological factors are crucial in determining the level of politeness which a speaker (S) will use to an addressee (H): these are relative power (P) of H over S, the social distance (D) between S and H, and the ranking of the imposition (R) involved in doing the face-threatening act (FTA). Grimshaw (1980a, 1980b, 1980c and 1983) gives prominence to the same three factors, as do (in different ways) Bates (1976), Lakoff (1977b), Lakoff and Tannen (1979) and Leech (1980, 1983). There is also strong experimental support in the compliance-gaining literature for the importance of the P and R factors in determining politeness assessments; for example, from Falbo and Peplau (1980), Baxter (1984), and Holtgraves (1984) (for the P variable), and from Cody, McLaughlin and Schneider (1981) and Lustig and King (1980), for the importance of R.

However, a number of experiments have shown opposing results to the predictions of our model for the D variable. For example, Holtgraves (1984) found that subjects judged a high degree of encoded politeness as indicating higher reciprocal liking between speaker and addressee, and Baxter (1984) found that subjects prescribed that they would use greater politeness for close (i.e. friend) relationships. Slugoiski (1985) argues this is due to the nature of friendship relationships, which do not legitimize instrumental goals (and hence are bald on record utterances), and that therefore our D variable should be further broken down to distinguish familiarity from affect (intimates don’t necessarily like each other, and liking predicts politeness directions which are opposite to those predicted by unfamiliarity). Slugoiski demonstrates that the distinction (between affect and social distance) is also necessary in interpreting ironic utterances as either insults or compliments.

Some of these results are fairly baffling, and (as the experimenters note) often equivocal with respect to our theory. But Slugoiski’s finding that ‘liking’ is so important in distinguishing an attack (insult) from an expression of admiration (compliment) is hardly surprising. Nevertheless, we can only concede that ‘liking’ might be an independent variable affecting choice of politeness strategy. If so, as Slugoiski argues (1985: 96), some more complex arithmetical compounding of these factors might be required. It would be interesting to investigate this by looking at cultures
where 'friendship' is less confounded with social distance; for example in India, where cross-caste friendships can be especially strong.

We pointed out (in 3.4.2 [of Politeness]) that P, D and R are composite categories which are compounded of culturally specific factors. For example, as Rosaldo (1982: 230) has argued, the composition of the P variable is very different in egalitarian as opposed to hierarchical societies. She goes on, though, to question whether variables like our P, D and R are too simple to capture the complexities of the ways in which members of different cultures assess the nature of social relationships and interpersonal behaviour.

In our view, P, D and R (as defined in 3.4.2 [of Politeness]) can be seen to subsume most of the culturally specific social determinants of FTA expression, but we must concede that there may be a residue of other factors which are not captured within the P, D and R dimensions. In addition to the liking factor, the presence of an audience is another, as we mentioned above, which operates in part to affect definitions of situational 'formality', and so enters into the context-variability of P, D and R assessments. It seems likely that formality (and other sorts of situation and setting classifications – see, e.g., Levinson 1979a; Brown and Fraser 1979) will have a principled effect on assessments of FTA danger, and there may well be cross-culturally valid generalizations as to the direction of this effect. (See Bloch 1975; Irvine 1979; Laver 1981; Atkinson 1982; for some recent discussions of interactional aspects of formality.)

Of course there are dimensions to social relations other than those of power and social distance that show up verbally in different ways – for example, coded social statuses like that of warrior or Brahmin, in South India (Levinson 1977), or the ade relationship among the Kaluli of New Guinea (Schieffelin 1984) – and we cannot hope to capture all the nuances of such relationships with our P, D and R variables (but see Stiles 1981). But for cross-cultural comparison these three, compounded of culturally specific dimensions of hierarchy, social distance and ranking of imposition, seem to do a remarkably adequate job in predicting politeness assessments.

2.2.3 On and Off Record, and the Hierarchy of Politeness

A related set of considerations arises in relation to the various attempts to verify (or discredit) our claims as to the intrinsic ranking of politeness strategies in terms of a cost/benefit analysis; in our schema, positive politeness precedes (is less face-redressive than) negative, and negative precedes off record, because of an assessment of the risks involved in choosing each of these super-strategies. (See definitions and discussion on pp. 68–74 [of Politeness].) First, two distinctions must be made: we must distinguish the overall ranking of these super-strategies from within-strategy ranking of politeness levels (for example, elaboration of politeness levels within conventionally indirect requests). And we must distinguish
overt behaviour – how speakers actually use these strategies in interaction, in relation to P, D and R assessments – from subjective ranking of perceived politeness. The questions we shall address here, then, are (1) to what extent is our cost/benefit analysis supported by this research? and (2) to what extent do subjective politeness rankings match those predicted by our model?

Experimental support for the cost/benefit approach has come from psychologists Clark and Schunk (1980, 1981), who demonstrated (contra Kemper and Thissen 1981) that experimental subjects do indeed rank English conventionally indirect speech acts in the order of politeness predicted by our theory (see pp. 142–44 [of Politeness]). (See also Walters 1980; Fraser and Nolan 1981, for similar rankings of indirect requests in Spanish; and Bates 1976, for Italian.)

On the other hand, certain weaknesses in our formulation have been suggested by other research attempting to apply our ranking system to new data. A number of workers have claimed (e.g. Harris 1984; Streeker, in preparation) that our super-strategies can be mixed in discourse, that is, that we may obtain, for example, positive politeness markers within negative politeness strategies like indirect requests or off-record positive politeness. To be true counter-examples to our claims it will not be sufficient to show that in a short stretch of talk between two interlocutors two or more strategies were employed. For that stretch might contain more than one FTA, each FTA with different R values, the distinct R values motivating different strategies. Nor will it be sufficient to show that hint-like utterances were used with explicit positive or negative face redress, for the ‘hints’ may in fact have been de facto on record. Nevertheless, these authors have persuaded us that we may have been in error to set up the three super-strategies, positive politeness, negative politeness, and off record, as ranked unidimensionally to achieve mutual exclusivity. However, one possible source of confusion here is this: when describing positive politeness, on the one hand, we included the use of ‘markers’ of social closeness like intimate address forms; and when describing negative politeness, on the other hand, we included the use of ‘markers’ of deference like honorifics. Now, although address forms and honorifics may, in certain cases which we described, be FTA-sensitive, i.e. the choice of a form and the choice to use them at all may be influenced by R-factors, yet on the whole such elements are tied relatively directly to the social relationship between speaker and addressee. The consequence of such direct ‘markers’ of social relationship is that they may occur with an FTA of any R-value, and thus equally with markers of positive and negative politeness; if shifts are permissible at all, we should merely expect a shift towards a more ‘formal’ address form than normally used (which may of course still be somewhat ‘intimate’) when R-values increase between the same interlocutors. Thus, certain aspects of, for example, positive politeness like ‘inti-
mate' address forms may happily occur in off-record usages motivated by high R factors. What we did not expect, and have not found, is that there might be a shift to more 'intimate' address forms with an increase in R.

One problem encountered in assessing the 'ranking' of positive as opposed to negative politeness is the different nature of the two. Scollon and Scollon (1981), who applied our model to the analysis of inter-ethnic interaction between Athabaskan Indians in Canada and native English-speakers, made the point that positive politeness, which is relevant to all aspects of a person's positive face, is a quite different phenomenon from negative politeness, which is specific for the particular FTA in hand. They argue that positive politeness is naturally escalated in interaction (a positively polite utterance is naturally responded to by one upgrading the degree of positive politeness), and hence unstable; in contrast, negative politeness, lacking the escalating feedback loop, tends to be stable, suggesting (implicitly) that these two super-strategies cannot be ranked on a unidimensional scale. However, while acknowledging the fundamental differences between positive and negative politeness, we do not see them as incompatible with a systematic use in one case versus another — their ranking follows naturally from the Durkheimian perspective: rituals of approach are for lesser deities, those of avoidance for the ultimate deity (Durkheim 1915).

Other research has challenged our intrinsic ranking of politeness super-strategies, suggesting, for example, that off-record requests might not always be ranked as more polite than negatively polite on-record indirect speech acts. Blum-Kulka (1985) found, in a series of experiments designed to test perceptions of politeness and indirectness in English and Hebrew, that the highest politeness level in both languages was awarded to negatively polite indirect speech acts and not to hints, off-record requests. She suggests that, in requests at any rate, politeness and indirectness are linked for conventional indirect requests but not necessarily in cases of non-conventional indirectness. In part this result may have been due to the experimental design: because of the use of off-record hints to do requests of a certain R level is limited to certain kinds of alters, in experimental scenarios subjects might well rank the off-record hints as less polite (since they would presume certain kinds of addressees). Furthermore, the request to rank 'politeness' level explicitly might conjure up associations of schoolbook notions of etiquette which do not fit happily with off-record unexplicitness. Also, the requests chosen for her experiment all assumed a relatively low R (requests not unreasonable in the context specified from S to H), so indirectness might have seemed inappropriately devious (as indicating a higher-risk FTA than was actually involved).

A genuine counter-case to our ranking of off-record and negative politeness would exist if it could be shown that, to two different addressees, one higher in P than S and the other not higher, subjects used
negative politeness strategies to the higher-ranking H, and off-record ones to the lower-ranking H, and, to our knowledge, no politeness-ranking experiments have shown this. However, Blum-Kulka’s results do suggest that in some societies (as suggested by Lakoff 1974a, 1977b), an ‘efficiency’ factor is involved in the assessment of payoffs of off-record vs on-record strategies for making requests; i.e. it is perceived as rude to require a superior to calculate the illocutionary potential of an off-record request. We call this an ‘efficiency’ factor, following Lakoff’s idea that this is related to culturalvaluations of the superior’s ‘time’ etc. The use of off-record speech actions is restricted by this efficiency factor and by another culturally specific expectation: that mere co-presence in an interaction is implicitly demanding, as it requires the superior’s attention. This is certainly not the case in all societies (e.g. India, or see Philips 1974 on Warm Springs Indians), so we do not see efficiency as an intrinsic component of negative politeness for all kinds of FTAs, as do, for example Lakoff (1977b) and Leech (1983).

One source of the impression that off-record strategies ‘mix’ with positive and negative ones should be mentioned. When utterances constructed like hints are actually, in the context, on record (that is, when only one interpretation is acceptable in the context), they are sometimes positively polite (as with irony or understatement) and sometimes negatively polite (as with indirect speech acts). The motivation for the use of off-record strategies in on-record negative politeness is obvious enough (see 5.4.1 [of Politeness]), but their use in positive politeness is less obvious. A possible explanation for the positive-politeness impact of strategies like irony and understatement, for example, would lie in two characteristics of positive politeness: the reliance on mutual knowledge to decode utterances, such mutual knowledge of attitudes and values normally obtaining only between in-group members, and the fact that positive politeness uniquely allows the introduction of extraneous material (not relevant to the particular FTA in hand). There is also the point raised in recent conversation-analytic work (e.g. Drew 1984) that (between interlocutors of the appropriate relationship) off-record strategies can ‘invite’ positively polite take-ups; by reading an ambiguous utterance as a criticism, for example, the addressee ‘colludes’ in the negative attitude which was indirectly conveyed. (See also Drew’s analysis of pre-emptive self-invitations, discussed in *3.4. below.) However, the fact that strategies may be shuffled from off-record ‘down’ (in terms of face redress) into positive or negative politeness, while not necessarily creating problems for the interactants, may be problematic for the analyst.16

In general, despite the various deviations from our expected hierarchy that have emerged from some of these experimental tests, no one (to our knowledge) has come up with clear evidence of a counter-ranking: where (for example) positive politeness is used for greater FTAs, negative polite-
ness for smaller ones, or where off-record is used for smaller FTAs (or to
lower-status Hs) than negative or positive politeness. It may not be unpro-
bлемatic to construct valid indices of the social variables P, D and R (as the
Baxter and Slugoski studies indicate), but insofar as this is achieved the
predictions of our model should be testable.

At present, in the absence of definitive evidence that we got the ranking
wrong, there are good arguments for insisting that off-record strategies are
generally more polite than on-record. For one thing, as we argued in detail
below (section 5.4.1, strategy I [of Politeness]), the appearance of utterances
constructed as off-record hints in cases where they are actually on-record
requests (giving H a token ‘out’ in interpreting the utterance as a request)
would not otherwise be motivated. In a similar way, the diachronic origin of
honoris in off-record strategies (cf. section 8.1.3.7 (of Politeness)) also
argues for the greater degree of politeness for indirectness. A third point is
that off-record strategies are a solution half-way between doing the FTA on
record and not doing it at all; therefore, in the absence of context-specific
implicatures to the contrary, we would expect them to be more polite than on-
record performances of the FTA. Fourth, the off-record super-strategy is a
natural extension of negative politeness (in adding an additional element of
avoidance), analogous to Radcliffe-Brown’s ‘avoidance’ relation as the
relationship of extreme respect (1952). And a final source of support for
our ranking comes from research in second-language usage; for example,
Chun et al. (1982) and Day et al. (1984) found that ‘correction’ of a non-
native speaker’s utterances by a native-speaker interlocutor tended to be
more ‘on record’ if they were friends, and off record for higher D relations.

In our view, present evidence is too equivocal to entail the abandonment
of our original scheme. But we do concede that the possibility that the off-
record strategy is independent of, and co-occurrent with, the other two
super-strategies is something which definitely requires close investigation.

2.3 Problems of Quantification and Operationalization

A number of attempts to test our hypotheses directly by applying them to
actual language usage data, either experimentally induced or naturally
occurring, have run into difficulties in operationalizing the model and in
coding the data. Shimanoff (1977), for example, tried to use our politeness
strategies as categories for quantitative tests of the hypothesis that
women’s speech would be more highly elaborated for politeness; no sex
differences were found, and a number of difficulties in applying the model
appeared. For example, 3 per cent of her sample of 300 strategies involved
‘crossovers’, where negative politeness strategies were serving positive
politeness functions and vice versa. And Baxter (1984), as mentioned
above, had experimental subjects rank utterances with respect to likelihood
of use in eight situations and perceived politeness; she found subjects
reported that they would use more politeness in close relationships, and
ranked positive politeness strategies as more polite (in some respects) than negative politeness ones. Blum-Kulka's experimental results (1985), mentioned above, likewise displayed an inverted order to assessments of politeness for indirect speech acts and off-record hints.

To what extent do these results reveal inadequacies in our model, and to what extent problems in the operationalizations favoured by the experimenters? It should be pointed out, first of all, that our strategies were never intended as an exhaustive taxonomy of utterance styles, but rather as an open-ended set of procedures for message construction, and they therefore do not necessarily provide sensible categories for quantitative research. Second, experiments attempting to get subjects to rank politeness assessments need to manipulate or control for each of the three factors D, P and R, and to report exactly what utterances the subjects were required to assess, in order for the results to be interpretable in terms of our theory.

But third, and more critically, there are intrinsic difficulties in trying to obtain quantitative measures of politeness strategies in naturalistic interactional data. Problems with frequency counts that emerged in the attempts by Shimanoff (1977) and Brown (1979) include:

1 The count of redressive features may be high but native-speaker intuitions are that the utterance is not very polite, or vice versa. This may be due to the fact mentioned above, that our strategies are an open-ended list; polite redress (or impolite counters to overt politeness markers) may be being done in ways (e.g. intonational or kinesic) which are not captured by the counts. Also, as argued throughout (see *1.1), politeness is implicated by the semantic structure of the whole utterance, not communicated by 'markers' or 'mitigators' in a simple signalling fashion which can be quantified.

2 Not all instances of a given strategy may be being used to do politeness, since (as we stressed, p. 93 [of Politeness]) politeness is not the only motivation for using these strategies; they may, for example, be used to put on a social 'brake' or 'accelerator' in the development of social relationships, or an off-record utterance may be used to avoid responsibility for actions unrelated to face concerns.

3 The semantics and pragmatics of utterances must be taken into account in assessing degree of face redress; if the overt content of an utterance is rude, for example, politeness strategies won't necessarily redeem it. And the speech act function of utterances, and their R ranking in the culture, must be coded before our politeness model can be applied to assess degrees of face redress.

In our view, therefore, quantitative evaluations of polite redress in natural language data must always be preceded by, and supplemented with, qualitative ones. Controlled experimental tests of our model should, however, be possible, given the specific predictions it makes about the
ranking of super-strategies, the ranking of politeness levels within strategies, and the summative nature of P, D and R assessments.

2.4 Recent Work on Linguistic Themes

2.4.1 Honorifics

Honorifics provide obvious and important evidence for the relation between language structure, politeness and social forces in general, yet because of the ethnocentric nature of much sociolinguistics they have been relatively neglected. However, recently there has been a considerable increase in interest, and there is sufficient further evidence against which to test our earlier generalizations.\textsuperscript{17}

In the body of the work, we refer to honorifics under a number of headings: first, and most obviously, as motivated by a strategy of giving deference (5.4.3, Strategy 5, p. 178ff [of Politeness]); second, as diachronically motivated by a strategy of impersonalization (5.4.4, Strategy 7, p. 198ff [of Politeness]), this predicting the person-number switches found, for example, in polite pronouns of address; third, as providing evidence for a tendency for higher strata in complex societies to be concerned especially with negative politeness, while lower strata elaborate internal positive politeness (7.2, p. 245ff [of Politeness]); fourth, as providing good evidence for the non-arbitrary nature of polite forms, being for the most part "frozen" or grammaticalized outputs of productive politeness strategies (8.1.3.7, p. 276ff [of Politeness]).

Recent work confirms the importance of all these themes. Let us take first the diachronic sources of polite pronouns. Three cross-linguistic surveys confirm our generalizations (independently, Levinson 1978, based on a sample of thirty-eight languages; Head 1978, based on about 100 languages; Wenger 1982, based on more detailed examination of eleven languages). These surveys confirm that pluralization, substitution of third person for second person, and other person switches, are widespread throughout the world, and common in that order;\textsuperscript{18} the regularities are such that a number of quite detailed implicational universals can be stated (see Head 1978; Levinson 1978; Wenger 1982). Thus (contrary to Brown and Gilman 1960, who assumed these were diffused culture traits), there must be strategically motivated sources for these switches – deference is not encoded in language by the use of arbitrary forms, but by the use of motivated forms (see also Haiman 1985: 154). This is of course the hub of all our claims, here illustrated in one area but on a worldwide scale: polite forms cannot be fully understood within a Saussurean structural perspective of an arbitrary system of oppositions that thus varies from culture to culture; rather they are systematically motivated by a reasoning from the proper treatment of the social person, and thus have the universality they empirically do. We may also note that a number of our detailed hypotheses,
like the diachronic development of addressee honorifics from referent honorifics, now have supporting evidence (see, e.g., Wenger 1982).

We therefore argue that honorifics are frozen conversational implicatures, constituting some of the best examples of Grice's category of conventional implicature (Levinson 1979b, 1983: 127ff). However, the conventional implicatures attached to honorifics do not exhaust their social significance – because a particular dyadic pattern of exchange is what distinguishes deference (high P) from mutual formality (high D) (Brown and Levinson 1979: 296–7; see also Bean 1978: ch. 8.) Levinson (1978) notes that one can also state universals on the social valuation of dyadic exchanges of honorifics (as on p. 250 [of Politeness]), and this can be related to a potentially universal exchange symbolism (see *3.5 below and Levinson 1982: 116ff).

The kernel idea of our politeness theory, that some acts are intrinsically threatening to face and thus require 'softening', finds ratification in microcosm in the domain of honorifics. For there is enough cross-linguistic evidence for the FTA-sensitivity of the use of honorifics that one can confidently predict that, for example, honorifics will especially co-occur (often at an upgraded level) with requests (see, e.g., Bean 1978: 39–40, for Kannada; Hill and Hill 1978: 139 for modern Nahuatl; Paulston 1976: 376 for Swedish; McClean 1973: 93 for Nepali; Haviland 1982: 61 for the Australian language Guugu Yimidhirr; Duranti 1981 for Samoan – the last cites co-occurrence with disagreements).

Of all our generalizations in this area, the idea that politeness strategies, and thus the use of honorifics, might be used differently in the high and low levels of stratified societies, with higher levels emphasizing V and lower ones T, was the most daring and the least substantiated at the time. Since then we have found some limited confirmatory evidence, if only at the level of informal observations and stereotypes (see, e.g., McClean 1973: 91; Slobin 1963: 199). In so far as this pattern is confirmed, our hypothesis about the probable importance of social network (p. 246 [of Politeness]) receives backing from the growing evidence for the power of that level of social organization as a sociolinguistic determinant (Milroy 1980). However, there is also some distinct counter-evidence to the hypothesis: Lambert and Tucker (1976) found that, according to children's reports, Canadian middle-class families use more internal tu than working-class families; and Bates and Benigni (1975) found the same pattern for Italian address. However, in the Italian study, upper-class informants expressed the belief that lower-class informants used more familiar forms, and the authors conclude that either the sort of hypothesis we are maintaining is a middle-class myth, or there has in fact been radical change (1975: 276–9). One cross-cutting factor here, it has been argued (Levinson 1978), is another generalization about group tendencies in the use of honorifics, namely the tendency for rural families to be more authoritarian, and thus
to use more asymmetrical T/V and other politeness forms, than families of similar socio-economic status in cities (for evidence see, e.g., Paulston 1976; Lambert and Tucker 1976; Hollos 1977: 223) – for the Bates and Benigni working-class population seem to be quite largely rural migrants from South Italy. Thus generalizations about class-stratified patterns of honorific use will always have to be restricted to relatively stable, traditional stratified populations. With this proviso in mind, the hypothesis still seems to us to be open, and worth pursuing. Incidentally, the great sociological utility of honorifics in the study of stratification is demonstrated in detail in two independent studies in the same region of India (Levinson 1977 and 1982; Den Ouden 1979; see also Bean 1978: 118ff).

The relationship of honorifics to the use of our more open-ended politeness strategies is something that requires further investigation. For example, it is noteworthy in Tamil that some direct requests (specifically those of low R) may occur from subordinates to superordinates, providing that such requests are mitigated with the appropriate honorifics; this might suggest that in some languages the burden of politeness might be carried more by the grammaticalized system of honorifics and less by matters of language use. However, this inference does not seem to be generally correct; there is not, as it were, a certain quantity of politeness to be conveyed by one channel (the grammaticalized honorifics) or another (strategic language use) – politeness is usually redundantly expressed in both. Thus, Mackie (1983) finds that our politeness strategies are used by Japanese children even before they have acquired the complex honorific system in full.

2.4.2 Cross-cultural Data on Speech Acts and FTAs

In the past ten years, many books and papers have appeared, exploring how particular kinds of speech act are realized in different contexts and in different languages, and much of this research deepens our understanding of cross-cultural parallels in politeness strategies for particular kinds of ‘face-threatening acts’ or FTAs. Our review here can do no more than sample this large literature (see bibliography in Verschueren 1978 and in press).

The heavy emphasis on requests, that derives from psychological and linguistic studies of speech acts, was reflected in our presentation of the politeness strategies, and is still prevalent in the literature, although it is now being supplemented by information on many other kinds of potentially face-threatening act. In addition to the work on requests by linguists, carried out within the framework of speech act theory, there is a large body of work on ‘compliance-gaining’ in the communications literature, for example (see Baxter 1984, and the bibliography therein), and work on children’s acquisition of pragmatic competence still maintains a strong focus on requests (see references in *3.3 below). There is a great deal of
other material on requests in English (e.g. Clark and Lucy 1975; Ervin-Tripp 1976, 1981; Gibbs 1979; Jacobs and Jackson 1983). Cross-cultural work on requests includes the large-scale project reported in Blum-Kulka and Olshtain 1984, which investigated requests and apologies in Hebrew, Danish, German, Canadian French, and British, American and Australian English; Havercate (1979) and Walters (1979) explored requests in Spanish; and there have been other studies comparing requests in English with those in Greek (Drossou 1985; Tannen 1981c), and in German (House and Kasper 1981), comparing white Australian and Aboriginal English in Northeastern Queensland (Eades 1982a), white and black Americans (Weigel and Weigel 1985), and examining requests amongst Israelis (Blum-Kulka et al. 1985), the Ilongot (Rosaldo 1982), and the Wolof of Senegal (Irvine 1985), to mention just a few.

Relatively formulaic polite 'routines' have also received a fair share of attention. Particularly interesting, as Goffman (1967) insisted, are apologies and associated ways of repairing delicts with face-threatening consequences: Owen 1983 is an in-depth study of apologies and remedial interchanges in English, with a framework for cross-cultural comparison (built on similar principles to our account of face-redressive strategies) with sample applications, while Coulmas (1981) compares thanks and apologies in certain European languages and in Japanese; Fraser (1981), Edmondson (1981), Cohen and Olshtain (1981) and Olshtain (1983) offer additional perspectives on apologies. Cross-cultural work on other politeness formulae includes Firth 1972, Goody 1972, Ferguson 1976, Tannen and Öztok 1981, Laver 1981. We also have much new information on how people do particular FTAs, for example compliments in English (Manes 1983; Manes and Wolfson 1981; and see Pomerantz references below), and among Spanish-American bilinguals (Valdés and Pino 1981), announcements (of intended actions, including threats and warnings) in German (Rehbein 1981), and American English invitations (Wolfson, D'Amico-Reinsner and Huber 1983). In addition, an important development is attention to speech actions of these kinds in a sequential context — for example politeness uses of pre-sequences (Beach and Dunning 1982), invitations (Davidson 1984), requests (Wootton 1981), compliments (Pomerantz 1978, 1984a), the seeking of information (Eades 1982a, 1982b); but we discuss these developments in *3.4 below.

Another area in which research has proliferated is the examination of conflict and confrontation in interaction; how this is done — and what constitutes a slight — has obvious implications for any theory of politeness. Benoit (1983) examines children's threats, Bleisener and Siegrist (1981) look at conflicts between doctors and hospital patients, McLaughlin, Cody and Rosenstein (1983) and McLaughlin, Cody and O'Hair (1983) explore 'account' sequences (after initial hostilities) in conversation, Bonikowska (1985a, 1985b) and House and Kasper (1981) look at the speech act(s) of

Clearly, there is now a great deal more evidence concerning the cross-cultural realization of face-threatening speech actions. Much of this material is descriptive and classificatory and does not attempt cross-linguist comparison; but there are also significant attempts to formulate frameworks for such comparison (see, e.g., Olshtain and Blum-Kulka 1983; Wierzbicka 1985a) and to criticize them (e.g. Rosaldo 1982).

Some of this might at first appear to be quite challenging to our thesis: for example, the relative absence of mitigating or face-redressive features associated with, say, requests in some communities (see, e.g., Rosaldo 1982; Weigel and Weigel 1985; Wierzbicka 1985b); or the apparent preference for confrontation in some interactional styles (Goodwin 1980a, 1983). However, by and large, we believe that the evidence falls in line with our predictions, and that the exceptions are the kind allowed for by the specific socio-cultural variables we introduced (see 7.2 [of Politeness]; *2.0 above).

2.4.3 Other Linguistic Realizations of Politeness Strategies

Aside from the construction and use of address forms, honorifics and indirect speech acts, which have received most attention, detailed studies have appeared of some of the other phenomena we described as involved in constructing linguistic realizations of positive and negative politeness strategies. For example, our claim (pp. 194–6 [of Politeness]) that passive and dative constructions can be used negatively politely, to distance S and H from the FTA, has been supported by Berk-Seligson’s (1983) study of grammatical case usage in Costa Rican Spanish, where she illustrates how non-active constructions (especially dative and reflexive passive) are used to avoid attribution of blame to persons in adverse situations, and argues that this phenomenon is common in many dialects of New World Spanish.

Other areas of current interest which bear upon politeness issues include the communication of affect, an area at present of special interest within the ethnoigraphy of speaking. Stimulated by Ochs (in press b) on Samoan, B. Schieffelin (Schieffelin, in press; Schieffelin and Feld, in press), Feld
(1982) and E. Schieffelin (1980) on the Kaluli of New Guinea, others have begun describing how affective states are communicated in different societies and languages (e.g. Irvine 1981, 1982). Insofar as the display of affect is socially constructed, with cultural and situational expectations about what and how feelings should be displayed, work here links in directly with our discussions of face-threatening acts (3.2 [of Politeness]), positive politeness strategies (5.3) and cultural ethos (7.2.1). Other work from a more strictly linguistic perspective also contributes to our understanding of the intensifying mechanisms which convey socially appropriate levels of affect (see, e.g., Labov 1984 on intensifiers in Black English Vernacular, and linguistic work on discourse particles and evidentials, e.g. Goldberg 1982; James 1983; Gibbons 1980; Wierzbicka, in preparation). Here again the tension between universals and cultural particulars is a matter of primary concern.

Irony is another phenomenon we considered (pp. 221–2 and 262–5 [of Politeness]) which has received considerable attention recently, partially as a critical case used to challenge or refine Grice’s theory (e.g. Kaufer 1981; Sperber and Wilson 1981; Sperber 1984; Clark and Gerrig 1984; Slugoski 1985; Slugoski and Turnbull 1985). Work here, as well as empirical work on the use of irony in conversation (e.g. Brown 1979: 470–501; Roy 1976, 1977, 1978; Tannen 1984a; ch. 6), tends to support our analysis of how on-record irony operates as a positively polite stressing of in-group knowledge and commonality of attitudes. Studies of joking behaviour (e.g. Basso 1979, for Western Apache) and ritual abuse (Parkin 1980) also support this point.

Other linguistic realizations of positive politeness strategies have received empirical attention, for example the use of slang (Gordon 1983), and of tense manipulations as a form of point-of-view switching to emphasize commonality of perspective (Johnstone, n.d.; Schiffren 1981; Wolfson 1982). A study of deixis in kin term usage (Carter 1984) provides evidence that quite young children can do this kind of point-of-view switching.

In short, this (very partial) review of recent work demonstrates that there is now available a great deal more detailed information bearing on the particular linguistic realizations of politeness strategies which we formulated. Had we had access to all this material originally, our account of these details would doubtless have been more precise and better founded.

3.0 Recent Developments

Turning now from the linguistic details to more general issues, there are several areas of current research where findings have tied in closely with our concerns in this paper. We will focus on four of these. First, from a
number of different disciplines critical attention is being focused on the language use of non-powerful or disadvantaged groups (women, ethnic minorities, second-language learners, for example), and here the question of cultural particulars vs universal patterns is foregrounded. Second, there is interesting work in the child language field on the acquisition of politeness strategies and children's use of indirect speech acts. Third, there is a great deal of current work on the structure of conversation, which although carried out within a frame of reference quite different from the one we operate within here, has turned up many properties of conversational organization which tie in directly with matters of politeness. And fourth, there is a recent attempt to apply our framework of politeness to the analysis of ritual. We will briefly survey research in these areas and assess its contribution to the concerns of the present volume.

3.1 Language, Power and Control

The work done within this rubric raises two questions central to our model. On the one hand, are there, as the model would predict, discernible patterns of language usage characteristic of members of non-powerful groups, and, on the other, are there difficulties encountered in communicating across linguistic subculture boundaries interpretable in terms of parameters provided in the model? We made some stabs at predictions about these matters in 7.2 [of Politeness], but recent work has prompted us to develop these ideas further.

3.1.1 Women and Language Use

One body of research that might be expected to support or contradict our framework is the burgeoning work on women's language use. Here we can only selectively review work of immediate pertinence.\textsuperscript{19}

There are of course differences between the speech of men and women that may have nothing whatever to do with our framework – linguistic indicators of female identity for example (as in Koasati, Haas 1964); or certain paralinguistic features (Laver 1968; Loveday 1981). Also, much of the work in this field has dealt with sexism in linguistic structure and in the content of speech, matters peripheral to our concerns here. But directly relevant is the line of research attempting to describe the features of gender-differentiated styles (or 'genderlects'), sparked off by the arguments popularized by Lakoff (1975, 1977a, 1979) that women are more 'polite' than men. Empirical tests of Lakoff's specific claims (that women use more tag questions, hesitation markers and 'trivializing' adjectives, for example) have by and large failed to substantiate them in detail (see, for example, Dubois and Crouch 1975; Crosby and Nyquist 1977; Brouwer, Gerritsen and de Haan 1979; Edelsky 1979; Brouwer 1982; Baroni and d'Urso 1984), but the argument that women have a distinctive 'style', due to their distinctive position in society, is still being actively pursued,
despite the persistence of negative evidence (no clear sex differences found) in much of the research.

In trying to understand the often very elusive and subtle differences between language use of men and women, we need to be crystal clear about exactly where and how the differences are supposed to manifest themselves. For example, we need first to distinguish behaviour in same-sex dyads and cross-sex dyads. We also need to distinguish effects due to sex of speaker from those due to sex of addressee. And we need constantly to remember the obvious but always pertinent fact that gender is just one of the relevant parameters in any situation, and is indeed potentially irrelevant in a particular situation. Thus we need to specify closely some claim of the sort that ‘women are more polite than men’ – more polite than whom, to whom, about what and in what circumstances?

As we make clear (7.2 [of Politeness]), our framework makes available just a few possible parameters that can account for variation in politeness levels. The most obvious of these is the P variable: if gender is, as seems to be generally the case, a contributory factor in the perception of social asymmetry, power and authority, then we might expect to find that women are more polite to some arbitrary interlocutor than are men from the same status-bearing group (family, caste, class, etc.); also that, for any arbitrary speaker, there ought to be more politeness shown to a male than a female addressee of the same status-bearing group. However, any such simple predictions are likely to be confounded by the fact that if gender may play a role in P assignments, it certainly plays a (sometimes compensating) role in D assignments.

If we now turn to the literature, we find that the evidence is equivocal: the many negative results where predicted sex differences were not found suggests uni-causal explanations in terms of P (i.e. that women are universally subordinate to men and therefore more polite) will not do justice to the complexities. Some studies do show the importance of P; for example, work on interruptions (e.g. Zimmerman and West 1975; West 1979) shows that, not only do men tend to interrupt women, but high-status men interrupt low-status men, high-status women interrupt low-status women, and adults interrupt children, suggesting that P is the important factor here.

Insofar as P factors account for the differences between men’s and women’s speech, these differences are, in a sense, epiphenomenal – neither the social underpinnings (the P differential) nor the linguistic manifestations are specific to gender. An obvious testable corollary of this reductionist claim is that when women are in positions of high authority vis-à-vis some interlocutor, we should expect these women to be less polite than speakers of lower status of either sex (a finding of the work by Ochs, in press a. on Samoan, and others).

However, there are indications that not all gender differences in the use of language are accounted for just by the P factor. If they were, (a) high-
status women should talk exactly like high-status men (insofar as gender is irrelevant to that estimation of status, and the other factors D and R are held constant); (b) the characteristics of ‘female speech’ should be entirely context-dependent, only manifesting themselves in circumstances where gender plays a crucial role in P (or D assessments). But the claim that there are true ‘genderlects’ perhaps presumes something more than this, namely that there are stabilized patterns of language use characteristic of male and female identities; and this is in part an empirical matter, but in part a matter of definition, of what constitutes a ‘stabilized pattern of language use’, and how variable across contexts is it allowed to be.

A second source of variation in politeness levels provided by our model is the D factor. We hypothesized (pp. 245–6 [of Politeness]) one effect of differentials in D assessments, namely, that women would be more likely to develop positive politeness strategies to a high degree, at least insofar as they operate dense social networks, these kinds of network possibly being quite generally associated with lower-status groups. The issues here are closely related to one raised in the work of Labov and his associates on sociolinguistic variables in large Western cities, on the tendency of women to ‘hypercorrect’. A quite general finding is that women typically use more prestigious dialect variables (more ‘standard’ phonological forms) than men do in comparable situations (Labov 1966; Trudgill 1974b; Cheshire 1982). Work by Milroy (1980) has shown that this phenomenon appears to be attributable not directly to sex but to the relative absence of dense female networks: in the Belfast working-class communities she studied, men typically had denser social networks than women – density being associated with divergence from the standard dialect. (And in the exceptional community where women had denser networks than men, men were the leading users of the standard linguistic forms.) This suggests that in the large Western cities where these studies have been carried out, women may well not be analogous to other lower-status groups (based on class, caste or ethnicity) in their tendency to develop dense networks, although in other societies like Tenejapa that does seem to be the pattern (see also Gal 1979), with the expectable association of positive politeness with female–female interaction. Finally, we should mention here an attempt (Deucher 1985) to link the female ‘hypercorrection’ data directly to polite accommodation to male (and other high-status) investigators (see also Bell’s 1984 reassessment of this area).

Notice, though, that insofar as sex differences in language use are captured in the kinds of linguistic dimensions described in our politeness strategies, it is possible that they are due to perceived differences in the one variable in our model that is not dependent on social attributes of the interlocutors, namely the R factor that measures the perceived intrinsic ‘danger’ of an FTA. For this is clearly sometimes assessed differently in different subcultures, and it may be that where gender groups are
sufficiently segregated, there is a systematic higher rating of FTAs by women. Where this was the determinant of greater politeness by women, there would be precise predictions: for example, two men of equal status and social distance (say, cousins) should use less-face-redressive measures than two women of equal status and social distance (cousins). This kind of account was in fact developed by Brown (1979) to deal with the characteristics of female speech in Tenejapa, a society where the sexes are relatively segregated. We think it is unlikely to be the case where they are not, as among the urban middle classes in industrialized societies.

In short, despite the volume of work on sex differences in language, the various possible contributory variables (P, D, R, sex of speaker vs hearer, etc.) have not been carefully enough controlled for this research to be used to test our hypotheses in the way that we might have hoped. Whether it is in general true cross-culturally that ‘women are more polite than men’, and, if so, whether this is a simple and direct consequence of the systematic contribution of gender to P and D assignments, remain open questions. Meanwhile, current research on gender and speech is moving in other directions.\(^{23}\)

We may mention here that in addition to studies of gender and language use there is an increasing literature on other aspects of speech by groups or individuals of lower status or lower power, which may be brought to bear on these questions, including work on medical encounters (e.g. Treichler et al. 1985; see also other papers in Kramarae et al. 1984), classroom interaction (e.g. Cazden 1979), judicial proceedings (O’Barr 1982), police interviews and magistrates courts (Thomas 1983b, 1985). (See also the articles in van Dijk 1985: vol. 4.) In the communications literature, our politeness framework has been employed to analyse strategies of control in employer–employee relations; for example, Fairhurst et al. (1984) explored the employer’s use of positive face support in controlling poor performances, and showed that positive face support was associated with a higher performance rating of the employee. And Kline (1981) devised coding schemes for measuring positive and negative face support and applied them to managers’ strategies of control. Indeed, it has been suggested that the analysis of linguistic politeness might have quite general application in social skills training (Good, in press). All of this material on ‘unequal encounters’ (Thomas 1983b) will potentially provide many useful insights into the ways in which asymmetrical social relationships are displayed in, and perpetuated through, interactants’ use of linguistic strategies.

3.2 Cross-language, Cross-cultural Interference in Interaction

Another area concerned with the linguistic manifestations of social inequality is the study of inter-ethnic communication, focusing on the performance of minority group members in communication tasks defined
by majority group norms (see reviews by Verschueren 1984; Tannen, in van Dijk 1985: vol. 4). Pioneering work here by Gumperz and colleagues (1978a, 1978b, 1982a, 1982b) has shown that the most subtle linguistic cues, ranging from the placement of intonational nucleus to the rhetorical structure of an argument, can systematically differ between majority and minority varieties of the ‘same’ language, with the consequence that exasperation, incompetence, aggression and so on may be unintentionally signalled. Since in Western democracies, at least, much in the way of opportunity is channelled through the brief and crucial ‘gate-keeping’ interview (Erickson and Schultz 1979), failure to match another ethnic group’s standards of linguistic decorum may be fatal to individual social advancement.

The interest of this kind of research to investigations of politeness is at least threefold. First, the possibility of such miscommunication, especially amongst ethnic groups in long and daily contact, might be thought to undermine our claims about the essential universality of politeness strategies. Of course, though, it does nothing of the sort: it demonstrates that the most subtle differences in the prosodic or pragmatic features of a linguistic variety are sufficient to engender mismatches in perceived politeness (Labov 1978), even without differences in the perception of the social relationships and FTAs being negotiated. Second, and relatedly, this work is interesting confirmation of the key role of Goffman’s concept of the ‘virtual offence’, which predicts that the non-communication of the polite attitude will be read not merely as the absence of that attitude, but as the inverse, the holding of an aggressive attitude.\(^{24}\) Third, and most importantly, work on inter-ethnic miscommunication constitutes an entirely different and intriguing method for discovering cultural norms of politeness. This method, the discovery of social norms through the study of their systematic violation, has long been advocated by Garfinkel (1972; Heritage 1984b: ch. 4), and has been put to good effect here not only by Gumperz, but also by other work to which we now turn.

Scollon and Scollon (1980, 1981, 1983) have explicitly analysed inter-ethnic communication partly within the framework of our politeness theory to produce an assessment of interactional difficulties between Canadian Athabaskan Indians and (monolingual) English speakers. One basic finding was that Athabaskan interactional style is characterized by the negative (‘deference’) politeness based on the assumption of reciprocal social distance (high D) (1981: ch. 7), with a serious mismatch to the positive (‘solidarity’) politeness assumed by English-speaking Americans in gate-keeping interviews. The mismatch is a ‘double-bind’ condition, where the Athabaskan feels incapable of adopting the positive politeness of an intimate relationship, but is then involved in the asymmetrical giving of respect symbolic of low status (1981: 186–7). Scollon and Scollon in fact recommend that ‘gatekeepers’ in inter-ethnic interviews should adopt
negative politeness strategies because of the intrinsic dangers of the assumption of positive politeness. Interestingly, working in a quite unrelated framework, Basso (1979) has developed similar themes in his sensitive ethnographic work on Apache views of interactions with White men.

Brown (n.d.) and Brown and Levinson (in preparation) in a similar vein have analysed Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal interaction in Northern Queensland; Chick (1985) has analysed South African Black/White interaction. Other studies in more limited domains have described (and, explicitly or implicitly, contrasted) interactional styles in American Jewish society (Tannen 1981a, 1981b; Lakoff and Tannen 1979), among Greeks, Greek-Americans and Americans (Tannen 1981c, 1982), between Cree Indians and ‘whitemen’ (Darnell 1985), between American men and women (Maltz and Borker 1982), between German and English (House and Kasper 1981), and Japanese and English (Barnlund 1975; Loveday 1982).

The practical implications of this work are many, primarily perhaps for the training of ‘gatekeepers’. However, as Schegloff (n.d.) points out, the maintainance of intersubjectivity is a frail affair even where there are no obvious problems of linguistic or ethnic differentiation, a maintainance that depends on the possibility of ‘repair’ (including correction). Since the techniques used to accomplish repair in any one language or variety appear to be invariant to the kind of problem or error that requires it (Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks 1977), one practical consequence is the importance of establishing shared repair techniques.

But most important for our present concerns is the cross-group perspective on details of politeness strategies explored by this research: as in-depth studies of cultural differences in interpretive strategies and interaction accumulate, we should be able to refine our analysis of the ways in which the quality of interaction determines particular cultural assessments of the P, D and R factors, and specify more precisely the relationship between cultural particulars and the universal principles of interaction which seem to underlie them.

3.2.2 Second Language Learning

Closely related interests are pursued in the extensive body of research on learning a second language. Here issues of cross-language, cross-cultural interference are of prime concern, and in this work the focus on differences has tended to obscure cross-linguistic parallels in the construction of utterances.

Some of the research in this field has directly addressed the question of the transfer of politeness strategies from one language to the other. Studies of native/non-native English speakers’ judgements of politeness in indirect speech acts (Carrell and Konneker 1981; Fraser and Nolan 1981; Scarcella 1980; Scarcella and Brunak 1981; Walters 1980, 1981) have demonstrated that politeness rankings of differently formulated requests, for example, are
highly correlated for native and non-native speakers (as we predict they would be), although there is some evidence that learners perceive more politeness distinctions than do native speakers, suggesting that they may be over-sensitive to distinctions of grammatical form (mood, modals and tense) in different request forms. Thomas (1983a) criticizes this work for underplaying the effect of context on such rankings. Other work has examined the interaction of sex and age with politeness factors in second-language users (Rintell 1979, 1981; Zimin 1981), finding evidence of transfer from native (in this case Spanish) pragmatic strategies into English.

A second line of enquiry has focused on cultural differences in norms and values underlying our P, D and R assessments – the extent to which speakers from different cultural backgrounds emphasize hierarchy vs equality, or individualism vs social harmony, for example, and the nature of the social person (public vs private self) – in relation to degree of directness in formulating utterances (see, for example, Blum-Kulka 1982, 1983; Loveday 1982; Richards and Sukwimiat 1983), and to rhetorical patterns in speech (Clyne 1981; Loveday 1983; Tannen 1984b; Varonis and Gass 1985).

A third dimension involves looking at speakers’ strategies for facilitating mutual understanding between native and non-native speakers (Faerch and Kasper 1984). For example Chun et al. (1982) and Day et al. (1984), extend our on/off-record distinction to assess the form of native speaker corrections of non-native speaker utterances; in line with our predictions they found that on-record corrections were more likely when the interlocutors were friends. (See also Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks 1977; Jefferson, n.d.)

While all this work has focused on cultural differences, and has clearly demonstrated that even minor differences in interpretive strategies carried over from a first to a second language (e.g. whether an up-gliding or down-gliding intonation pattern conveys a polite offer) can lead to misunderstandings and cross-group stereotyping of interactional style, there is (as pointed out in the prior section) no inherent contradiction between this evidence of the pervasive effects of linguistic and cultural differences and our own insistence on underlying universal (or ‘generic’) properties of the linguistic construction of utterances, which we see as deriving from universal constraints on human interaction. For our model of politeness, the significance of the work on second-language interference, as well as that on cross-cultural interaction, lies in the great accumulation of detailed information about how speakers of different languages use and interpret politeness strategies, and how the factors P, D and R are differently assessed (Thomas 1984). In the main, it supports our claim that it is differential assessments of these three factors which produce those variations in interactional style which we called ‘ethos’.
3.3 Child Language and the Acquisition of Politeness

Another area of research to which the student of politeness looks with interest is the field of child language. A considerable amount of the extensive literature on child language development has focused on the acquisition of particular types of speech act, especially requests or 'directives', and on the acquisition of politeness formulae and strategies (see, for example, Garvey 1975; Ervin-Tripp 1977, 1979, 1982; Ervin-Tripp et al. 1984; Ervin-Tripp and Gordon, in press; James 1978; Read and Cherry 1978; Gleason 1980; Wood and Gardner 1980; Newcombe and Zaslow 1981; and papers in Ervin-Tripp and Mitchell-Kernan 1977; Ochs and Schieffelin 1979; Wolfson and Judd 1983). Most of this work has been on English, but there are a number of studies of other languages (e.g. Bates 1976, on Italian; Hollos 1977, on the acquisition of the T/V system in Hungarian; Hollos and Beeman 1974, on directives in Norwegian and Hungarian; Mackie 1983, on Japanese; Ochs in press b, on Samoan; Schieffelin 1979 and in press, on the Kaluli of New Guinea). A parallel line of research has explored aggressive and 'rude' behaviour in children (Benoit 1983; Boggs 1978; Lein and Brennieis 1978; Katriel 1985; see also *2.4.2 above). Others have looked at how children acquire sex-differentiated communicative norms and interactional styles (see, e.g., Edelsky 1977; and review in Maltz and Borker 1982).

A number of interesting points have been raised by this work. It appears, for example, that children as young as 2½ years old can use and understand question forms of directives; Bates (1976) found Italian 2½-year-olds were using the Italian form of 'please', and upgrading the politeness of their requests in response to unsuccessful direct first attempts, and by the age of 4 were using formal address forms in play. Newcombe and Zaslow (1981) also found 2½-year-olds in English using question forms and even indirect hints as directives. However, they suggest that the children were not necessarily using such hints for politeness reasons but rather, especially where the hints were statements of need, because they expected adults to attend to their needs. Therefore, when compliance wasn't forthcoming, the tendency was to repeat their requests in a more explicit form, rather than 'softening' them as the Italian children in Bates's study did. A few examples of truly subtle hints were identified, however, suggesting that by a very young age, perhaps by 3, children are able to employ strategic hints for politeness (or other) reasons.

Mackie's work on Japanese (1983) claims that children control politeness strategies like hedging long before they learn the elaborate formal system of honorifics. She argues that Japanese children don't begin to learn honorifics until they enter school, at about 5, and it takes many years to acquire the full system of subject/object honorifics. The first- and second-grade children in her study used no referent honorifics, and only one used
addressee honorifics (the desu/masu formal style), but all demonstrated the ability to use several degrees of politeness, constructed of things like tone of voice, sentence-final particles (hedges), and preference for agreement.

Studies such as these suggest children begin acquiring strategic variation in utterance formation naturally, along with the acquisition of language, and that formal markers of politeness (honorifics, address variables) come later and are more explicitly taught. It is clear from the limited amount of material already available that studies of how children use language in different languages and cultures will, almost regardless of their intended focus, greatly contribute to our understanding of the processes by which politeness is incorporated into a child’s verbal repertoire. Issues of special interest would be whether the features we claim to be universal precede the acquisition of language-specific forms of politeness (as the precedence of the acquisition of strategies over honorifics hints); whether the acquisition of linguistic politeness can be correlated with the growth of skill in handling social interaction in general; and what role specific cultural beliefs about ‘face’ play in socialization.

3.4 Politeness, Discourse and Conversation Analysis

If issues of politeness have the wide ramifications we envisage, then clearly such matters should inform the structure of day-to-day conversation. In 6.3 [of Politeness], we referred to some ways in which this might be the case, but since then much published work in conversation analysis has greatly deepened our understanding not only of conversational ‘mechanics’, but also of the way in which modulations of these serve to communicate the essentials of social relationships.

One area of particular pertinence is what conversation analysts call preference organization (see Atkinson and Heritage 1984: Part II; Levinson 1983: 332ff). The term refers to the phenomenon that after specific kinds of conversational turn, responses are often strictly non-equivalent: one kind of response, termed the preferred, is direct, often abbreviated and structurally simply, and typically immediate; in contrast, other kinds, termed dispreferred, are typically indirect, structurally elaborated, and delayed (Pomerantz 1975, 1978, 1984a). The preferred type of response is usually more frequent also, but the term ‘preference’ refers to the structural disposition, to the fact that conversational organization conspires to make it easier to use the preferred type of turn, not to participants’ wishes. In this sense it can be shown that there are preferences for matters as diverse as: (i) agreement (vs disagreement); (ii) repair by self (vs repair by other of mistake or unclarity by self); (iii) acceptances (vs rejections) of requests and offers; (iv) answers (vs non-answers) to questions; in addition, preferences also hold across sequence types, for example, (v) offers by A (as opposed to requests by B to A); (vi) recognition by other of self on telephone (vs self-identification); and so on.
If one asks what determines which kinds of response are preferred vs dispreferred, in this structural sense corresponding to unmarked vs marked in form, respectively, a large part of the answer must surely lie in face considerations (Heritage 1984a, 1984b: 268). For example, taking the above list, agreement is preferred because disagreement is an FTA (as noted in 5.3 [of Politeness]); self-repair because correction by other may imply that self is misguided or incompetent (3.2.1 [of Politeness]); acceptances of offers or requests because the alternative refusals would imply lack of consideration (5.3.2 [of Politeness]); as might non-answers to questions. In the case of (v), the preference for an offer–acceptance sequence over a request–acceptance sequence, clearly there is less face risk in A’s inducing B to make an offer than in A making a request of B, because B may refuse the request, but not withdraw the offer. And in the case of (vi), the preference for recognition without overt self-identification on the telephone can be attributed to the deleterious positive-face implications of failure of immediate recognition (like name forgetting). Thus face considerations seem to determine which of two alternative responses after another turn will normally be associated with the unmarked, preferred turn format. (Incidentally, the use of the unmarked simple form to do the stereotypical, expected and structurally predisposed action, while any departure from this will serve to signal the complement of that interpretation, fits in with a Neo-Gricean theory of implicature developed in Horn 1984, and in Levinson, in press).

Sometimes, face considerations motivate conflicting requirements. For example, Pomerantz has explored the interaction of the preference for agreement with compliments on the one hand (1978) and self-denigrations on the other (1984a). To agree with a compliment is, Pomerantz notes, to run counter to a constraint against self-praise. To preserve something of both the preference for agreement and the constraint, various intermediate turn types are often used: agreements with praise-downgrade; agreements about praiseworthiness but with praise shifted to third party; return compliments. Self-denigrations also raise problems for the general preference for agreement, running counter to a constraint against criticism of others: again, intermediate solutions involve, for example, agreement with self-inclusion; implicit agreement by silence or minimal acknowledgement. All three of the principles here seem to lie firmly in the realm of face-motivated behaviour: the preference for agreement follows from positive face considerations (see 5.3 strategy 5 [of Politeness]), as does the constraint against criticism of alter, of course: while the constraint against self-praise follows from face considerations in a way parallel to the way in which honorifics work – just as to raise the other is to imply a lowering of the self, so a raising of the self may imply a lowering of the other.

A feature of preference organization that is of special interest here is that it makes possible a whole range of face-preserving strategies and
techniques. For example, given that preferred turns should immediately follow a first turn, the slightest delay is often sufficient to signal that the recipient does not in fact intend to produce the preferred action (will reject the request, invitation, etc.); this makes it possible for the speaker of the first turn to resume with a modification, in an attempt to make the initial action more acceptable (Davidson 1984; Pomerantz 1984b), or even to withdraw it (Goodwin 1979), even though no overt rejection has taken place.

We noted that some kinds of entire sequence (of conversational turns) are preferred to others. Again, face considerations help to explain this, as Heritage has pointed out (1984a). We noted, for example, the preference for inducing offers over making requests. But how does one induce an offer? One way is to give a prior indication that a request may be coming up, and this may be done by means of a ‘pre-request’, a turn that typically checks out whether some precondition for a request obtains (e.g. ‘Do you still have that good bicycle?’), thus making it clear that a request may follow – which may be pre-empted by an offer. In this sort of way, face considerations motivate many kinds of pre-sequences (see review in Levinson 1983: 345ff). But they also motivate more indirect ‘fishings’ still, where reports of events may be used to elicit other reports (Pomerantz 1980), offers, etc. (Drew 1984). Drew gives the following sort of example: if A announces the acquisition of some new furniture, and B then pre-empt an invitation to come and see it by requesting permission to do so, B conveys ‘the essence of sociability’ – a pre-emptive display of caring about what is important to the other. Thus by reporting events that make such a display possible and pertinent, A can make relevant such a pre-emptive self-invitation without in any way requiring it – B can quite appropriately offer congratulations or other appreciations of a lesser sort. Pre-sequences and ‘fishings’ thus allow the off-record negotiation of business with face implications well in advance of the possible on-record transaction. Thus nearly all of the structural predispositions that have been studied under the rubric of preference, and many aspects of pre-sequences, seem to be motivated by face considerations.

There is much other work in conversation analysis that is pertinent to our themes, but let us single out one topic in particular, how ‘troubles’ are broached and received (the subject of extended research by Jefferson 1980, 1984a, 1984b; Jefferson and Lee 1981). A’s announcement of a misfortune (which may be, as in the case of a death or a divorce, a matter that one is socially obliged to communicate) poses various interactional problems. A may appear to be upset, not in control, not properly maintaining ‘face’ (3.2.2 [of Politeness]); to counteract which reports of ‘troubles’ are often delivered by the ‘troubled’ with laughter, ‘exhibiting that, although there is this trouble, it is not getting the better of him; he is managing’ (Jefferson 1984b: 351). Although laughter by speaker typically invites laughter by
recipient, here of course recipient refrains from laughter and treats the report as a serious matter. Thus A attends to the face implications of A’s ‘not managing’, while B attends to the face implications of A’s trouble. Although of course if B properly refrains from laughter while A reports the misfortune, A may nevertheless find a subsidiary topic offering comic relief (again, displaying self-control), and manage to induce reluctant laughter from B, who will nevertheless typically display ‘a tremendous caution about and sensitivity to engaging in laughter in the course of a troubles telling’ (Jefferson 1984b: 358).

Reports of misfortunes raise additional interactional problems: how to disengage from the topic without seeming to belittle its import. In fact, Jefferson finds that in the majority of cases the only available solution seems to be to end the conversation without introducing further topics (1984a). Alternatives may be to ‘restart’ the conversation with the ‘How are you?’ or ‘What have you been doing?’ typically reserved for the beginning; or to seek a change in topic that is nevertheless focused on the troubled participant’s welfare, ‘in effect, a breaking away from talk about a trouble exhibits deference to it by preserving the interactional reciprocity that is a feature of such talk’ (1984a: 194). Alternatively, the trouble-teller may lay the ground for a ‘step-wise transition’ to a new topic by introducing, in the final stages of troubles-telling, ancillary material that invites elaboration in other topical directions. In short, the face implications of the reports of troubles are quite sufficient to structure the entire conversation from the point of their introduction.

Although we have scarcely done justice to its depth and subtlety, all this work conspires to show how complex and intricate are the ways in which conversational organization is interwoven and informed by the concern with participants’ self-esteem and its preservation. This work is essential for establishing the empirical basis for speculations of the sort we have indulged in. While our framework could hardly be said to predict all these details, it does suggest a more abstract level of explanation to which conversation analysis might usefully refer, perhaps reconstructing our ideas in line with the emerging empirical observations. It is a matter of regret that so little conversation analysis has been done in non-Western languages, especially by native speakers of them, but this lacuna will, we hope, be filled in the near future.25

Naturally, politeness is prototypically exhibited in conversation and other kinds of face-to-face interchange, and so other approaches to discourse analysis, using different kinds of text (predominantly narrative) have contributed less to our theme. A notable exception here, though, is the linguistic approach by Labov and Fanshel (1977) which concentrates on the analysis of a therapeutic interview. They attempt to enrich the philosophical theory of speech acts by building in social felicity conditions; for example, they suggest (1977: 78ff) that there are felicity conditions on
requests requiring that (the speaker believes that) the addressee has the obligation to do what is requested, and the speaker the right to tell the addressee to do it. Thus one can construct an indirect request by mentioning one of these conditions. Further, they propose a distinction between ‘mitigation’ and ‘aggravation’, and claim that reference to needs and abilities is generally mitigating (as in Do you have enough time to dust this room?), while reference to obligation (as in Shouldn’t the room be dusted?) is generally aggravating (1977: 85). Thus a scale of politeness (or ‘mitigation’) of indirect request forms can be predicted which more or less coincides with the accounts by us below and by Leech (1983).

We cannot here discuss the Labov and Fanshel approach in detail (see Levinson 1983: 286ff; 1986); suffice it to say that insofar as it succeeds as an account of politeness it does so because it builds the FTA nature of speech acts into their felicity conditions, and does so illegitimately (we believe) because there do not in fact appear to be such social felicity conditions (e.g. one can ask a stranger for change where there is neither obligation to give nor right to tell the addressee to provide change). In addition, no account is given of why references to abilities and needs are ‘mitigating’ while references to obligations are ‘aggravating’ (in requests, but why are they ‘mitigating’ in offers? Cf. Leech 1983: 107ff). Here advances in conversation analysis have shown that the theory of indirect speech acts, wherein the questioning of a felicity condition can serve to perform the relevant speech act, can be recast in sequential terms: so-called indirect speech acts are in fact pre-sequences designed for cooperative pre-emption or tactful evasion (Schegloff 1979; Levinson 1983: 356ff); to question needs and abilities is to offer an escape route, which is in fact the escape route most typically used (Wootton 1981), an important fact noted by Labov and Fanshel themselves (1977: 86ff).

Labov and Fanshel’s analysis raises many further pertinent issues. One is the conventional nature of ‘frozen mitigators’ (1977: 83ff; cf. Levinson 1983: 274), much addressed in the speech acts literature (see *2.4.2 above).26 Another important question they raise is whether family life is not in fact more characterized by ‘aggravation’ than ‘mitigation’ (Labov and Fanshel 1977: 84; cf. Wootton 1981; Ervin-Tripp et al. 1984), and thus whether our interests in politeness should not be better balanced by an interest in confrontation (see section *2.4.2).

We have selected for review just two trends in a rapidly growing literature concerned with the sequential analysis of verbal interaction from many different perspectives, many of which inevitably touch on issues germane to politeness (for a compendious review, see Van Dijk 1985),27 and some of which are directly focused in that direction (see, e.g., Owen 1983, on remedial interchanges). However, the essential lesson from all this work is that the kind of perspective which we have emphasized, which focuses on the internal structure of conversational turns that realize FTAs,
is properly and necessarily complemented by a focus on what came before and what comes next, for it is those two contingencies that the internal structure of a turn is specifically adapted to: thus an upgraded offer (Davidson 1984) looks back to a polite, perhaps implicit, refusal and forward to a possible acceptance.

3.5 Politeness as Ritual

The ‘ritual’ character of politeness has been much stressed by Goffman and others. One diagnostic ritual is often held to be repetitive or prepatterned behaviour. Although our theory plays down the importance of politeness routines by stressing the ‘generative’ production of linguistic politeness, polite formulae clearly form an important focal element in folk notions and in the distinction between ‘personal’ tact and ‘positional’ politeness (*2.1.1 above), where the latter is associated with formulaic decorum (Coulmas 1979, 1981).

However, here we wish to focus on politeness as a model or prototype for other kinds of ritual. In recent work, Strecker (in preparation) has tried to show that many of the politeness strategies that we elucidate have clear parallels or exploitations in the structure of ritual and ceremony. We cannot do justice here to his suggestions, but find them intriguing, and prompted by his work we here record our own thoughts on the interrelation of interpersonal politeness and the formal rites that have preoccupied anthropologists.

That there must be simple and direct links we dimly saw when we borrowed the distinction between negative and positive politeness from Durkheim’s distinction between negative and positive rites, which is worth quoting in full:

By definition sacred beings are separate beings. That which characterizes them is that there is a break of continuity between them and the profane beings. . . . A whole group of rites has the object of realizing this state of separation which is essential. Since their function is to prevent undue mixings and to keep one of these two domains from encroaching upon the other, they are only able to impose abstentions or negative acts.

(Durkheim 1915: 299)

However, he adds,

Men have never thought that their duties towards religious forces might be reduced to a simple abstinence from all commerce; they have always believed that they upheld positive and bilateral relations with them, whose regulation and organization is the function of a group of ritual practices. To this special system of rites we give the name of *positive cult*.

(Durkheim 1915: 326)
And he goes on to adduce rites of sacrifice, initiation and 'representation'.

Goffman has suggested that the interest of interpersonal ritual is partly, in our Western urban settings, as a kind of residue from our earlier ritually dominated forms of public life:

In contemporary society rituals performed to stand-ins for supernatural entities are everywhere in decay, as are extensive ceremonial agendas involving long strings of obligatory rites. What remains are brief rituals one individual performs for or to another, attesting to civility and good will on the performer's part and to the recipient's possession of a small patrimony of sacredness. What remains, in brief, are interpersonal rituals. These little pieties are a mean version of what anthropologists would look for in their paradise. But they are worth examining.

(Goffman 1971: 63)

But we wish to reverse the suggestion: interpersonal rituals are not some poor residuc of the 'staged' rituals of some prior age; they are rather the primordial origin, and the omnipresent model for rituals of all kinds. As Durkheim put it, seeming to take this view:

The human personality is a sacred thing; one dare not violate it nor infringe its bounds, while at the same time the greatest good is in communion with others.

(Durkheim 1915: 73)

The key prototype for the sacred thing is the social person; grand rites are, on this view, projected from the interpersonal to the larger stage of the set-piece ceremony. Perhaps we could even embrace a Malinowskian 'extensionalism': the prototypes for all ritual are familial, or at least based in the kinship domain, so that the prototype positive and negative rites are distributed across the parents and uncles and aunts as predicted by Levi-Strauss's 'kinship atom' (e.g. in matrilineal societies, the father receives positive rites from the child, the mother's brother negative rites, and in patrilineal societies the pattern is reversed).

If, following Strecker, we can find in the treatment of the sacred, in the details of high ritual, the same minutiae of symbolic expression that we can find in verbal politeness, perhaps this 'extensionalism' can be shown to have real foundation. One element in such a theory would have to be Leach's (1966) rejection of the definition of ritual as a type of event, specifically a non-instrumental, obliquely communicative kind of activity – instead, as he urges, we must see it as a mode of action that may accompany the most instrumental of activities. Then there is a natural continuum from the prototype familial interpersonal rituals, through the elaborate interpersonal rituals of adult life to the highly cathected sacred
rites that are so prominent in traditional societies (as suggested by, e.g., Geertz's 1960 description of the religion of Java).

Here, we would like to focus on just one kind of parallel between interpersonal ritual and institutionalized rites, and this is the way in which our ideas about typical dyadic rituals of interpersonal communication (p. 250ff [of Politeness]) suggest a startlingly simple theory of a universal symbolism of exchange. Our starting point is from the details of a particular kind of linguistic exchange, namely the use of the polite (or V) and intimate (T) pronouns. We deal below (in 5.4.3, Strategies 5 and 7 [of Politeness]) with these from the point of view of linguistic politeness, but here we are interested in their use in line with a much more general pattern of exchange. Brown and Gilman (1960) drew attention to the generality of the following pattern: in relations of intimacy, A and B exchange T pronouns; in relations of social distance (or non-intimacy) A and B exchange V pronouns; in relations of dominance where A ranks higher than B, A gives T and receives V. Although, as they noted, there is here an iconic relation between asymmetrical social relations and asymmetrical usage, that alone will not explain the direction in which the particular pronouns are used, or why symmetrical T should have the value it does in contrast to V. Further, their appeal to particular historical conditions (the double Roman Emperors of the fourth century) is not sufficient for what we now know is a worldwide generality for this particular pattern (see Head 1978; Levinson 1978; Wenger 1982); hence the attempt below to relate an explanation to universal principles of politeness.

However, through work done in an Indian context, it became clear to us that the pattern extended beyond linguistic exchanges. Marriott, Mayer, Dumont and others (see Marriott 1976) have shown conclusively that the complex patterns of food and service exchange between castes in Indian villages have a symbolic valuation as follows: in relations of social equality or alliance, castes exchange cooked food; in relations of dominance, the higher caste provides cooked food and the lower caste reciprocates with services. Most Indianists have looked at this purely in terms of a Hindu metaphysic concerned with exchange and ritual purity, but the pattern properly construed is in fact quite general. From a detailed study of the relation between verbal and non-verbal exchanges in a Tamil village (Levinson 1982) it is clear that the use of the T pronoun patterns in a highly complex series of precise parallels like the use of cooked food, and the use of the V pronoun patterns more or less like the provision of services. What on earth do the T pronoun and cooked food have in common? In essence, both are 'intimate stuff'. What then do the V pronoun and the provision of services have in common? By contrast, they are 'non-intimate stuff'. With this clue one may look more broadly within the Indian village for parallels, and find that who will approach and sit with whom, who will delouse whom, who will physically avoid whom, and so on, all
pattern, where cultural restrictions allow, in the same sort of way; that is, symbols of intimacy (commensality, grooming, approach and propinquity) are used like the T pronoun, both as symbols of intimacy and domination. And fitting neatly into these patterns one can find the use of positive politeness and bald on-record politeness strategies (as detailed below) being used both symmetrically as symbols of equality and asymmetrically (downwards, as it were) as symbols of domination. In India, there is evidence (see Beck 1972: 172; Levinson 1982) that the relations of social equality and hierarchy that are first expressed, disputed and finally stabilized in the interpersonal rituals of linguistic (and interactional) exchange are then slowly converted into the more rigid idiom of the institutionalized rituals of commensality (as in the order of eating at a Brahman feast). In short, not only are the rituals of the exchange of ‘intimate stuff’ on the interpersonal level paralleled on the level of ‘staged’ ritual, but the interpersonal rituals can be shown to have priority.

Further reflection will show that these are not peculiarly Indic patterns. An English country gentleman, like an Indian landlord, to this day can feast his tenants, but would refrain from accepting food from them; one-way ‘commensality’ is dominance. Again, a social superior (teacher, boss) may use the form of English address, the first name, otherwise used reciprocally amongst intimates, but receive title plus last name (otherwise used reciprocally among non-intimate equals) in exchange. The widespread nature of these patterns is well known. Intimate stuff used non-intimately takes on a different, but highly predictable, meaning, namely the symbolism of dominance (a prototype for which can be found, perhaps, in the relation between parent and child).

With some temerity we suggest that this simple reasoning might be applied quite generally to the analysis of rituals of exchange. Consider Mauss’s (1966) remarks about the ‘gift’: why on some occasions is the gift an expression of solidarity (cf. under 5.3.3 [of Politeness]), and on others an expression of hostility and domination? Symmetrical non-competitive giving would have the same symbolism as T-exchange, but to attempt to out-give, to arrive at a state where one party cannot reciprocate in kind, is, by our simple principle of asymmetrical exchange of intimate stuff, to claim dominance, as in the Kwakiuql potlatch. Part of this is just anthropological commonplace, as Leach remarks: ‘If you return my gift in kind ... the behaviour expresses equality of status. But if the reciprocity involves gifts which are different in kind ... the behaviour expresses inequality of status’ (1976: 6). But it is the nature of the gifts that flow in opposite directions that establishes who is dominant, and the peculiar predictability of the one-way use of ‘intimate stuff’ that is our special contribution here.

We have dwelt on rituals of exchange, but there are other connections (many raised by Strecke, in preparation) between interpersonal rituals and
grand rites. But perhaps the most important is the role of ritual in social control, a role long emphasized by social anthropologists. Bloch (1975: 5ff), for example, specifically links verbal politeness to political control through the constraints it imposes on next actions by addressees. Bloch, thinking primarily of traditional oratory, sees these constraints as directly imposed by the sequential rules of formal speech, but perhaps a more subtle perspective is the one indicated by Goffman's concept of the 'virtual offence' (p. 489 above): politeness, in exactly specifying the semiotics of offence, and in so making offensiveness as much a loss to the instigator's as to the target's 'face', produces the social order of everyday life out of the primordial chaos of self-seeking individuals.

4.0 Conclusions

This review of recent work will, we hope, have indicated both in general and in detailed ways many directions that future research may usefully take. We would like to conclude with some general observations and remarks on relevant trends in some of the contributory disciplines.

The very range of the material we have reviewed might give rise to the suspicion that politeness, construed in this broad way, subsumes just about every facet of the social world; and thence to the concern that there is no unitary field of enquiry here. Of course, every attempt at synthesis is open to such suspicions; we lay our case on the detailed evidence that these aspects of language use and our three main social parameters simply do cohere, and we point out that though broad in scope our perspective is in some ways narrow – for example, in the short shrift given to cultural variations, the minimization of factors other than our three social parameters and the reluctance to generalize from an act-based account to an account of style (all matters complained about by commentators).28

Rather than assemble a curio collection, we believe we happen to have stumbled on (not without prior guides of course) an area where many orthogonal aspects of social life converge in a set of crucial preoccupations in social interaction. We hope that the interdisciplinary interest in politeness will promote further work in general on social interaction. Our framework attempts to tie together phenomena of quite different kinds, from parameters of social structure to the linguistic details of message construction, each the preserve of various disciplines. But the integration is possible, if indeed it is, just because there is one domain where all these factors are instantiated, namely social interaction. Since the groundbreaking work of Goffman, Garfinkel and other early workers, there have been, of course, signal advances in the study of this crucial domain, but it remains the Cinderella of the social sciences, despite its good claims to methodological priority (see, e.g., Giddens 1984; Heritage 1984b; Schegloff, in press). We
believe that work on the fundamentals of interactional systematics will continue to reveal the importance of politeness considerations in one of two ways: either the systems under investigation will be directly addressed to issues of politeness, or, more often, they will constitute the medium through which politeness is expressed. Social interaction is remarkable for its emergent properties which transcend the characteristics of the individuals that jointly produce it; this emergent character is not something for which our current theoretical models are well equipped. Workers in artificial intelligence have already detected a paradigm clash between ‘cognitivism’ and ‘interactionism’, and noted the failure of the former paradigm to account for interactional organization (see, e.g., Bateman 1985; Suchman, in press); our own account suffers from the same overdose of ‘cognitivism’. Work on interaction as a system thus remains a fundamental research priority, and the area from which improved conceptualizations of politeness are most likely to emerge.

However, it is only when we have achieved a good understanding of systems of interaction in a reasonable number of unrelated languages and cultures that we would find ourselves in a position to do this fundamental reconceptualization from a cross-cultural perspective. Here one naturally looks to anthropology. However, at present there are only a handful of researchers actively engaged in the study of verbal interaction in societies outside Western cultural dominance; and of those, few have native cultural competence. We simply do not know, for example, the extent to which conversational organization is universal, although preliminary findings point to extensive parallels. The search for universals in language usage should be a major research objective: without such knowledge, the claims of cultural peculiarities in language use cannot be properly assessed, while with it the possibility of functional accounts of universal linguistic properties arises.

Meanwhile, we may hope to receive from anthropologists further intensive studies of how politeness is thought of in particular societies, i.e. folk theories of ‘face’, deference and demeanour. As we have pointed out above (*2.2.1), our universal claims constrain but do not determine what we would expect native concepts in this area to be. It would be worth testing these hypothetical constraints, but beyond that much might be learned by attending directly to folk formulations, seeing to what extent they correspond to behaviour, and how cultural elaborations in this area fit cultural preoccupations in other areas.

Turning now to linguistics, and in particular to linguistic theories of language usage, it is worth noting that the role of politeness in theories of pragmatics is undergoing change. When we first wrote, the major justification for the bifurcation of the theory of meaning into semantics and pragmatics was the basic Gricean observation that what is ‘said’ is typically only a part of what is ‘meant’, the proposition expressed by the former
providing a basis for the calculation of the latter. In this perspective, *indirection*, together with related kinds of mismatch between the said and the unsaid, is a central phenomenon, and has received much technical attention. But why does the phenomenon exist at all? It was that motivational question that our politeness theory was specifically designed to answer. For some theorists, Leech (1983) for example, politeness still plays this central explanatory role in pragmatics. However, others think that the relation between what is ‘said’ and what is pragmatically calculated is really very much more complicated – for the proposition that we express by an utterance is itself determined only very partially by what is ‘said’: it takes pragmatic principles, for example, to fix the reference of referring expressions (Sperber and Wilson 1986; Levinson, in press). Thus, on this view, pragmatics enters the arena twice: once to fix the proposition expressed by what is ‘said’, the second time to calculate the indirect or contextual implications of the proposition expressed. Politeness will still be seen to play a central role in the second kind of calculation, though perhaps only a negligible role in the first kind (but euphemisms, honorifics, etc. may provide interesting exceptions). While research effort is diverted to understanding the pragmatic processes involved in determining the proposition expressed by an utterance, issues of politeness are likely temporarily to lose the limelight even though they surely deserve a good part of the stage.

In sociolinguistics, one development that we confidently expect is a change of stress away from concern with linguistic indicators of social origin and identity (as in the influential Labovian paradigm) towards a greater concern with the linguistic expression of social relationships (Brown and Levinson 1979). Of course the two concerns are linked, as stressed in ‘accommodation theory’ (Giles 1980, 1984; Trudgill 1981; Street and Giles 1982; Coupland 1980), and this has been underscored by Bell’s (1984) re-analysis of the Labovian concept of ‘style’: he shows that sociolinguistic variables are tied more fundamentally to social relationships than to self-monitoring (or ‘formality’ conceived of as degree of attention to speech). There is already some evidence that these sociolinguistic variables perform discourse functions (Labov and Fanshel 1977), and it is therefore possible that these phonological and morphological variants vary with the kind of speech action being done – in short are FTA sensitive. In any case, a change of stress towards an interactional sociolinguistics (Gumperz 1982a, 1982b) promises signal advances, for all the social motivations for patterns of language use must be at least mediated through the ‘playing out’ of social relationships in interaction.

Such a development in sociolinguistics would have the merit of connecting issues in language use directly to matters at the heart of social theory. We may conclude by reminding the reader of the particular importance that Goffman attributed to the behaviours that we have collected
under the rubric of politeness, namely as indicative of essential aspects of human nature and its social construction:

If persons have a universal human nature, they themselves are not to be looked to for an explanation of it. One must look rather to the fact that societies everywhere, if they are to be societies, must mobilize their members as self-regulating participants in social encounters. . . .

Universal human nature is not a very human thing. By acquiring it, the person becomes a kind of construct, built up not for inner psychic propensities but from moral rules that are impressed upon him from without. . . . The general capacity to be bound by moral rules may well belong to the individual, but the particular set of rules which transforms him into a human being derives from requirements established in the ritual organization of social encounters.

(Goffman 1967: 44-5)

Notes

1 Since the first appearance of this work we have had the benefit of comments from too many people to acknowledge individually here, but we must single out Pascal Boyer, David Good, Rachael Harris, Geoffrey Leech, Ruven Ogien, Marion Owen, Ben Slugoski, Ivo Strecker, Jenny Thomas and David Zeitlin for supplying thoughts and material specifically for this introduction. The many relevant papers given at the International Pragmatics Conference at Viareggio (see Papi and Verschueren, in press) were also a useful stimulus. We must especially thank Esther Goody, whose editorial skills got the first issue of this work into print and who encouraged this reissue. We dedicate this work to the memory of Erving Goffman, from whose ideas it directly stems, and from whose encouragement we took much succour, but specifically with this thought in mind – that without him, observational studies of social interaction would hardly exist today. That dedication pre-empts proper expression of two great debts: the one to Edmund Leach, who taught Levinson what little he understands of social theory (and much else besides), and the other to John Gumperz, who taught us both how to dare to mingle sociological and linguistic speculations, and who has played a special role in establishing a field of interactional sociolinguistics. Our earlier acknowledgements to the original essay stand of course unabated.

2 Other kinds of formal protocol that regulate potential conflicts, as in the courtroom, committee room or democratic assembly, may perhaps be usefully explored in this perspective; see, for example, Atkinson 1979; Atkinson and Drew 1979. For a striking example of the role of rituals of greeting in the avoidance of conflict, see Youssouf, Grimshaw and Bird 1976.

3 References to sections in the original essay are unasterisked; those to sections of this introduction are preceded by an asterisk.

4 The sense in which (at least some) Gricean principles might be said to be ‘asocial’ in contrast to politeness principles is nicely shown up by the contrast between human interaction and man–machine interaction – see Pateman 1982b; see also Good 1985.

5 Leech refers here to Bolinger’s notion of a second-instance proposition, i.e.
one that presumes that another is entertained in the context; see here also Sperber and Wilson’s concept of an *echoic utterance* (1986: 237ff).

6 This is another place where Leech unnecessarily proliferates maxims by positing a maxim of negative un informativeness, even whilst noting that its effects are independently predicted (1983: 100ff). See Horn 1978 for a Gricean account of negation.

7 Incidentally, Riley (1981) accuses us of an inappropriate Clausewitzian or zero-sum analysis of interactional strategy. It is true that Goffman’s perspective, with its emphasis on the ‘virtual offence’, and the consequent metaphors of ‘threat’ etc., might give that impression. But the diplomatic assumption of the ‘virtual offence’ is precisely designed to convert a potential zero-sum game into a non-zero-sum game or game of pure coordination (Schelling 1960; Schiffer 1972) to which we obliquely referred in 4.1. See also Heritage’s (1981) response to Riley. Also relevant here is Labov and Fanshel’s (1977: 345–6) ‘paradox of micro-analysis’ – interactional anlyses ‘exaggerate the aggressive character of verbal interaction’ by separating what was done from how it was done; yet they concede that ‘mitigating devices do indeed mitigate conflict’. Cf. Leech (1983: 113): ‘the function of the Tact maxim is a negative one: it is a means of avoiding conflict.’

8 We are here primarily defending the cross-cultural relevance of the Gricean perspective; we deal below with the potentially separate issue of whether politeness can reasonably be held to be based on universal principles. Incidentally, the perspective of the individual actor we adopt can retrospectively be seen to be part of a general trend in social science theorizing (see Ortner 1984).

9 Since we made the appeal in 8.1.1 [of Politeness] for more linguistic work on social pressures on linguistic structure, much has appeared under the rubric of *functionalist* approaches to linguistics. Insofar as there is a unitary approach here at all, it is marked by an emphasis (which only non-specialists would think unexceptionable) on the preconditions a language must meet to be effective as an instrument of communication (see, e.g., Givón 1979; Foley and Van Valin 1983; Leech 1983: ch. 3). However, approaches that emphasize the social functions of language still remain relatively undeveloped. For example, Van Valin (1980), reviewing the Stanford universals volumes (Greenberg et al. 1978), notes that of all that work only Ferguson 1978, exploring crosslinguistic generalizations about baby talk, falls into that category; see also Silverstein 1979.

10 We must once again thank Dr E. Annamalai for his help here with the Tamil. We should also mention, for the record (pace one reviewer), that one of the authors is a native speaker of British English, the other of American English.

11 See for example, Benedict (1946: ch. 8) on Japanese concepts of ‘giri to one’s name’, or Brown (1979: ch. 2) on Tzeltal sensitivity to slurs on female sexual morality and the showdowns they invoke.

12 For example, there is a considerable literature on the ‘honour and shame’ complex of Mediterranean societies, see, e.g., Peristiany 1965, Pitt-Rivers 1977; for connections to linguistic politeness, see, e.g., Harris 1984. Incidentally, it is as well to remember that ‘folk-models’ in this domain can be, like all ideology, considerably out of line with actual practice, and therefore such models cannot themselves offer direct confirmation or refutation of theories, like our own, concerned primarily with practice.

13 Goffman (1967), in pursuing the metaphor of ‘face’, refers to this study and to Mauss’s (1966: 38) reference to the Kwakiutl use of the same metaphor. Goffman’s essay remains the essential introduction to these concepts.

14 We are grateful to Ruven Ogien and Rachael Harris for persuading us of the
importance of these points. Ogien appeals for more attention to folk terms, like tactful, polite, delicate, considerate, etc., and the semantic field they delineate.

15 See though, in *1.1 above, our reservations about the proliferation of politeness maxims. Here we may add that such a framework in fact presupposes the core concepts of face we (and others) have developed, as the notions that integrate modesty, generosity, agreement, etc., within a single conceptual field of 'politeness'.

16 It may, for example, cause problems in quantifying strategies in an attempt to measure degrees of conveyed politeness (see Shimanoff 1977, for example, which we discuss below).


18 For example, there is some further cross-linguistic evidence now for the use of 'we-inclusive' as a polite pronoun of address, noted for Tamil in Table 3 [of Politeness]; see Lefebvre 1979 and Mannheim 1982 for Quechua; Duranti 1981 for Samoan.

19 There are a number of recent reviews of this area; see, for example, Kramer, Thorne and Henley 1978; Philips 1980; Kramaroe 1981; McConnell-Ginet 1983. Recent books include Buttuff and Epstein 1978; Eakins and Eakins 1978; Orasanu, Slater and Adler 1979; McConnell-Ginet, Borker and Furman 1980; Vetterling-Braggin 1981; Thorne et al. 1983; Smith 1985; Philips, Steele and Tanz, in press.

20 This last point has often been ignored in the eager search for sex differences in speech, and might well account for some of the inability to find them (e.g. Brouwer, Gerritsen and de Haan 1979). Speech in contexts where gender is salient, for example in cross-sex interaction between potentially sexually accessible interlocutors, or same-sex interaction in gender-specific tasks, would be promising areas to focus on (see Hogg 1985). Stereotypes, as portrayed in soap operas and the like, need to be contrasted with realities (see, e.g., Shibamoto 1985 and in press, on Japanese women's speech; cf. e.g., Leech 1983: 136–7.

21 To exemplify: if a male A addresses a female B from a higher-status group, another female C, of the same status group as male A, might be expected to be more polite than A to B because she would be of relatively lower status due to the contribution of gender; but on the other hand B and C sharing gender may perceive less social distance, with the net result that A and B do not use perceptibly different levels of politeness to C.

22 See Schegloff, in press, however, for a critique of this work, including the observation that in the White House transcripts it appears that President Nixon tended to yield the floor to his subordinates, indicating power/status isn't necessarily directly related to interruptions. See also Lycan 1977.

23 For example, there are now empirical studies of gender styles (e.g. Brown 1979, 1980 for Tzeltal; Ide 1982, 1983; Ide et al. 1986 and Shibamoto 1985 for Japanese; Maltz and Borker 1982, Tannen 1982, 1984a, and papers in Philips, Steele and Tanz, in press) which relate the styles carefully to ethnographic conditions in an open-minded way.
24 Compare here Schegloff's (n.d.) observation of a perennial tendency for 'innocent' utterances to be interpreted as complaints.

25 Meanwhile, see, e.g., Moerman 1977 and in press; Brown 1979; Irvine 1981; Harris 1984; Schieffelin 1979 and in press; Ochs 1984 and in press b; Bayraktaroglu, in preparation; Haviland, in preparation; for analysis of conversation in non-Indo-European languages that specifically addresses some of these issues.


27 One perspective of special relevance is concerned with the sociolinguistic description of style; see, e.g., Tannen 1984a and references therein.

28 See, e.g., Mathiot 1982; Slugoški 1985; Scollon and Scollon 1981: 171, respectively. This paragraph is prompted by apposite remarks by Ruven Ogien.

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