

Putting Linguistics on a Proper Footing: Explorations in Goffman's Concepts of Participation

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GOFFMAN AND LINGUISTICS

In this paper I want to offer an appreciation of Erving Goffman from a linguistic perspective. Although Goffman published a number of papers in linguistics journals (1976, 1978), his contributions to linguistic thinking are perhaps much less obvious than his contributions to other social sciences. That is partly because linguists are the snobs of social science: you don't get into the club unless you are willing to don the most outlandish presuppositions (like a psychological reductionism hardly consonant with Goffman's position). But it is also because Goffman's ideas have been filtered through intermediaries who may not always have succeeded in passing the credit back to its source. For example, the 'face-work' ideas have been recycled as a theory of linguistic politeness by Lakoff (1973), Brown and Levinson (1978), Leech (1983) and others, spawning a really substantial literature (see Brown and Levinson 1987) much of which makes little or no reference to Goffman (see, for example Leech 1983). That is but one example: another would be Goffman's emphasis on situation and the role that this has played (again partly filtered through, partly augmented by, Hymes, Gumperz, Labov and others) in sociolinguistics and the ethnography of speaking.

However, another reason for the apparent lack of impact on linguistics is simply that the full force of his ideas has yet to make itself properly felt. This force will in fact be relayed and amplified by

the many disciplines and specialisms that nowadays contribute to the study of social interaction – and it is as one of the principal founding fathers of *that* (rather perhaps than as the author of ideas about face-work, response cries, footing or other specific contributions) that he will in time come to be seen to have had a lasting effect on linguistic theorizing.¹

In order to illustrate these points, as well as to underline Goffman's particular contributions to linguistics, I shall take up some suggestions that he made under the rubric of *footing*. It is a frequent complaint about his work in general that not only is it not empirical, but that it is not clear how it might be so. Here I shall attempt to answer this criticism by showing how a number of quite different kinds of evidence can be brought to bear on his ideas about 'footing'.

FOOTING OR PARTICIPATION STRUCTURE

Goffman was concerned from his very earliest work (1953) with the nature of participation in social encounters, the special nature of participation in 'focused' encounters *versus* the studied inattention in unfocused encounters, the ratification of participation, and the different kinds of participation that interactants recognize (for references and discussion see Williams 1980; Goodwin 1981: ch. 1). Talk is properly analysed, he argued, only in the context of the participation status of each person present in an encounter: 'the study of behaviour while speaking and the study of the behaviour of those who are present to each other but not engaged in talk cannot be analytically separated' (1964b: 62; quoted in Williams 1980: 216). He criticized the preponderance of the dyadic model of verbal interchange and suggested that re-analysis of the underlying forms of participation should 'be approached by re-examining the primitive notions of speaker and hearer' (1981b: 128–9), and in effect decomposing them into their underlying constituent concepts.

He went on to develop in several papers a number of analytical distinctions (most of which can be found in fact in incipient form in his dissertation), for example that between addressees and mere overhearers, but the mature statement to which almost all my remarks will be addressed is the short paper called 'Footing' (Goffman 1979), republished in the book *Forms of Talk* (Goffman 1981b).

Goffman has often been accused, with some justice I think, of substituting arrays of categories for both proper theory and proper

observation (see e.g. Lofland 1980). Although his remarks on footing have the same character, there are two extenuating circumstances: first, in such uncharted territory there really seems to be a need for some sort of preliminary Linnean operation; secondly, although he didn't feel it necessary to emphasize this, there are important connections both to his concept of the social self and, more obviously, to the other substantive focus of his work, the social encounter. Here however I shall largely ignore these theoretical connections, which provide the theory breathing life into the categories, seeking only to assess and improve the analytical categories he offered.

'Footing' as the Heart of Deixis

Before proceeding headlong into details, let me briefly sketch why issues of footing, or (as I shall prefer) *participant role*, might be of central interest to linguistics and other disciplines concerned with communication. The central question raised, from a linguistic point of view, is: What are the essential concepts that underlie the phenomenon of *deixis* (or indexicality, as the philosophers prefer)? Deixis concerns, of course, the way in which utterances are semantically or pragmatically anchored to their situation of utterance, by virtue of the fact that certain key words and morphemes have their reference fixed by various (temporal, spatial, participant role and social) parameters of the speech event. Now the importance of the phenomenon to linguistic theory is fundamental and multi-stranded: (a) it introduces an irreducible context-dependence into the nature of meaning; (b) in so doing, it also introduces an irreducible element of subjectivity (Lyons 1982); (c) it may be seen ontogenetically to be the source of reference in general (Lyons 1975); and (d) it has a pervasive influence on many aspects of language structure and meaning (Fillmore 1975). At the heart of deixis are the concepts of participant role – *here* means close to speaker, Latin *iste* means close to addressee, and so on. Yet linguists (and philosophers) have operated with unanalysed concepts of first and second person. If these can be shown to be decomposable, that is a fundamental contribution to our understanding of the whole phenomenon.

For philosophers, many of these same concerns recommend an interest in deixis, and they have also emphasized the interconnection of indexicality, reference, truth-conditions and assertion. But in all this there are signs of serious mistakes, or at least oversimplifications,

arising from the assumption of dyadic verbal interchanges as the basic (or sole) form of human communication – thus the infelicitous term ‘hearer’ is used with vague application by philosophers both formal (e.g. Montague 1974, Stalnaker 1978) and informal (e.g. Searle 1969). For example, the failure to make the elementary distinction between addressee and hearer seems to be at the heart of some of the prolonged debate over the Gricean analysis of communication (see Schiffer 1972). The failures of speech-act theory consequent on this under-analysis of the concept of ‘hearer’ are nicely brought out by Clark and Carlson (1982). Thus many issues in philosophy of language turn on a proper analysis of the categories of participant role that underlie the phenomena of deixis.

Of course there is a sociological and psychological interest also. Ancient grammarians like Apollonius insisted that the concepts of grammatical person were roles like dramatic characters – on this view the pronoun *I* labels a transient role and is not a name for a denotatum (Buhler 1982: 19). It is clear that these are the first such roles learnt by the child and it may be essential to the acquisition of the concept of social role to see the distinction between role and incumbent made at the rapid rate at which the roles of speaker and addressee alternate. It is of considerable interest that children pass (somewhere between the ages of two and three) through a specific phase during which the first and second person pronouns are incorrectly thought to be names and not alternating roles (Clark 1978; see too Bellugi and Klima 1982: 309ff.). Curiously, the nature of participant roles as the prototype social roles *par excellence* is something presupposed rather than stressed by Goffman.

Criteria for Setting Up Categories of Participant Role

We need, it will be argued (following Goffman 1981b), more categories of participant role than are provided by traditional descriptions of the communication situation. In effect, this amounts to the decomposition of the concepts of *speaker* and *addressee* (or ‘hearer’) into their underlying component concepts – allowing them to be recombined into other, related but more specialized participant roles. But how are we to decide how many such categories we need, and exactly which? (Goffman was not explicit here.) I am going to suggest that two rather different kinds of evidence should be brought to bear on these decisions: (a) the examination of grammatical distinctions made in the languages of the world, and (b) the analysis of actual language use. The underlying rationale is this: there is an

interplay between language structure and language use such that usage properties often have effects or correlates in linguistic structure. Thus, by looking at both the more *recherché* aspects of deictic systems of natural languages and at aspects of verbal interaction, we may hope to obtain the best heuristics for putting together a set of potentially universal distinctions – distinctions that may show up in the *use* of one language, but in the *structure* of another (see Levinson 1983: 42ff., for general discussion of this strategy for pragmatic analysis).

In what follows, we shall pursue this strategy. First, we shall develop an elaborate set of categories for possible participant roles. Then we shall review some of the lesser, and underexplored, categories of deixis in a range of languages, attempting to show that at least some of these distinctions in participant role are well-motivated by the grammatical facts. We turn then to matters of language use, distinguishing the study of speech events from the study of the concurrent assignment of participant role during the production of single utterances, and show that, again, good motivation can be had from the study of language use for the finer distinctions in participant role that Goffman and others have recommended.

CATEGORIES FOR THE ANALYSIS OF PARTICIPANT ROLE

Long traditional in our culture is the threefold division between speaker, hearer, and something spoken about. It has been elaborated in information theory, linguistics, semiotics, literary criticism, and sociology in various ways . . . All such schemes appear to agree either in taking the standpoint of an individual speaker or in postulating a dyad, speaker-hearer (or source-destination, sender-receiver, addressor-addressee). Even if such a scheme is intended to be a model, for descriptive work it cannot be.

(Hymes 1972: 58)

Unfortunately, beyond one or two suggestions, Hymes does not offer us any better scheme. How then to proceed? Let us review some earlier suggestions.

Some Earlier Schemes

One way is to take the grammatical distinctions of first, second and third person, and then distinguish special cases: e.g. we could divide

each such category according to presence/absence from the speech event, and this is perhaps part of the traditional wisdom on the subject.³ Thus we would have speakers who speak for themselves *versus* those that speak for absent others (spokesmen), addressees who are intended recipients, *versus* those that are vehicles for a message to absent others (messengers), and third parties who are present (audience) *versus* third parties who are absent (non-participants), as in figure 7.1.

FIGURE 7.1 'Traditional' scheme

(present) <i>speaker</i>	(present) <i>addressee</i>
(absent) <i>source</i>	(absent) <i>target</i>
3rd parties	
(present) <i>audience</i>	
(absent) (not part of speech event)	

Or, alternatively, we might adopt and refine the communication theoretic treatment developed by Shannon and Weaver (1949) and now part of the 'commonsense' about communication (see Lyons 1977: 36ff.). This distinguishes *sender* (source of message) from *transmitter*, and *destination* (goal of message) from *receiver*, as in figure 7.2.

FIGURE 7.2 Communication theory model

sender → *transmitter* → (via channel) → *receiver* → *destination*

However, simple schemes of either of these sorts will not capture the kinds of participant roles actually employed in speech events. For example, consider < 1 > :

- < 1 > (from Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1978: 29)
- | | |
|---------------|---|
| <i>Sharon</i> | You didn' come tuh talk tuh Karen? |
| <i>Mark</i> | No, Karen- Karen' I're having a fight, |
| | (0.4) |
| | after she went out with Keith an' not with (me) |
| <i>Ruthie</i> | Hah hah hah hah |
| <i>Karen</i> | Wul, Mark, you never asked me out |

Intuitively, Mark's utterance has as *addressee* Sharon, but as *target* Karen, inasmuch as (a) Sharon asked a question, and we expect a reply to her from Mark – making Sharon the natural addressee, and

(b) Karen is referred to in the third person, ruling her out as an addressee. Nevertheless, the remark is delivered in Karen's presence, and being a report of a 'fight' and an imputation of blame clearly picks out Karen as a recipient – who may be expected to respond with a defence or counter-complaint (which is in turn forthcoming).

This sort of example is problematic for both the simple schemes above. In the case of the 'traditional' scheme, we have an indirect target who is nevertheless present and attending to the utterance in question; and in the case of the communication-theory scheme we have a receiver (Sharon) and also a destination (Karen), but the message is not transmitted by virtue of a physical link between Sharon and Karen. And whereas the traditional scheme at least has something to say about Ruthie's appreciative laughter (she's in *audience* role), the communication-theory scheme seems quite unhelpful here.

So we need at least more terms, like some term for the source of the spokesman's message, and some term for third parties who are neither audience nor absent. Further, we need a compositional analysis that breaks these categories down into minimal constituents and then shows how they are re-assembled into apparently simple concepts like (present) *speaker* in the traditional scheme. In short we need some finer-grained conceptual analysis, and a bundle of terms to label the constituent and compound concepts.

Before proceeding, it is essential to note a systematic ambiguity in the use of terms like *speaker*, *addressee* and *audience*, namely a *speech-event/speech-act* ambiguity. Thus one can identify the speakers, addressees, and members of the audience during an entire *speech event* (e.g. a conference), but also during a single speech act, or as we shall prefer *utterance-event* (in order to avoid some of the baggage of speech-act theory). This leads to a systematic ambiguity in the use of terms like *speaker* and *audience*: for example, a guest speaker at an interactive seminar may be the designated speaker in the speech-event sense even when someone else is doing the talking (a speaker in the utterance-event sense). The ambiguity arises, of course, because particular participant roles may be systematically and unevenly distributed over the personnel present, throughout a speech event. Here, however, we are specifically concerned with the *utterance-event* use of terms like *speaker* and *addressee*; for the speech-event usage is parasitic on this primary usage, in ways I hope to show. In due course, we shall see that the notion of an *utterance-event* is itself problematic, but for the moment let us say that an

utterance-event is that stretch of a turn at talk over which there is a constant set of participant roles mapped into the same set of individuals – i.e. that unit within which the function from the set of participant roles to the set of individuals is held constant. Think of the categories to be proposed below, then, as a blow-by-blow analysis of the proceedings during some speech event, *not* an overall summation of roles held throughout such a speech event. (Those roles, and many other factors, may be involved in the recognition of which participant roles are activated in a single utterance event; but I am here distinguishing questions of *process of category assignment* from questions about the primordial set of categories themselves.)

Goffman's Categories of Participation in Talk

Goffman begins with a notion of *footing* that is not entirely clear; indeed it seems intended to have some pretty global and correspondingly vague application. Issues of footing occur where 'participant's alignment, or set, or stance, or projected self is somehow at issue' (1981b: 128); examples range from a President's switch of frame from press conference to remarks to a journalist on her dress, to a lecturer's switch from text to self-commentary or aside (*ibid.*: 174ff.), to a radio announcer's change in voice consequent on change of subject matter (*ibid.*: 237).

However, changes of footings are communicated especially through changes in *participation*, these expressed linguistically: 'linguistics provides us with the cues and markers through which such footings become manifest' (*ibid.*: 157). Indeed, Goffman sometimes speaks as if footing reduced to matters of participation status: 'the alignment of an individual to a particular utterance whether involving a production format, as in the case of a speaker, or solely a participation status, as in the case of a hearer, can be referred to as his *footing*' (*ibid.*: 227). Thus questions of participation status at least partially exhaust the notion of footing, and I shall not be over-cautious in my use of the two terms.

Goffman (like his colleague at Pennsylvania, Hymes, quoted above) emphasized the inadequacy of the terms 'speaker' and 'hearer', as incautiously used by linguists and philosophers, and the dyadic model of communication that those terms seem to presuppose.⁴ He suggests the need for 'decomposing them into smaller, analytically coherent elements' (*ibid.*: 129). The notion of hearer should be decomposed into a set of categories for different kinds of recipient, collectively termed *participation framework* in a later essay

(ibid.: 226); while the notion of speaker should be decomposed in a similar way into a set of categories he termed the *production format* (ibid.: 226). Table 7.1 outlines the kind of categories he had in mind (note my suggested reformation of his terminology). Goffman notes (ibid.: 136) that the inclusion of bystanders in this set of categories implies application not just to the focused social encounter but also to the wider *social situation*, 'the full physical arena in which persons present are in sight and sound of one another'. Thus those studiously 'disattending' a conversation come within our orbit too; as do those *response cries* produced outside a ratified circle of reception solely for the benefit of bystanders.

Unfortunately, although Goffman's categories are a notable advance on earlier schemes, they do not seem sufficient. First, they appear empirically inadequate, simply not providing sufficient distinctions: thus Karen's role in <1> remains undesignated, as it did in the earlier schemes (here, she'd have to be in the same role as Ruthie as 'unaddressed ratified participant'). Secondly, they remain essentially unexplicated – we are not given sufficient characterization to make the application of the terms at all clear. Thirdly, he fails to consistently make the crucial distinction between *utterance-event* and

TABLE 7.1 Goffman's participation roles (1981b page references)

Production format (henceforth *production roles*):

- 1 *animator* 'the sounding box' (p. 226)
- 2 *author* 'the agent who scripts the lines' (p. 226)
- 3 *principal* 'the party to whose position the words attest' (p. 226)

Participation framework (henceforth *reception roles*)

A: *ratified* (p. 226)

- 1 *addressed recipient* 'the one to whom the speaker addresses his visual attention and to whom, incidentally, he expects to turn over his speaking role' (p. 133; cf. 1976)
- 2 *unaddressed recipient* (p. 133) the rest of the 'official hearers', who may or may not be listening

B: *unratified*

- 1 *over-hearers* 'inadvertent', 'non-official' listeners (p. 132) or *bystanders*
 - 2 *eavesdroppers* 'engineered', 'non-official' followers of talk (p. 132)
-

Note that Goffman's misleading term 'participation framework' will henceforth be replaced by 'reception roles', retaining 'participation' – as Goffman sometimes used it (ibid.: 137) – to cover both the production and reception role sets.

speech-event applications of these terms (although he indicated his awareness of the ambiguity (*ibid.*: 137)). This leads him to suggest that his categories are only applicable to one kind of activity, namely conversation, and that in others, such as 'podium talk', other sets of categories like 'actor' *versus* 'audience' will be required (*ibid.*: 140). In that case, all such sets of categories would be activity-specific, and of course culturally relative, playing no possible part in a comparative ethnography of speaking. All three failings are, I believe, important analytical errors, which I shall try to correct.

Some Further Systematization

There are at least two ways of developing a systematic set of relevant categories. We could take some participant roles as basic or primitive, and then define derivative participant roles in terms of the basic ones.

For example, we could set up a simple scheme, as in table 7.2, in which we make a distinction between *source* and *speaker* (or utterer), noting that sources may or may not be participants in an utterance event; and a similar distinction between *addressee* and *target* at the receiving end (targets being not necessarily, but possibly, participants). Employing the same notion of *participant*, we could say that an *audience* is constituted of those participants who are not *producers* (= sources or speakers) and not *recipients* (= addressees or targets). (Note that this is an utterance-event definition of the

TABLE 7.2 A system of basic and derived categories

Basic categories

source = informational/illocutionary origin of message

target = informational/illocutionary destination of message

speaker = utterer

addressee = proximate destination

participant = a party with a ratified channel-link to other parties

Derived categories (formed from Boolean operations on basic categories)

producers = sources or speakers

recipients = addressees or targets

author = source and speaker

relayer = speaker who is not the source

goal = an addressee who is the target

intermediary = an addressee who is not the target

etc.

concept of audience, and that we would naturally use the speech-event definition rather differently – there, the audience may be the target, etc.) Then, with a basic set of categories like that, we could go on to define derivative categories of some utility – e.g. we could say an *author* is someone in the role of both *source* and *speaker*, a *goal* someone who is both *addressee* and *target*, etc.

Such a scheme is quite adequate for most purposes, but it would be more satisfactory if we could break down the basic concepts into defining features and re-assemble them to make the more complex categories we need. This requires an understanding of the underlying categorial dimensions, which are by no means easy to discern. But as a first approximation, we might offer the feature analyses in tables 7.4 and 7.5 (table 7.3 introduces the method through a simplified version). These employ the rich classificatory potential of matrices of polythetic defining characteristics – I borrow the ‘technology’ unadulterated from phonology.⁵

The terms suggested are, I am aware, far from felicitous; but natural English metalanguage (although helpful up to a point with terms like ‘spokesman’) could hardly be expected to run to this level of discrimination, which is hopefully of some universal application. But the terms themselves are of no analytical importance. What is essential, though, is the set of underlying discriminations – the labels utilized here are I hope more or less transparent, although the underlying concepts may be anything but that, as we shall see in the next section. However, let me indicate roughly what I have in mind: *TRANSMISSION* is the property that utterers or actual transmitters have, *MESSAGE ORIGIN* the property of originating the message, which in the more complex scheme (table 7.4) I have split into having the *MOTIVE* or desire to communicate some particular message, and devising the *FORM* or format of the message. On the receiving end (table 7.5), we have the feature of *ADDRESS*, i.e.

TABLE 7.3 Production roles (simple version)

	MESSAGE ORIGIN	TRANSMISSION
<i>author</i>	+	+
<i>indirect source</i>	+	—
<i>relayer</i>	—	+
Super-ordinate ('natural') classes:		
<i>speaker</i>	= + TRANSMISSION	
<i>source</i>	= + ORIGIN	

TABLE 7.5 Reception roles

ADDRESS	RECIPIENT	PARTICIPANT	CHANNEL-LINK	Examples
(a) Participant reception roles				
<i>interlocutor</i>	+	+	+	ordinary addressee
<i>indirect target</i>	-	+	+	see Karen in <1>
<i>intermediary</i>	+	-	+	committee chairman
<i>audience</i>	-	-	+	see Ruthie in <1>
(b) Non-participant reception roles				
<i>overhearer</i>	-	-	+	bystanders
<i>targetted overhearer</i>	-	+	+	Barbadian 'butt'
<i>ultimate destination</i>	-	+	-	
Redundancy rules:				
+ PARTICIPANT $\rightarrow$ + CHANNEL-LINK				
(Corollary: - CHANNEL-LINK $\rightarrow$ - PARTICIPANT)				
+ ADDRESS $\rightarrow$ + PARTICIPANT				
Useful superordinate classes:				
<i>recipient</i> = + RECIPIENT				
<i>addressee</i> = + ADDRESS				
<i>participant</i> = + PARTIC				
<i>hearer</i> = + CHANNEL-LINK				
etc.				

TABLE 7.4 Production roles (complex version)

Term	PARTIC	TRANS	MOTIVE	FORM	Examples
(a) Participant producer roles					
<i>author</i>	+	+	+	+	ordinary speaker
' <i>ghostie</i> '	+	+	+	~	ghosted speaker
<i>spokesman</i>	+	+	-	+	barrister
<i>relayer</i>	+	+	-	-	reader of statement
<i>deviser</i>	+	-	+	+	statement maker
<i>sponsor</i>	+	-	+	-	defendant in court
' <i>ghostor</i> '	+	-	-	+	copresent ghost writer
(b) Non-participant producer roles					
<i>ultimate source</i>	-	~	+	+	source of military command
<i>principal</i>	-	-	+	~	delegate's constituents
<i>formulator</i>	-	-	-	+	absent ghost writer

Redundancy rule:

+ TRANSMITTER → (implies) + PARTIC

corollary: ~ PARTIC → ~ TRANSMITTER

Useful superordinate categories (unspecified for other features):

speaker = + TRANS (Goffman's animator)

composr = + FORM (Goffman's author)

motivator = + MOTIVE (Goffman's principal)

source = (+ MOTIVE, + FORM)

whether the message picks out a recipient by means of a feature of address, including second-person forms, vocatives, gesture, gaze or a combination thereof, or even just sheer singularity of possible recipients. *RECIPIENTSHIP* may be indicated by linguistic form, e.g. by formulation of information, but is hard to define – informally it is about who a message is *for*. Being a *PARTICIPANT* has something to do with what Goffman calls a ‘ratified role’ in the proceedings, and presupposes *CHANNEL-LINKAGE* or ability to receive the message. As we shall see, these concepts are none too clear, but at least using them we can define a provisional vocabulary with discriminations sufficient for what follows.

Finally, I should note that one area that I’m glossing over at present is exactly how to think about utterance events that imply prior to following utterance events; e.g. ‘Tell Charles to empty the garbage’ projects a succeeding utterance event, and ‘Harry said to tell you to empty the garbage’ implies a preceding utterance event. By invoking the distinction + / – *PARTICIPANT* we may distinguish between sources and recipients linked to this utterance event by other ones – thus in these cases we may talk of the ultimate source or *origo* (Harry) and (ultimate) *destination* (Charles). Again, I am not sure that this is a useful conceptualization, but it will be sufficient for current purposes.

Underlying Dimensions

Our ready ability to construct schemes of this sort should not distract us from analysis of the underlying dimensions on which they are constructed. However, this analysis proves quite difficult and is probably best done by examining the empirical materials that motivate these distinctions in the first place. It will be useful, though, to consider in advance some of the problems that arise.

First, consider the implications of the idea that these are social roles. On the dyadic analysis of a social status (as in Warner 1937, or Goodenough 1967), a single status (like ‘father’, ‘doctor’) implies a ‘grammatical’ pairing of social identities (‘father/son’; ‘doctor/patient’), to which the rights of one identity constitute the duties of the other. In a dyadic conversation, the assignment of speaking role to A will thus imply addressee/recipient role to B. (The same may hold of two-party speech-exchange systems, where each party may consist of more than one individual, as in press conferences (q.v. Schegloff, (b), in press) – reminding us once again that issues of role are to be distinguished from issues of incumbency.) However, we

are especially interested in just those cases where this dyadic mode of analysis seems inadequate – where more parties are presupposed than just speaker and addressee.

But this does raise the important question of the connection of concepts of participant role to the essentially dyadic system of turn-taking in conversation. From the perspective of such two-party arrangements, issues of participant role might be held (I believe erroneously) to more or less reduce to the study of the turn-taking system, and its associated back-up systems. The turn-taking procedures are a set of mechanisms that provide participants with a reasonably clear procedure for deciding *whose* turn to speak it currently is, and consequently who is thus in the complementary set of (non-speaking) roles – audience/recipient/addressee. The back-up systems provide, *inter alia*, for ways of resolving whose turn it is when simultaneous speech has started. These systems have been deeply explored by Schegloff and associates and I shall not attempt to summarize their findings here (see Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1978; Levinson 1983: ch. 6; Goodwin 1981 specifically addresses the relation of the turn-taking system to Goffman's categories of participant role). Suffice it to say that the turn-taking system in conversation 'organizes but two speakers at a time, "current and next", and is not overtly directed to the size of the pool from which current and next are selected' (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1978: 22), hence its elasticity in handling from two speakers up to indefinitely many. Further, many kinds of non-conversational turn-taking systems likewise assume just two parties, where one (or more) of the parties may have multiple incumbents (Schegloff (b) in press; cf. the press conferences mentioned immediately above).⁷ Thus, it seems that we cannot look to the turn-taking system for any direct analysis of participant role. This is despite the fact that the turn-taking system is clearly deeply related to issues of participant role. Consider, for example, that the so-called 'back-channel' markers like *mhmm*, *uhuh*, etc., are transmissions effectively renouncing speaker role (see Schegloff 1982); that they typically violate the phonotactic rules of the language is perhaps an iconic indication that they are not a speaker's speech. Consider too that from a turn-taking point of view 'a party may be a speaker even though he is not saying anything at the moment' (Goodwin 1981: 3).

In any case, what we are concerned with here is what happens when this dyadic pattern of analysis appears to be inadequate, for example when the speaker with the current turn is not to be thought of as the source of the message, or when there is no other party being

addressed, or where who is addressed is not the intended destination or target, and so on. Thus, the turn-taking system, while certainly germane to many of these issues, appears to operate at a higher level of abstraction as it were: it assumes two parties, without distinguishing the different possible compositions of each of those categories. Quite probably, the universal tendency in languages to distinguish, in pronominal categories or elsewhere, primarily and prototypically the two deictic categories of first and second person, is related closely to the superordinate categories of speaker and addressee/recipient that are the basis of the turn-taking system.

Another initial problem is to clarify the distinction between role and the two aspects of incumbency: self-presentation as an incumbent of the role *versus* other-assignment of self as incumbent of a role. Consider, for example, that a speaker may seek a particular individual (e.g. by gaze) as an addressee, but that party may choose not to attend in that capacity; meanwhile another party may attempt to usurp the role of addressee by displays of reciprocity (see Goodwin 1979, 1981: ch. 1; and discussion in 203–5 below). Clearly a participant role is, from the point of view of participants, not something that is unilaterally assigned, but rather jointly negotiated.

Let us turn now to the set of roles themselves and indicate some of the problems that assail any such mode of analysis. The concepts involved in the production set of roles are, compared to the reception end, relatively unproblematic. Of these, message transmission, or emission, is the most straightforward; but even here there are kinds of language use where the application of the property is not so clear. We have noted already that if 'speakership' is a role assigned by the turn-taking system, then an individual can be the incumbent of that role when he is silent and someone else is transmitting (back-channel cues, laughter or other signs of recipient role) – thus the relationship between speakership and transmission is not straightforward. Consider too, for example, simultaneous translation: A transmits a message in code L to B, who transmits the 'same' message in code M to C – is there one speaker but two transmitters? Or consider cases where the natives hold that something or someone is transmitting a message, but an observer may be in doubt, as in cases of divination (cf. Evans-Pritchard 1937: part III) or when the Ojibwa claim that the thunder says determinate things (Hallowell, cited in Hymes 1974: 13). Or, to bring the problem home, when the mother interprets the child's one 'word' utterance as the determinate proposition P (see 208–9 below), has the child actually transmitted P? (For the Wishram, children's pre-speech babblings were considered

sensible transmissions in a language known only to babies, dogs and coyotes – Sapir, cited in Hymes 1974: 74). The point is that the concept of transmitting ('speaker') role is not at heart so straightforward. However, if we keep in mind that participant roles are interactively assigned, then we can see that the fact that the 'natives' might assign transmission-based roles where the analyst might not is hardly a serious conceptual problem.

Leaving transmission aside, we turn to the characterization of the *source* of the message. The distinction between *source* and *transmission* may be clear enough in the case of the newscaster reading from a script – although even here prosodic 'colouring' can play an important role in the perception of the message (Goffman 1981b: 227ff.). But it becomes much more difficult where the individual doing the transmitting has some partial role in the origin of the message. (Consider, for example, the distinction between directly quoted and indirectly quoted speech.) One underlying problem here is to distinguish the source of the information from the source of the illocution – the proposition P may derive from some other party, but the commitment with which it is relayed may vary, and the very indication of a source other than the transmitter may weaken or strengthen that commitment (see discussion of evidentials in 184–6 below). Or consider a military order issued through a chain of command: it presumably has the illocutionary force derived from both the original source and the most proximate source or transmitter; in contrast, it seems unlikely that an actor could be sued if the TV advertisement he enacted made false claims – the transmitter there carries no illocutionary commitment. Thus, it may be argued, it is not sufficient to distinguish just two elements of the *Source* (namely, *Motive* and *Form*) – we may also need a distinction between different kinds of *Content* (namely *Force* and *Proposition* or the like).

However, it is the reception-role set that is especially resistant to analysis. First there is the issue of what constitutes *channel-linkage*. In the case of verbal communication, being within audible range of the transmitter is clearly a precondition. For some cultures, that will not be sufficient, as when in Guugu Yimidhirr much essential referential information is indicated gesturally (Haviland 1986b). But in any case more is presupposed; specifically, it may be claimed, a shared code – unless that should properly require an additional feature (or features).⁸ Yet the basic message of sociolinguistics is that concepts like 'shared code' are highly problematic. Glossing over these difficulties, let us say that being able to 'tune-in', then, to both

channel and message code, will constitute the essence of channel-linkage – but an essence not easily explicated.

The notion of *participant* is problematic in part because it is hard to escape the speech-event level of analysis; in speech events, the processes by which 'ratification' in that role is achieved are potentially perhaps as diverse as the varieties of speech events themselves. In the speech-event sense, it is possible to be a participant that is non-attentive, even temporarily not in channel-linkage (as when the international delegate takes off his headset through which simultaneous translations are delivered). However, in the utterance-event sense central here, a participant is such just by virtue of actual or presumed attentiveness, and it is here that studies of displays of participancy have been most instructive. Heath (1982, 1984), for example, argues that kinesic and postural displays of 'availability' for participation are systematically distinguishable from displays of 'recipency': whereas the former indicates readiness for interaction should it occur, the latter may actually invite another to speak (1982: 154ff.). Goodwin (1984) shows that while a speaker A tells a dinner-table story to addressee B, the members of the audience C and D so time their non-verbal activities that they properly coincide with the pivotal points in the story (so that, for example, they are not involved in other activities when the punch line is reached). Further, where C is the butt (indirect target) of the story, he will so organize his movements that his facial display is appropriate precisely at the moment (at the end of the punch line) when all gaze is turned to him. Thus the roles of C and D are also systematically distinguished posturally and kinesically. Thus, participation is a demonstrative social role,⁹ where each kind of participant role requires a particular kind of appropriate display by its incumbent (we return to these issues in 204–5 below).

Recipientship and *address* are best discussed together. A recipient is someone whom a message is *for*; it is thus perhaps essentially a role defined by the pertinence of the *informational (or attitudinal) content*. The roles of recipient and addressee come apart in our culturally favoured genre of speech event, the formal chaired meeting, where the addressee is always properly the chair, and the recipient often some other individual. Because recipientship is essentially informational, the means whereby it is recognized are perhaps primarily matters of content and sequencing: in a chaired meeting, a question about books may be clearly aimed at the librarian present, while a retort to a challenge may have its target made clear by its sequential location immediately after the challenge. The sequential aspects of

talk designed for overhearers have been subject to preliminary investigation by Heritage (1985). He finds, for example, that in courtroom and news-interview talk there is an almost complete absence of the news receipt tokens (like 'Oh, really') typical after reports in conversations (1985: 98). This he suggests is primarily because such tokens presuppose that their speakers are the 'primary addressees' of the prior utterance, while in courtrooms and news interviews the elicited reports are in fact primarily for others (1985: 100). Instead of 'Oh, really' and the like, reports are often received in these settings with 'formulations' that further direct the talk in specific channels useful to the overhearers. However, there are also subtle linguistic and kinesic indicators of intended reciprocity, about which more later (203-21). In short, recipients are designated destinations for messages, but the ways in which these destinations are distinguished from other participants (or non-participants) are both subtle and hardly understood.

Address is, in the last resort, quite puzzling. It is often suggested that the addressee is that participant with the right to reply (Lyons 1977: 34; Goffman 1981b: 133), but it is clear that this is not definitional (as when the judge sentences the defendant, or the priest blesses the congregation; see also conversational counter-evidence in 209-20 below). Although there are formal linguistic features of address in second-person pronouns and other grammatical features encoding second person, these do not generally in and of themselves serve to pick out one addressee from other participants. (Exceptions are forms reserved for particular dignitaries, etc.; in languages with rich honorifics, these too may serve to unambiguously single out addressees; and as Goffman notes (1981b: 126), citing Gumperz, the choice of a minority language in code-switching situations may convert all non-addressees into non-participants.) Vocatives (names, titles, etc., often with special inflections) may serve to exactly identify an addressee, as may an ostensive gesture (making clear the envisioned division of labour in an utterance like 'You do the dishes and you clean the floor'). But only some small proportion of utterances are so directly addressed, making gaze and body posture, in English anyway, central (Beattie 1983; Goodwin 1981).

Why do languages, and users of them, not make more verbally explicit the feature of address? It seems that the deep analytical difficulties that attend analysis of the recipient-role set in fact follow naturally from the intrinsic nature of the vocal-auditory channel that has been selected in evolution to carry the bulk of human communication. That channel is, as Hockett (1960) put it, the natural choice

for 'broadcast transmission' – sign language will fare ill in the jungle or in the dark. For generalized warning signals, that broadcast nature will hardly be a limitation; but for human social organization it is deeply problematic. Consider, for example, the operation of a rule of the sort 'don't tell people what they already know' (for which there is ample evidence (Levinson 1986)); how can such a rule operate in a broadcast system of communication? Or how can one ensure that insults go to one's inferiors but not to those who rule the roost? Skilful use of amplitude is one natural (and much used) solution (see 205–8 below and Goldberg 1978), but more is required. The solutions, I suggest, are attempts to create, via the features of address, a directed focal channel of communication in a medium that is essentially resistant to it. It is this perhaps that explains the special role of gaze in conversational activity, specifically the finding that speakers' gaze at addressees to check whether reciprocal gaze is forthcoming (Goodwin 1981: 74ff., and references therein) – the visual medium of gaze providing a precise alignment of channel (Beattie 1983: 23) necessarily absent from the aural medium. But given the recalcitrant medium, we cannot expect address to be always unequivocal – indeed we can see that achieving successful address without the use of unambiguous vocatives is indeed an achievement.

Finally, we should note that issues of informational *versus* illocutionary nature emerge at the receiving end of communication, just as they do at the production end. Consider an utterance of the sort 'The last one to leave the room turn off the light': none of the addressees may, in the event, be the last one to leave the room – others may come; the instruction is for the last one to leave the room, whomsoever he or she is (for the theoretical consequences of this sort of example, see Clark and Carlson 1982). Is this person the intended recipient (if so we shall have to alter our scheme so that + *RECIPIENT* does not imply + *PARTICIPANT*)? I think not: it is one of those (problematic) cases where what is said projects a future utterance event.

Some Consideration of the Minimal Components in an Utterance Event

It is tempting to say that for an utterance event to occur we need *minimally* a *speaker* and a *recipient*. To clarify the discussion, we should, following Goodwin (1981), distinguish the participant *roles* from the *incumbents* of those roles. Doing that, we can see that 'talking to oneself' is not a counter-example to the hypothetical

necessity for at least a speaker and a recipient, but rather just the limiting case where the incumbent of both roles is the same person. But what is a counter-example, perhaps, is the phenomenon of *out-louds* (Goffman's (1981) term is *response cries*). A Goffmanesque example might be: I am standing in a bus queue and finally the bus is seen rounding the corner – I say 'Phew, at last!'. One analysis here would be that there is a recipient, namely myself and any others that care to elect themselves. Another analysis would be: there is no recipient, unless someone elects himself, such utterances being designed to make possible, but not to presuppose, the existence of a possible set of addressees or audience. Whatever the status of these English *out-louds*, there seem to be certain speech acts in many languages that do not presuppose an audience; certain expressives like *ouch!*, *damn!* etc., do not seem to be addressed to self or others (they may well of course have *indirect targets*); or consider *imprecatives*, conventional curses or blessings, that do not seem to require a co-present addressee or audience (though they may presuppose an omnipresent spiritual bystander). There will be further discussion of this below, but the relevant upshot here is that for a verbal expression to constitute an utterance event which invokes the categories of participant role, all that seems to be necessary is that there is a transmitter or speaker.¹⁰

One important point raised by the distinction between role and incumbency is that any role may be occupied by any number of incumbents simultaneously (in the case of speakers, of course, this implies a chorus). Alternatively, one individual can stand duty for a joint incumbency (as when the chairman of the jury announces 'guilty'). This makes possible some further potentially distinctive participant roles, e.g. we could define a *representative* as a speaker (transmitter) who is one of a set of persons in the source, or *goal-member* as an addressee who is one of the intended recipients, etc. But as long as the distinction between incumbency and role is not forgotten, we can handle such cases with analytical clarity when they occur.

GRAMMATICAL MOTIVATION FOR CATEGORIES OF PARTICIPANT ROLE

Grammatical Category of Person versus Participant Role

Let us turn now to examine evidence from language structure for the finely discriminated kinds of participant role we have considered.

We shall here be concerned with the ways in which the concepts underlying *first* and *second* person must (arguably) be broken down into their component concepts, at least for the description of some languages. However, it is important to bear in mind that there is a distinction between the *grammatical categories* of person, and the *interactional* and *indexical* notions of participant role (Lyons 1977: 636ff.).¹¹ It seems reasonable to suppose that the set of potential participant roles are universally relevant (which is not to say that some may or may not be in much greater use in some societies) and the present paper is based on this assumption.¹² But it is very much an empirical question as to how, and to what extent, the set of participant roles are *grammaticalized* in specific languages.¹³ Thus I shall try to argue that participant roles more specialized than simple speaker (first person) and addressee (second person) are sometimes encoded in the structure of languages, although my data here is still rather sparse. The necessity and utility of making the distinction between the grammatical categories of person and the interactional categories of participant role is demonstrated by the *slippage* that can occur between the two sets of categories. For example we are all familiar with cases where grammatical second-person forms are used for referents that are not in specific participant roles at all ('You can never tell nowadays'), or third-person forms used for persons in addressee participant role (as in 'Your Honour is ruling on a point of law?'), or first-person forms used for persons in addressee role (the condescending *we*). Nevertheless, despite the sometimes indirect relation between the two sets of categories, there may be much to be learnt from grammatical distinctions about the kinds of participant role we need to distinguish between.

First and Second Person as Prototype Categories?

It is only comparatively recently (starting with Bühler [1934] 1982) that serious linguistic attention has been paid to deixis (see Levinson 1983: ch. 2 for a review). The three 'persons' of the classical linguistic tradition are of course central here, and the dramaturgical analogy (*persona*, player's mask, character in a play) employed in classical thought was, insists Bühler (1982: 19), entirely appropriate: 'the words *I* and *you* refer to the role holders in the on-going speech drama'. (Part of Goffman's interest in participant roles must indeed have been in their nature as ontogenetic prototypes for social roles in general.)

The classical analysis has held up remarkably well in the face of recent comparative analysis.¹⁴ The great majority of languages

exhibit the three persons in a paradigm of pronouns, verb agreements or elsewhere (Forchheimer 1953; Ingram 1978; Anderson and Keenan 1985). It's important of course to see that 'third person' is a residual category – neither speaker nor addressee – and for that reason there are languages without third-person pronouns (as in the Ngaanyatjara dialect of the Western Desert of Australia, Dixon 1980: 357; Australian languages seem therefore to invalidate Ingram's (1978) putative universals). Some languages appear to lack proper pronouns, using third-person titles for reference to speaker and hearer; this seems to be an areal feature in SE Asia, where it is linked to elaborate honorific systems (see Sansom 1928; Emeneau 1951: ch. 4; Cooke 1968). But Lyons (1977: 641ff.) argues that such systems presuppose the concepts of first and second person that they seem to do without.

However, with these exceptions in mind, it does seem that there is something natural enough about the grouping of concepts into 'speaker', 'addressee' and 'other' to make the classical three-person system recur in most natural languages. Given the kinds of possible distinction explored in tables 7.4 and 7.5 above, this calls for explanation: why should most languages utilize first- and second-person grammatical categories that are indifferent to all the finer distinctions that are possible? One answer may be that pronouns universally exhibit a 'prototype' semantics (Fillmore 1982) based on a canonical situation of utterance where there are only two participants, so that the composite notions 'speaker' and 'addressee' exhaust the relevant participant roles, and third persons are non-participants. Another possible kind of explanation for the omnipresent dyadic categories of first and second person is to be found in the two-party nature of the turn-taking system, which appears to be (in this respect at least) universal for informal talk; the two-party system being indifferent to the number of possible participants and to the exact participant role in which they stand.

Despite this indubitable tendency for first- and second-person grammatical categories to be realized in such a way that they conflate the finer distinctions we have explored, these finer discriminations are often grammaticalized in less salient ways in (perhaps) most languages.

In searching for grammatical realizations of participant role, it is important to remember that person deixis – that is, participant role – can be grammatically encoded *directly* in many ways other than by pronouns, e.g. quite typically in verb morphology and perhaps always in vocative forms. Thus in many languages one can say 'The

woman am complaining' meaning ['I (female) am complaining']* where the category of first person is carried only by the verb agreement (e.g. Spanish, Warlpiri, Tamil; see Anderson and Keenan 1985: 264). Secondly, participant role is *indirectly* encoded, or presupposed, in many other aspects of deixis: in time deixis, tenses and time adverbs are normally interpreted relative to the time the message is encoded by speaker or writer; in place deixis, locations are typically expressed relative to the location of speaker or addressee or both; in social deixis, the social relationship of the speaker to the addressee or to a third-person referent is what is typically encoded (for a review of each of these areas, see Levinson 1983: ch. 2). Person deixis has an importance in linguistic theory not only because it guarantees an irreducible subjectivity in language (Lyons 1982), but also simply because it is pervasive.

Grammaticalization of Non-prototypical Participant Roles

I wish now to show that unanalysed notions like 'speaker' and 'addressee' are inadequate to handle the grammatical distinctions made in the deictic (and other) systems of various languages. Instead, just in order to describe these facts properly, we shall need to use the decomposed concepts coalesced in those putatively prototype categories.

Let us start at the production end. The prototype notion 'speaker', we've suggested, subsumes the concepts of transmitter (Goffman's 'animator'), motivator (Goffman's 'principal') and composer (Goffman's 'author'). One clear area of grammar where these decompose is in what Jakobson called *evidentials* (Jakobson 1971: 135). Many languages require that one specify the personal commitment with which an assertion is produced, the epistemic basis for assertions being intrinsically linked to degrees of commitment beyond mere transmission. Consider Hidatsa: there are six sentence-final affixes that signal six 'moods' (Matthews 1965: 99ff.):¹⁵

- 1 'period' mood (-c): this 'indicates that the speaker believes the sentence to be true; if it should turn out otherwise, it would mean that he was mistaken, but by no means a liar' – the most used form;

* Editors' note: in this chapter glosses of expressions or statements in the text are notated through the form [' ']; actual, or purportedly actual, utterances are notated, as in other chapters, with single quotation marks alone.

- 2 'emphatic' mood (-*ski*): indicates certainty and commitment and can be used to signal a promise;
- 3 'quotative' mood (-*wareae*): glossed as 'they say', indicating a second-hand but indefinite source, used, for example, to retell stories and myths;
- 4 'report' mood (-*rahe*): 'indicates that the speaker was told the information given in the sentence by someone else, but has no other evidence of its truth value';
- 5 'indefinite' (-*toak*); and
- 6 'question' moods: 'the question and indefinite mood are alike in that they both indicate that the speaker does not know whether or not the sentence is true. The indefinite also means that the speaker thinks the listener (sic) does not know; whereas the question means that the speaker thinks the listener does know.'

Matthews (1965: 101) also notes that there are systematic patterns in the relation of first tellings to second tellings, such that if A tells P to B, and B relays this to C, the relayed message has a largely predictable mood:

Original Mood	Mood on Retelling
A → B	retold by B → C
Emphatic	Period
Period	Period/report
Quotative/report	Quotative/report
Indefinite/question	Indefinite/question

One would like to know a lot more about how such a system is actually used, but it is clear that the epistemic basis for a statement, and thus its authorial status, is here distinguished in various ways from its mere transmission. (Incidentally, Tagalog appears to have a similar distinction between quotative and reportative sentences – see Sadock and Zwicky 1985: 168, citing Schachter and Otnes 1972: 414.)

Systems of evidentials are apparently common, especially in Amerindian languages. Thus Boas (1911, vol. 1: 496) lists four contrastive suffixes for Kwakiutl:

- 1 -*2 la* = 'it is said/hearsay';
- 2 -*emsku* = 'as I told you before';

- 3 -*xent* = 'evidently, as shown by evidence';
 4 -*eng.a* = 'from a dream'.

Similarly in Tzeltal (Brown & Levinson 1978: 152ff.) and Lahu (Matisoff 1973: 331ff.) there are numerous evidential particles. In Guugu Yimidhirr (Haviland 1979a; supplemented by author's fieldwork), myths and well-known historical tales are properly told using a special aspect marker (similar to the use of quotative in Hidatsa) on all appropriate verbs, so that the communal status of the subject matter is clearly distinguished from the transmitter's role (a fact which fits together in a complex way with 'ownership' of stories by birthright; see also Dixon 1980: 49). Or in Turkish, the 'inferential mood' 'conveys that the information it gives is based either on hearsay or on inference from observed facts, but not on the speaker's having seen the action take place' (Lewis 1967: 122, cited in Sadock and Zwicky 1985: 169). But, Lyons (1982: 111) reminds us, we do not need to go so far afield: French has a verbal form known as the 'quotative conditional' (*le conditionnel de citation*) which implies an indirect source:

Le premier ministre serait (cf. est) malade
 ['The prime minister is, reportedly, ill']

He points out that the gloss is misleading in that it erroneously suggests that such a sentence can be adequately paraphrased by another that makes the 'quotative' nature explicit – a point that holds for all the evidential forms we have reviewed.

Clearly, what most of these evidentials do is distinguish between (in the terms of tables 7.3 and 7.4) the relayer or transmitter and the informational source. Now there may be some doubt that such distinctions in *informational* source are closely related to distinctions in what one might wish to see as *illocutionary* source: it may be rather different to say something on one's own behalf that one has heard from another than to be paid to say something devised by another for that other's purposes (as in a TV commercial). But there is clearly a close and intrinsic connection: indeed on a Searlian analysis of assertion, I cannot sincerely assert P just because you told me to assert P, unless I have reason to firmly believe P. Thus differing strengths and grounds for belief imply differing illocutionary forces, a point made well by those languages that signal a gradation of forces from assertion to question, usually by particles. Tamil is one such language (Brown and Levinson 1978: 164ff.), Japanese another (Tsuchihashi 1983).

Related to the phenomena of evidentials is the set of grammatical distinctions between different kinds of reported speech. In moving from 'John said "I'm coming"' to 'John said that he would come' it is often said that we move from a 'verbatim' to a 'gist' report and thus from relayer role to formulator or spokesman role (see Banfield 1973; Lyons 1968: 174). Indirectly, authorial or non-authorial status can also be indicated by the fact that a number of languages have forms only used by *authorized speakers* (much like *gringo* can hardly be used by a white North American). What is interesting then is what happens when the speaker is not fully the source. Thus Haas (1964: 230) records that in Koasati, female speakers used different verbal suffixes from male speakers; but a female speaker reporting what a male speaker said would use the appropriate male suffix – thus indicating that she did not author the utterance.

Turning now to the reception set of categories of differential participation status, let us start by noting that languages often provide special forms where the speaker indicates that no-one, or no-one present, or no-one other than himself, is addressed. Thus in Japanese there are two particles that contrast in the following way: *kana* is 'used when talking to oneself with others invited to listen' as in:

soo kana

that speculative ['I wonder about that']

kashira is contrastive: 'unlike *kana*, which invites others to listen in on one's musings, one is really talking just to oneself' (Tsuchihashi 1983: 365). The Tamil particle *-oo* serves both these functions (Brown and Levinson 1978: 164), while the Lahu particle *na* (with low tone) seems especially to perform the second function: thus it can be used to indicate that the speaker is calculating a response as in 'In this village there are – *how many-na* – 270 people' (as in English 'let's see now'; see Matisoff 1973: 375). (It is noted of a similar particle in Dyirbal (Dixon 1972: 49) that although it accompanies hesitation or a word-search it is specifically not used to invite an addressee's guess.) Thus these particles serve to indicate that although words were spoken, they were not addressed to anyone other than the speaker, and although they may have been heard by others, the particles may (as with Japanese *kashira*) or may not (as with *kana*) exclude a ratified audience role to those listeners.

Many languages have minor sentence types (additional to the major and almost universal imperative, declarative and interrogative types), some of which presuppose a special reception

setting. Consider for example *imprecatives*, or special formats for cursing. Curses do not seem to require the presence of any listeners, and the target of the curse is perhaps often not addressed (but cf. English 'Damn you!'). Thus in Turkish there is a special future suffix *-esi* which 'occurs only in: *gor-mi-y-esi* (['May he not see!'])' (Lewis 1967: 115; cited in Sadock and Zwicky 1985: 164). In a similar way, blessings may occur in a special sentence type, as in English 'May the blessings of the Lord be with you!'; the same function is performed by the Lahu particle *pi-a 2* (with two high falling tones; Matisoff 1973: 354). In the case of blessings, although the target (or beneficiary) of the blessing may occur in the second person, it would not seem to be essential that the beneficiary has channel-linkage to (or is co-present with) the speaker at all!

Clearly, other minor sentence types like exclamations may presuppose a special reception organization. Exclamations might be taken to be prototypically 'out-louds' or 'response cries' in Goffman's (1981b) terminology, requiring no addressee. On that analysis, English sentence types of the sort 'How amazing!', 'Wow, can he ever run!' would be syntactic forms specialized to indicate that no addressee is necessarily presupposed (Goffman 1981b: 90). Perhaps most languages have specialized exclamatives, often further divided according to degree of surprise, positive or negative attitude, etc. (see Sadock and Zwicky 1985: 163 for some examples; Brown and Levinson 1978: 156 for Tzeltal). Related in that they again presuppose no addressee are the minor sentence types called *optatives*, which express a wish, as in the archaic English 'Would that I might marry Celeste', or the more current 'If only Celeste would come'. Languages with true optatives (false descriptions abound; see Lyons 1977: 815) include, for example, Greenlandic Eskimo (Sadock and Zwicky 1985: 164). In any case, optatives normally seem to occur with first- or third-person subjects, as we might expect from their non-addressed character.

Of special interest, though, is the kind of minor sentence type often called *hortative* (or sometimes, *desiderative*) or non-second-person imperatives (Sadock and Zwicky 1985: 177). These are the forms often glossed with semi-archaic English *let*, as in 'Let him be welcome'. Some languages use the identical verbal inflection for 'imperatives' in all persons, as in Guugu Yimidhirr (Haviland 1979a: 92), Onandaga (Chafe 1970: 20) and Hidatsa (Matthews 1965: 107ff.): thus compare the following Hidatsa sentences, where the first is in the 'period (declarative subtype) mood', the second in the (third-person) imperative:

- 1 *wio a ate awahu kuo axuo-c*
The woman hid in the house - *Period*
- 2 *wio ate awahu kuo axuo-ka*
The woman hide in the house - *Imperative*
[‘I demand that the woman hide in the house’]

Some languages have specialized forms, like current English ‘Let’s go’ restricted to the first-person-plural inclusive, or Tamil verbal suffix -*TTum* restricted to third-person hortatives.¹⁶

The interest of these forms is this: a third-person imperative is a request to an addressee to get some third party to do something. It thus presupposes two speech acts: the current one, and the one projected between the current addressee, then speaker, and his addressee, the third party mentioned. Thus the illocutionary target, the person to do the thing requested, is distinct from the addressee, and this is encoded in these forms. Curiously, there is a construction in English which, unnoticed I think, performs exactly this special function. Consider where A says to B:

<2> Johnny is to come in now

and then B says to C (Johnny):

<3> You are to come in now

As far as I can see, this infinitive construction in English is usable just in case *either* the addressee is not the target (as in <2>), *or* the speaker is not the source as in <3>. More exactly, <2> is appropriately used to direct a message to an indirect target or destination via an intermediary, and <3> to indicate that the message comes from an indirect or ultimate source via a relayer (where such an indirect target and such an ultimate source are normally non-participants). This example is of interest because it suggests that many minor sentence types of this sort have escaped the grammarians’ notice, and not only in unfamiliar languages.

We turn now to another area of grammar where one might expect to find some of these underlying kinds of participant role invoked, namely spatial deixis. Demonstrative pronouns do not always have the prototype semantics that English *this* ([‘close to speaker’]) and *that* ([‘far from speaker’]) exhibit; they are often so organized that while the demonstrative glossed ‘this’ prototypically indicates an object close to the speaker, the pronoun glossed ‘that’ in fact indicates an object close to the addressee (Fillmore 1982; Anderson and Keenan

1985: 284ff.). Thus in Kwakiutl, a language 'characterized primarily by an exuberant development of location' (Boas 1911: Pt I 446), one is forced to specify location by one of six demonstrative suffixes, which gloss (1911: Pt I, 527ff.):

- | | | |
|---|-----------------------|-----------|
| 1 | near to S (speaker) | + visible |
| 2 | near to S | - visible |
| 3 | near to A (addressee) | + visible |
| 4 | near to A | - visible |
| 5 | near to third party | + visible |
| 6 | near third party | - visible |

We shall return to the visibility criterion in a moment, but note that so far we have no need to invoke other than the three traditional grammatical persons. However, an extension of such a system seems to exist in Samal (a language in the Philippines), where the distinctions are (W. Geoghegan, (personal communication)):

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1 | near to S |
| 2 | near to A |
| 3 | near to ratified participant other than S or A |
| 4 | near a non-participant |

Such a system permits a speaker to cut a person, demonstratively, out of the conversation by referring to an object close to that person using the fourth form!¹⁷

The visibility condition on the use of demonstratives is found not only in the NW Coast Amerindian languages (Boas 1911), but also in Australia (Dixon 1972: 45; 1977: 180ff.). An interesting question is: visible *to whom*? Anderson and Keenan (1985: 290ff.) interpret this dimension as invariably visibility to the *speaker*, but Boas's descriptions do not make this self-evident. Dixon's descriptions are also not clear, but are interpreted by Fillmore (1982: 45) as visibility to both speaker and addressee. It is entirely consistent with the descriptions that the condition is in fact 'in the visual field of the ratified participants', and I hazard the hypothesis that this is in fact the correct interpretation.

Another grammatical area where we might expect to find the finer shades of participant role reflected in grammar is social deixis, where the social relationships of participants to the current speech event are encoded in linguistic forms (Levinson 1983: 89ff.). Most typically what is encoded is the relative social rank of speaker to

addressee, or speaker to third-person referent – where the canonical three persons are descriptively sufficient. However, there are also honorifics (and other kinds of encoded relationship) which make necessary reference to other kinds of participant role, especially to bystanders or overhearers or audiences. Consider for example the Australian so-called ‘mother-in-law (or brother-in-law) languages’. According to Haviland (1979a), Guugu Yimidhirr ‘brother-in-law’ language was canonically used in the *presence of* but not *to*, tabooed relatives: ‘A husband speaking with BIL [brother-in-law language] words, directed messages to his father-in-law via his wife. And a father, speaking either in BIL or EV [everyday language] words, gave his daughter messages for his son-in-law’ (1979a: 376). On this account Guugu-Yimidhirr BIL language systematically lexicalizes the role of *indirect target*. However, further material from this and other Australian languages seems to indicate that what is really lexicalized or indexed by these lexical alternates is probably the set of non-producing roles that exclude addressees – i.e. the set {indirect targets, audiences, overhearers}. (See too Dixon 1972: 32, and analysis in Comrie 1976.) This set of participant roles is grammaticalized in languages in other parts of the world too. For example, some Ponapean royal honorifics encode that addressee is a royal, *or* that addressee is not a royal, but a member of audience *or* a bystander is a royal (Garvin & Reisenberg 1952: 203). Similarly, the Abipon of Argentina suffix every word with *-in* if any person present (or participating?) is a member of the warrior class (Hymes 1972: 61). Unfortunately, the lack of a proper analytical vocabulary makes such descriptions often unclear – is what is encoded that a member of the Ponapean royalty, or an Abipon warrior, is merely in channel-linkage, or must they be in more specific roles?

As a postscript it is worth mentioning that the folk *metalanguages* of some languages divide speech events and kinds of speaking along the lines of our more complex analysis of participant role (note the English terms *chorus*, *audience*, *spokesman*, etc.). Tojolabal is especially interesting in this respect, with terminological distinctions made between, for example, different kinds of prayers where God is the addressee or where God is the target but a human the addressee, or different kinds of dispute where a speaker speaks for himself *versus* one where someone else speaks on his behalf (Furbee-Losee 1976: 34f.).

We may conclude this brief account with the observation that writers of descriptive grammars have clearly not been looking for the finer discriminations in participant role that we are interested in, so

what information we can glean from published sources is surely only the tip of a probable iceberg. Nevertheless, what is evident is that there is considerable support from comparative grammar for the psychological reality and grammatical pertinence of at least some of those fine distinctions.

INTERACTIONAL MOTIVATIONS FOR THE CATEGORIES

That finely discriminated categories of participant role are not merely handy but necessary for the proper description of interaction has been illustrated by Goffman (1981b), Hymes (1972: 61, 1974) and recently demonstrated in more detail by, for example, Goodwin (1977, 1979, 1981, 1984) and Heath (1982, 1984). I cannot here compete with the exemplary detail of description and analysis in some of this more recent work. Instead I shall attempt to illustrate the general scope and importance of participant role assignment to the analysis of verbal interaction, first to some problems in the ethnography of speaking, then to some details of category assignment in some more familiar kinds of interaction. In considering the ethnographic remarks, though, a basic limitation of the present enterprise should be borne in mind: we are not here primarily concerned with the *processes* through which particular participant roles are assigned or claimed, except in the most sketchy way. Rather, we are concerned with *what kinds* of categories we need to capture the assignment that we intuitively perform. There is little doubt that what is really interesting is precisely how such categories are invoked and manipulated, and what background expectations and linguistic and conversational devices play a role in these assignments.¹⁸ But to study *that*, we need to have in advance some provisional idea of what kinds of categories we may encounter – although in the final analysis any such system of categories we may encounter – although in the final analysis any such system of categories should include just those that emerge from the careful analysis of interactional data.

A second issue that immediately arises with interactional materials is the discourse unit over which participant roles are to be assigned. Recollect our distinction between *utterance event* and *speech event*, and our decision to restrict ourselves in the first instance to the level of utterance events, which are primary, and allow a secondary definition of participant roles in speech events. We might then want to say that an *utterance event* corresponds to a turn at talk: however, although there

is perhaps a tendency to such a correspondence, it will certainly not be sufficient in all cases. Sometimes during the production of a single structural (utterance or turn) unit, not only the incumbents but also the participant roles change. This will make the notion of utterance event problematic and *post hoc*: I shall stipulate that *an utterance event is the maximal unit within a turn in which the participant roles are held constant*, and it may or may not correspond to structural units like turn segments or sentence tokens – more of which later.

Some Applications to the Ethnography of Speaking

The ethnography of speaking is especially concerned with the description of two kinds of recurrent and patterned speech activity: short verbal routines of a culturally salient kind on the one hand, and 'speech events' or cultural activities in which speech plays a crucial role on the other (see Hymes 1972, 1974; Bauman & Sherzer 1974). Let us take these in turn, illustrating the application of participant role categories primarily to data from non-Western societies, where concepts other than 'speaker' and 'addressee' are clearly required.

First, an Australian example. We have already mentioned the specialized vocabularies of Australian languages that, in some cases at least, lexicalize the category of indirect target. But considerable interest attends their use. For example, Thomson (1935; quoted in Haviland 1979a: 376) notes that among Umpila speakers:

A father-in-law . . . may speak to his daughter's husband . . . but the latter may not reply directly. The son-in-law may talk 'one side', that is, while he may not address his elder in ordinary speech (*koko*) he may speak in the language known as *ngornki*. Even in this language, however, he may not address his remarks in the first person directly to his . . . [father-in-law], but to his child, or even to his dog, to which he speaks as to a son, and not directly to the person for whom the remark is intended.

(Thomson 1935: 480-1)

An interpretation of this is: since the taboo language encodes indirect target role, the son-in-law A talks to the dog B with the father-in-law C in hearing; hence A is *speaker* and *source*, B (the dog!) is *addressee* and *intermediary*, and C is *indirect target*. Unfortunately, these systems no longer seem to operate, or at least not as they once did, but examining the accounts carefully, it seems that the usage of

these avoidance languages varied with the degree to which the taboo relative was respected or avoided. Thus mothers-in-law do not seem to have been even indirectly targettable, so that use in their presence indicated that they were mere overhearers, fathers-in-law could be indirect targets but could never be addressed, and in some cases brothers-in-law may have actually been addressed in the avoidance language (see Haviland 1979a: 369, 379). But the generalization seems to be: when channel-linked to a taboo relative, one had to use the avoidance language, and in most cases, could not address in it. (A stronger interpretation would be that such systems basically encoded the channel-linkage of a taboo relative exclusively in overhearer role – i.e. that they specifically excluded the possibility of participation by the taboo relative. On this interpretation C in the example above would be *targetted overhearer* rather than *indirect target* of A's remark. There is evidence for the cultural importance of participation withdrawal from, for example, Warlpiri sign language, currently under investigation by Adam Kendon, where signs are used by widows as a marker of partial withdrawal from participation status.)

A second example, from New Guinea, illustrates a different kind of phenomenon where we are in need of refined categories for participant roles. Schieffelin (1979: 87ff.) details a certain kind of routinized 'triadic' interaction pattern in Kaluli. In these routines A says to B 'X-elema', which glosses as ['Say to C (the pragmatically indicated party) X right now'].¹⁹

So we have interactions like the following, where A is a mother, and B and C two children (Schieffelin 1979: 96), omitting for a moment B's responses, and representing the triadic relation (A tells B to tell C) as (A to B(>C)):

- <4> Kaluli triadic interactions (Schieffelin 1979)
 A to B(>C) Eat! *elema*
 A to B(>C) Binaría (= C's name)! *elema*
 A to B(>C) Pandanus. Eat pandanus *elema*

What we have here is a conventionalized routine for a three-party transfer, from A to B to C, which would make A a source, C a target or destination, and B an intermediary, in terms of the categories we have proposed. Things are not quite so simple though: A may be proposing that B do the suggested speech act as if B is *author* – i.e. A may be suggesting that B take it upon himself to author the utterance (or at least act as 'ghostee'). (Indeed it is possible that this

is the real (illocutionary) force of *elema*). Here a distinction between proximate sources (in this utterance event) and ultimate sources (in a prior utterance event) may help: even if B delivers the suggested speech act as *author*, A may be an ultimate source. These routines are quite generally done when all three parties are present, so both source and speaker of B's forthcoming utterance is clear enough. However, that co-presence makes problematic the proper analysis of the receiving end. At the very least while A is addressing B, C is A's indirect target. In actual fact, in this particular episode, this was especially clear: just prior to it, C had been begging mother A for pandanus, of which she has already had her share; the mother (A) then angrily picks up an inedible leaf and offers it to C. Thus when A is telling B to tell C to eat pandanus, A is mocking C: C is *indirect target* for A's remarks, which are addressed to B. If we now consider B's responses, where B is only two years old, again our categories become relevant:

<5> (Schieffelin 1979: 96)

A to B(> C)	Eat! <i>elema</i>
B to C	Eat!
A to B(> C)	Binaria. <i>elema</i>
B to C	Binaria
A to B(> C)	Pandanus
B to C	Don't eat!
A to B(> C)	Eat pandanus! <i>elema</i>
C to A	He (B) says don't eat pandanus [whining]

One analysis might be as follows: B happily follows the *elema* instructions until mention of pandanus, whereupon he *authors* the negative imperative 'Don't eat' addressed to C. Just because this particular utterance does not have A as source, C can then complain to A about it, ignoring the irony of A's instruction to B to tell C to eat pandanus. The point is that interactionally these 'triadic' utterances have different consequences from 'dyadic' ones. Schieffelin's claim is that they play a very special role in Kaluli language acquisition, which consequently follows a very different path from Western acquisition patterns: instead of the use of 'motherese' in dyadic interaction, for example, one finds direct demonstration of proper, adult-like interaction by an adult intervening in a child's play with another child (Schieffelin, in press).

Barbadians provide us with another kind of interactional routine, especially distinctive of language usage in the island (Fisher 1976) and possibly the Caribbean in general. They call the routine *dropping remarks*, and an example is as follows:

<6> Barbadian 'dropped remarks' (Fisher 1976)

A to B in the hearing of C I hear you got a new boyfriend

Although clearly addressed to B, the remark is not for B, and if the 'dropped remark' is to come off, B had better not have just acquired a new boyfriend, while the overhearer C should indeed have done so. Only if these conditions are met has A 'dropped a remark' to C (Fisher 1976: 231), and such remarks are always insults or digs. Note that C has to be a non-participant in channel-linkage. Two subtypes of dropped remarks need to be distinguished: in the one case, illustrated immediately above (<6>), C may perhaps not know that the properties attributed by A to B can really only apply to C – i.e. the overhearer may not know that he or she is targetted. In the kind of case illustrated in <7> below, the properties may clearly only apply to the overhearer, leaving C in no doubt about the 'dig', and placing him or her in the role of *targetted overhearer*.

<7> Another Barbadian 'dropped remark'

A to B in the hearing of C Oh, I thought your mouth was
burst

(Where C is a woman wearing gaudy lipstick, and
B is a man whose lips are perfectly in order.)

(Note that the butt of these remarks is not an *indirect target* of the sort familiar from English interactions (as in <1> above), as he/she is *not a participant* – but a channel-linked non-participating recipient. What is also unfamiliar, from an English point of view, is the technique of 'misaddress' by gaze and posture.)

Fisher's analysis of these and different kinds of exploitations of overhearer role makes use of a small set of categories of the sort employed by Goffman and developed here, and we have both benefited from his observations. Incidentally, Fisher goes on to show that there are important connections to these indirect insults and many details of West Indian culture.

The examples so far are verbal routines drawn largely from those informal, ordinary kinds of talk we call 'conversations'. As Haviland (1986a) points out, however, much insight into the nature

of participant roles may accrue from consideration of talk in specialized 'institutional' settings – law courts, seances, religious services, committee meetings and the like – where the gross roles of producer and receiver may be surgically dissected for institutional purposes, testing any analytical set of categories severely. Thus for example, when a counsel interrogates a witness in court, that interrogation is conducted in order to be assessed by (and partly on behalf of) channel-linked adjudicators, namely judge and jury. Hence in cross-examination in a crown court, say, there is an assignment of *participant roles* to *institutional roles* roughly along the following lines (Carr 1983):

<8> Cross-examination in an English court of law

<i>Counsel</i>	(1)	speaker (of questions), but not fully source. Since counsel speaks on behalf of client, we perhaps need here to split source into <i>sponsor</i> (client) and <i>spokesman</i> (counsel). So counsel is speaker and spokesman;
	(2)	addressee (of witnesses' answers; and of judge's rulings on objections, etc.);
<i>Witness</i>	(1)	speaker (of answers), here more wholly source – however, note that <i>sponsor</i> is prosecution or defence, who may also be <i>ghostor</i> ;
	(2)	addressee (of counsel's questions);
<i>Jury</i>	(1)	audience;
	(2)	indirect targets;
<i>Judge</i>	(1)	speaker (and source) of rulings;
	(2)	addressee of objections;
	(3)	indirect target;
	(4)	audience;
<i>Public gallery</i>		audience or ratified overhearers.

There are many details of interrogation format that display a sensitivity to the fact that the crucial participants (judge and jury) are in audience role (see Levinson 1979; Atkinson & Drew 1979; Drew 1985: 136f.). Clearly, the proper description of such a complex speech event involves the complete specification of such assignments for each and every stage of the proceedings. Although it would be

foolish to pretend that such analyses take us far in the understanding of such complex events, they must surely be preliminary to any proper speech-event analysis.

In many cultures, there are professionals who specialize in some of our participant roles: marriage brokers who act as spokesmen and intermediaries (in the speech-event sense), mouthpieces for princes, or orators, poets or advocates who plead for a fee. The Wolof of Senegal are interesting here, with a Bardic caste (Griots) to relieve the great of the need to speak (nobles affect a disdain for both speech and grammar, adopting a lofty ungrammaticality; see Irvine 1974). Members of the caste are useful too in the expression of ritual jealousy (Irvine 1981). For example, during weddings, when the bride is brought to the groom's house for the first time, she is met by a Griot woman who addresses the bride with an elaborate chanted set of slanders and insults aimed at the bride or her kin. This is performed on behalf of the women (including co-wives) of the groom's household. Here the Griot woman is the *spokesman*, the co-wives who bought her services the *sponsors*, the bride the *addressee* and her kin the *indirect targets* (if they are present) and *ultimate destinations* (if they are not).

Finally, one should note that in many cultures the dyadic pattern of the speaker/single-addressee pair dominates in cases where a speaker addresses a group: the storyteller or speech-maker requires a designated responder, who will provide the customary 'back channel', without whom the performance cannot proceed (especially clear, for example, in Mayan languages, see Haviland 1986a; Brown, n.d.). (This is presumably the origin of the sung responses in the English liturgy, to be found in improvised form in Pentacostal services where the preacher's sermon will be punctuated by 'hallelujah' and the like.)

Problematic Aspects: Process and the Attribution of Categories

We have now seen that having some well-developed set of categories for participant roles may be of some utility both to the correct description of deictic categories and to the ethnography of speaking. However, so far we have ignored processual aspects, and in particular how participants, and analysts, might actually assign such categories to other parties during the course of an utterance event. One way of exploring these issues is to examine cases where the attribution of participant role seems to be a problem for participants. We will take up some cases, focusing first on the production then on

the reception end, where attribution is a problem for analysts, participants or both; or where the attribution of participant role is demonstrably equivocal.

Source Problems

Clearly, the attributions of the roles of speakers and sources are less likely to be interactional problems than those of non-producers – speakers, after all, are usually visibly, or at least audibly locatable as current transmitters. Of course one can know that a particular someone is speaking without knowing *who* they are – but this is a question of relating participant role to incumbent identity; such problems of identification are of great interest in their own right (see Schegloff 1979), but we merely note here the very important role that voice quality plays in this.

Nevertheless, problems of producer-category assignment do arise, even in face-to-face interaction, and we shall consider some which are problems for analysis and sometimes for participants too. Let us start with another ethnographic example, a case of spirit possession in Tamilnadu. The ethnographic details do not concern us here – we merely note that a woman who has been possessed comes to a NaTTarayan temple, well known for that God's ability to banish spirits. The priest addresses the woman. His problem is: who is he talking to, and who is responding? Ghost or woman? Consider extract <9>:

<9> Tamil Film 18: Ghost Possession

P . . . *onkaarattai solli nii enka uur enkeyeerntu inke vaantaay*
Say the chant, which place, from where have you
come?

iitooTene enne viTTu viTTu inta poNNu naan ille nnu
Go away at once! 'I am not with this girl'

oru onkaarattai pooTu
Chant that!

W [silence]

P *naaTTaya saami peeril pooTu*
Sing in the God NaaTTarayan's name

W *Goovintaa..... inta.....*
Govintaar! [God's name]

P *sattam [momentary recording break] yaaru*
Who is yelling?

W *onkaarattai pooTTatu koLLimalai karuppu*
The one who is yelling is the Kollimalai Ghost

- P koLLimale karup্প enke pooce-nnu poNNu enk iruntaay*
Where did the ghost go? Where did you possess the
girl? Say!
- W poNN ooTa kaaTTle koNTtoontu poNN-ooTa piTikka*
solli veccaankoo
They said that having taken the girl into the jungle
(I) was to 'catch' her
[*W sways violently for a number of seconds*]
- P kaTTuviTTU poNN ellaam*
Everything has left the girl?
naaTTa saami peeril nnu kaTTuviTTu kiTTu ellaam
In the name of NaaTarayan God has it all gone?
- W naaTTaaya saami peeril kaTTuviTTu pooTTeen*
In the name of NaaTarayan the God I am leaving
- P inta poNNaam kiTTee irukka paTaatu*
You shouldn't stay with this woman
- W irukka maaTTeen*
I won't stay
- P seeri muunu onkaaratte pooTu*
Okay, shout three times

The priest starts off assuming he's talking to the ghost, and tells it to chant the promise ['I'm going'] in front of the God NaTTarayan who can enforce it. The woman, swaying violently, chants another name of the god. The priest then asks ['Who is yelling?']: in context, this would appear to be ambiguous between a question about incumbency (is the source a woman or a demon?) and a question about identity (is the source demon A or demon B?). The demon takes it the latter way, identifying himself as the Kollimalai ghost – and the priest asks how he came to possess the woman. Later, after a period of violent swaying, the priest checks whether the source of speech is still the ghost or not (*In the name of NaTTarayan, has it all gone?*) – for the proximate potency of the god may banish the demon at any moment. The ghost is still the source, but he announces he's on his way. (It later transpires that there are six more to get rid of!)

The example makes the point that in certain circumstances one can be clear about who the speaker is without being clear about whether the speaker is acting as *relayer* or *author*. It also reminds us that when we have relayers who are not formulating or motivating the message in any way, we cannot assume that there was some prior separate speech or utterance event in which the relayer was informed by the source of what he was to say. Incidentally, note that

the disassociation of source and speaker is marked here by chanting register and dissociated behaviour; in some cultures (e.g. Bali) the possessed speak in an accurate representation of the voice qualities of the dead possessors (see the film *Balinese Trance* by Patsy and Tim Asch).

There are more plodding cases where the *source* can be in doubt. One is a standard kind of interviewer response in news interviews, namely the reformulation, of the sort 'So, you're really accusing them of profiteering' (Heritage 1985: 109), where the reformulation may just be a summing up of what the other said for the benefit of overhearers (the radio listeners), but may be an aggressive probe that will be resisted. Another kind of common case is a certain kind of sarcasm, as in <10>, where towards the end, in response to constant goading by F and after a series of escalating 'out-loud' protests, C says softly 'Imperial mission, example to the world'. Clearly, C is not *author*; rather he is attributing the utterance to F as *motivator* (or *sponsor*), although, given the extreme formulation, F is likely to resist the imputation (see <22> below).

<10> Stop the Week (8/5/82: Aiwa 191)

C = Bernard Crick, F = Anthony Flew

F . . . now if um these trip-wire forces many of which are all around the world and by *far* the most important is in West Berlin if these if one of these is allowed to be over-run with no response and people all say 'Oh well it's ridiculous to fight a war over this' [as many

C → [sigh]

F people said it was ridiculous to fight a war over Danzig .hh someone else will try it. The Venezuelans are already looking to knock out a bit of Guyana, which might be [(a very good thing)

C → [(Good God)]

F [There are half a dozen other places in- in Africa where

C [softly] Imperial mission, example to the world! ←

F people are eager to - but above all there's West Berlin

To see that people can take it upon themselves to speak for others, consider sentence-completions by others. In <11> we have a jokey completion, accepted by the first speaker. Note that the first speaker

was evidently having a 'word-search' problem – presumably for the item 'flowers'. Had B supplied that item, we might say that he had merely transmitted (*relayed*) what A had *devised* – it being clear exactly what item A had in mind. But B supplies what is, as it were, an improvement, a jokey substitute ('shrimps' for 'flowers of shrimp plant'). Besides he offers it not in the way that other-repair is normally done (with a tentative offer, like 'you mean flowers?' – q.v. Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks 1977), but rather in the way that self-repair is normally done, that is immediately, after a 'cut-off'. Thus the sentence completion has a deeply equivocal status – built like a speaker's self-repair, it incorporates the other's inventiveness. The first speaker accepts the offering with an appreciative laugh, in laughing acknowledging the other's contribution. More straightforwardly, in <12> we have a neutral chairman completing, for the sake of brevity, BK's statement of his position.

<11> Gardening Questions (Partic Tape B: Aiwa 45)

A . . . and it's the most descriptive name ever,
the shrimp plant because it looks like a –
what eighteen inch high bush covered with little
shrimps . . .

[*some mins later*]

And then wait until it starts just into growth
again and then knock it out and repot it ur (.)
if possible into only one pot bigger, don't give
it too much to work on or it runs to leaf instead
of er –

B → Shrimps!

A instead of shrimps heh

<12> (continuation of <23>)

BK There's a resolution-

[*some turns later*]

CH I think you are referring to the calling of a
ceasefire

BK Certainly, resolution 502 =

CH = it calls for a cease-fire ←

Sentence completions by others are used interactionally for various purposes (see Sacks 1967–72 for many observations), but one reason of course is precisely to display collaboration, or joint telling (Sacks 1971: Lecture on 19 October) – in short to display

joint authorship through doing it together! (The alternative, joint simultaneous production or chorus, being harder to achieve on a sustained improvisational basis.) It is arguable (and surely Goffman would have so argued) that it is the peculiar production status of jointly authored sentences that accounts for their interactional uses. On the other hand, these sorts of examples raise the fundamental question whether the collaborative nature of verbal interaction does not make inherently problematic the attribution of participant role. The linguistic, philosophical and psychological traditions treat the utterance as 'the product of a single speaker and a single mind', whereas 'the conversation-analytic angle of inquiry does not let go of the fact that . . . more than one participant is present and relevant to the talk, even when only one does any talking' (Schegloff 1982: 72), non-verbal feedback often serving to guide the production of an utterance (Goodwin 1979, 1981 and see below). The issue cannot be pursued here, but it is of course of considerable importance to the present enterprise.

Other cases where producing roles can get complex are of course when individuals speak in the institutional role of spokesman (using the term in the speech-event sense) – they may at times speak for themselves as well as for others (acting in *author* role but as representatives of other like-minded *principals*), while at other times they may act as mere *relayers* (for some *indirect source*) or *spokesman* (for some *principal*) in our restricted participant role sense (see table 7.4). The potential vagueness of the participant role associated with the institutional role is of course an exploitable resource – the utterances of official spokesmen can be repudiated if expedient. One sometimes wonders just what role institutional spokesmen, or persons other than the official source, have in the formulation of the message, and the White House transcripts provide some interesting glimpses here. In <13> Nixon and Ehrlichman prepare (or *ghost*) a presidential statement: in throwing out ideas they are not producing statements for this series of utterance events, but for some future series in which the President will be source (*ghostee* in my awkward terminology) and Ehrlichman *ghostor* or *formulator*.²⁰

- <13> White House Transcripts (*New York Times* edition, p. 702)

E = Ehrlichman, P = President Nixon

(Preparing a Presidential statement)

E . . . how about going on with the next sentence?

P 'The judicial process is moving to get all the facts.' Or, 'Moving -'

E 'moving ahead as it should'

P 'Moving ahead as it should. As I have said before all government employees, especially members of the White House staff, are to fully cooperate with the Grand Jury.' Or do we want to say 'Grand Jury'?

E How about 'fully cooperate' period

P 'Fully cooperate in this investigation', 'to fully cooperate with law enforcement authorities'.
How's that?

Problematics of the Reception End

Given the 'broadcast quality' of the vocal-auditory channel, it will come as no surprise that there are often interactional difficulties in assigning addressees, recipients and other non-producing roles; but it is also noteworthy that these very difficulties are often exploited for interactional purposes (as in the Barbadian 'dropped remarks', that make for unaccountable and deniable insults). But let us begin by seeing that speakers often have to work hard to gain satisfactory addressees. Consider <14>:

<14> (from Goodwin 1979, with simplifications)

- | | | | |
|----|----------|--|-------|
| 1 | J | I gave, I gave up smoking cigarette::s = | |
| 2 | (J to D) | | _____ |
| 3 | (D to J) | | _____ |
| 4 | D | = yeah | |
| 5 | J | I - uh one - one week ago t'da:y. acshilly | |
| 6 | (J to B) | | _____ |
| 7 | (J to A) | | _____ |
| 8 | (B to J) | ((no gaze)) | |
| 9 | (A to B) | | _____ |
| 10 | (A to J) | | _____ |

Goodwin gives a complex micro-analysis of this one sentence of J's (*viz.*: 'I gave up smoking cigarettes, one week ago today, actually'), which relies upon an analysis of gaze as a device for selecting an addressee. He argues that during the course of the production of this single sentence, J shifts addressee three times, to D, from D to B, and from B to A. He argues that there is a rule, crudely, that

speakers should gaze at addressees, and addressees should recognize this by making eye-contact (see also later formulation in Goodwin 1981: 74-5). In the transcript, simplified from Goodwin's, gaze is indicated on the lines below the utterance in question, by a line, with gazer and gazed in the margin.

The argument then proceeds roughly as follows. J starts off talking, fails to get gaze, re-starts (this being a conventional 'request' for an addressee), looks at D (line 2), who finally looks at him (line 3), and slips in the response *yeah* (line 4). Now it turns out that J thinks D doesn't know this piece of news (that J gave up smoking), and that D's response (*yeah*) is hardly of an appropriate sort (cf. 'Fantastic!', 'Oh good for you', etc.); J therefore shifts gaze in search of some more sympathetic addressee, settling on B (line 6). B however is a co-habitant with J, and therefore J's giving up smoking is hardly news for B; thus in switching addressees from D to B, J switches from a telling of news (the giving up smoking) to the announcement of an 'anniversary' (a week without the weed - line 5). Yet B's gaze does not move to engage J's (line 8); and having failed to elicit B as addressee, J seeks out A (line 7), who has displayed attendance by looking at B (line 9) for the non-forthcoming response. J's switch to A (not a knower of the news) requires once again a switch from the announcement of an anniversary of some old news, to an announcement of some new news, a switch partly achieved by the insertion of *actually*. And towards the end of *actually*, J finally gains an addressee, namely A (line 10). (But see Goodwin for detailed justification.)

Some important points that emerge from Goodwin's argument are these: (a) a single unit, whether sentence token or turn, can have different persons in the same participant roles throughout the course of its production. Hence the importance of the *incumbency/role* distinction. This is in part detectable by the study of gaze (although this will certainly not work in gaze-avoidance cultures like the Highland Mayan Indians of Chiapas; cf. Goodwin 1981: 57n.); in part by the study of ongoing reformulation of an utterance, so that parts can be seen to be directed at some addressees, other parts at other addressees (here, the *news/anniversary of the news* distinction); (b) a speaker may be assured of an *audience* and yet lack satisfactory *addressees* (a point also made by the widespread cultural practice, noted above (see also Haviland 1986a), of requiring a single designated responder when telling a story to a group); and (c) persons can control, at least to some extent, whether or not they will be incumbents of participant roles for which they are selected by

speaker (or, in ethnomethodological terms, incumbency is *negotiable*).

Notice the implications of Goodwin's analysis for my concept of *utterance event*: if this is a unit defined by constancy of the mapping of participant roles onto individuals, then this single sentence and short turn is constituted of no less than three utterance events. Now I want to pick on two particular reception problems, those associated with *out-louds* and *indirectly targetted utterances*.

*Out-louds*²¹

We have already mentioned out-louds as interesting in that, on one analysis, they do not seem to presume any roles other than speaker (on another, they presume but one incumbent of both speaker and addressee roles). Given this, out-louds have their uses when used in channel-linkage to other parties, e.g. in beginning a conversation with a stranger without unequivocally taking a first conversational step (Goffman 1981b: 100). So we find utterances produced as out-louds that actually have recipients and targets in mind. A relatively simple case is <15> from a radio 'phone-out': the compere is dialling up a member of the public, who will then be on the air, to wish whichever member of the couple answers the phone a happy wedding anniversary. While we radio listeners, the overhearers, are waiting through the ringing of the telephone, the compere is producing the sort of now-hopeless, now-hopeful out-louds one might produce, or think, to oneself when no-one answers at the other end. They are responses to the situation, tucked neatly between and responsive to the ringings of the phone – in Goffman's (1981b) terminology *response cries* – and are not addressed or directed to anyone. Yet, in an obvious way, they are essentially for the radio audience; not only do they fill an awkward gap created by this broadcast format, they also serve to keep us posted about how long the compere is likely to hang on:

- <15> Radio Phone-out (Partic: Aiwa 336)
 (A is telephoning B: the radio audience can hear both ends) [*telephone rings*]
 A Hopefully it's Penny and Steve Davis [*ring-ring*]
 They're celebrating their wedding anniversary today [*ring-ring*]
 They won't want to get out of bed too early will they [*ring-ring*]
 → huh huh huh huh (.) [*gloomily*] huh huh [*ring-ring*]

- huh huh huh [*resignedly*]
- hmm [*ring-ring; sound of receiver being picked up*]
- Oh hang on!

B Hello?

A Is that Steve?

B Yeah

A Hello mate Pete Wagstaff calling from Chiltern Radio

More complicated, but perhaps clearer, is the 'Oh God' in <16>, which is of a recurrent type. Here we have a well-known broadcaster on astronomy groaning at the use of the phrase 'moon-shuttle'. Note that the groan occurs *sotto voce* and in overlap right after the offending term. The groan could be a sheer reflex (like 'ouch'), but a version of it is repeated a shade louder at the end of the offending turn. Note the switch from 'Oh God' to 'Oh dear!', which seems to be a reformulation of the out-loud for overhearers. As Goffman (1981b: 97) puts it, 'A man who utters 'fuck' when he stumbles in the foundry is quite likely to avoid that particular expletive should be trip in a day nursery'. (Goffman also notes that having once embarked on talking to oneself, one is under obligation to explain it - motivating the repetition, which seems to be a common feature). Again, like the preceding 'Oh God', we can't say that this 'Oh dear' is addressed to anyone. But the second occurrence at least is fairly clearly *for* the studio audience (in *audience* role) and radio listeners (in *overhearer* role), by virtue of three features (a) it is said louder, (b) it occurs clear of overlap, (c) it is reformulated for public consumption. The audience promptly laughs, and the chairman then treats it as a turn out of turn.

<16> 'Patrick Moore' (Partic: 1982: IA: Aiwa 464)

CH Let's move on now please to another question

M Marie Higgins (.)

Would the team agree (.) that the millions of dollars now spent on a moon-shuttle (.) [could
Oh God

PM

M be better utilized to solve the problems of this planet =

PM = Oh dear!

(.)

CH huh { -huh-huh

AUD [[crescendoing laughter]

CH Well you just wait a moment Patrick – you just hold on. We'll have your professional expertise a little later

In panel sessions, where turns are strictly allocated, such devices for getting a turn out of turn are quite frequently used: there's another case in <17>, and it shows the same repetition of the out-loud, with greater amplitude, the escalation eliciting an audience response that makes it impossible to ignore what serves to disrupt the proceedings but (being unaddressed and officially not part of the proceedings) cannot be viewed as an interruption (see also <21> below).

<17> Question Time (I, Ulster: VHS1: JVC 382)

(CH = chairman, AM = Agnes McCormack, Socialist, JP = Jim Prior; A = Audience)

CH I'd like a brief reply on that from Mr Prior and then we'll move on

JP [gazing at A] Well I agree with that and I think that [the-

AM [softly] Good God! ←

JP [the more-

AM Good God! [louder] ←

[JP glances at AM, and grimaces]

[Laughter]

JP I don't know whether that'll get me into trouble or not but er (.) I think we do tend to put labels on people . . .

Now while on the first occurrence such out-louds might be held to presuppose no other participant role than speaker, on the second or later escalation they might arguably be held to presuppose not only an appreciative audience role but also, perhaps, an indirect target role for the individual whose utterance they respond to. But perhaps they achieve what they achieve just by being precisely equivocal over what participant roles they project: for if a second occurrence is recognizably the 'same thing' as an earlier occurrence, but the earlier occurrence has the low-profile characteristics (low amplitude, eclipsed by overlap) of a guarded response cry produced in polite company, then the second occurrence cannot be unequivocally an addressed or targetted turn even though it occurs loud and clear of any other turn! Again, the Goffmanian analysis would be, I take it,

that it is the peculiar reception status of 'out-louds' that accounts for their sequential properties (e.g. escalations with audience appreciations) and their interactional uses (like getting a turn when turns have been allocated to other parties).

One very important reason for being interested in out-louds is that they seem to play a special role in language acquisition. Child-language researchers have elaborate categories to call such things (e.g. Dore's *labellings*, *practicings*, etc. – see Atkinson 1982: 148ff.), but they do not seem to have closely attended to the special participant role configurations of children's utterances. In <18> for example, the child's utterances are perhaps without exception out-louds which are responses to either the cars passing outside, or the toy car within. The adult's attempts to engage the child in conversation, and to interpret the utterances as directed at him or her, may then be based on a strategy of wilfully interpreting these out-louds as actually addressed or at least indirectly targetted utterances. But it would be a mistake to make the same wilful interpretation as an analyst (note how the transcriber in noting 'whining' seems to be making just such an attribution).

<18> (simplified from Greenfield 1979: 161)

Ch [car going by outside] car

Ad What's the car doing? Where's it going?

Ch Byebye, byebye

[pointing to his toy car, 'whining'] car, car

Ad You want your car?

Ch [pushing car] byebye, byebye, rr-hh-mm

[patting car] beep-beep

[hears car going by outside] car! car! car!

[looking for toy car which has fallen] car

Ad Whatcha doing?

Ch [throwing toy car down] down, down, car

[car going by outside] car

[looks for toy car] car

It is interesting to speculate on the reasons for the prevalence of 'out-louds' in children's speech: they might be attributed, of course, to some Piagetian tendency to egocentric thought; or they could be attributed to the same factors accounting for their frequency in chaired discussions as in the earlier examples – namely as devices for evading restricted rights to speak. Alternatively, they might be interpreted as devices addressed to a more fundamental issue – namely

limited participation rights; if children are often treated as channel-linked overhearers, then an 'out-loud' recommends itself for just the same reasons as 'Phew, at last' does in a bus-queue – it invites participation without demanding it, and if ignored (as childrens' utterances no doubt largely are) implies no snub and thus no loss of face. Viewed from this perspective, the verbal ecology of the child perhaps looks rather bleak, seeking momentary participation rights by virtue of attention-inducing out-louds. In any case, the fact that out-louds appear to be characteristic of childrens' speech certainly recommends their serious study.

Indirect targets

Let us turn now to another class of utterance which pose specific problems for the analysis of reception roles, namely indirectly targetted utterances. We may begin by returning to example <1>:

- <1> (from Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1978: 29)
Sharon You didn' come tuh talk tuh Karen?
Mark No, Karen- Karen' I're having a fight,
 (0.4)
Mark after she went out with Keith an' not with
 (me)
Ruthie Hah hah hah hah
Karen Wul, Mark, you never asked me out.

Applying our categories to describe the participant roles involved in Mark's utterance(s), he is presumably *author*; but who is/are *recipients*? We have already pointed out that while Sharon is the apparent *addressee*, Karen is the *indirect target*, and that we know this in part because of linguistic features of person (*she* for Karen), and in part because of interactional expectations to do with responses to questions normally being directed at the questioner (making Sharon addressee), and to do with blamings eliciting justifications or excuses (hence Karen's response). To take another similar case:

- <19> (from Sacks 1974: 338)
K You wanna hear muh – eh my sister told me a
 story last night
R I don't want to hear it. But if you must.
 (1.0)
A What's purple an' an island. Grape-Britain.
 ➔ That's what iz sis//ter –

K No. To stun me she says uh there was these three girls
[dirty story follows]

A's utterance here is in various ways *disaffiliated* from K's offer to tell a story: he's suggesting, for one thing, that the kind of story will be the 'kiddy humour' illustrated by 'Grape-Britain'. But another way A's remark is disaffiliated is that it treats K as (at most) *audience*, (and, at least, possibly as mere *overhearer*), by virtue of the indicated participant role: for A uses third-person *his sister* to refer to the person K referred to with *my sister*. Thus the *author* of A's utterance (or turn) is A; the *addressee* is R (and perhaps others present); the *indirect target* is K. (Note the possibility that the first part of the utterance was in fact addressed to K – just as R's response is; while A might have then turned to others seeking appreciation for his put-down – but we have no video record.)

One circumstance in which utterances are often indirectly targetted are media political discussions, with a panel and studio audience. (And perhaps the occurrence of such utterances is in general typical of chaired meetings, where the chairman may be formally addressed but others intended – as in the parliamentary manner of 'Now, Mr Speaker, the Right Honourable Member for Tewkesbury North seems to be quite unaware of the 1957 Act'.) In any case, in such political panels, simply by an identification of participants with political parties, accusations of political incompetence (etc.) can readily pick out a representative of a political party as a non-addressed recipient, or *indirect target*. Typically, the non-addressed target immediately responds, as in <20> (and in <1> and <19> of course):

<20> Question Time (I/I: VHS 1: JVC 662)

BB = Betty Boothroyd, Labour MP

WC = Winston Churchill, Conservative

A = Audience

LM = Lord Mayhew

BB [gazing at A] . . . my government left Sea-Wolf

→ as a missile to be developed by the Conservative
→ government. I hate to make this political
but that's what it's all about isn't it, and it has
not been yet fully developed so that – for use in
that area =

WC = Hold on hold on Betty, you can't get away
with that [BB gazing at WC] ←

LM (Huh)

BB Okay [BB turns away to A and gestures]

Over to you! huh huh huh huh

[Laughter]

WC [gazing at BB] The – the ships that are down
there are ships that have been by and large
developed and deployed over the last 15 years

...

This has some theoretical interest because it throws light on the concept of an *addressee*. For example, it is tempting to claim that an addressee is in part identifiable as someone with a priority right of response; thus Lyons (1977: 34) writes 'The sender may then include as part of the signal some feature which identifies the intended receiver or *addressee*, and invites him to pay attention to, or respond to, the signal'; and Goffman (1981b: 133) identifies the 'addressed recipient' as 'the one to whom the speaker addresses his visual attention and to whom, incidentally, he expects to turn over his speaking role'. But indirect targets seem in the majority of cases to be the immediate responders, in contrast to the overt addressees (as in <1>, <19>, <20>) (and even where they desist from verbal response, they may be expected to produce visual displays – cf. <21> below and Goodwin 1984). A related issue is whether there is some close connection between the concept of *addressee* and what one may call the *illocutionary goal*. Clark and Carlson (1982) discussing examples like 'The last one of you to leave the room, turn off the light', claim that all present are the recipients of an *informative* illocutionary act, but only one, namely the last one to leave, is the recipient of the request. But a simpler analysis would be that the addressees are all those denoted by *you*, while the illocutionary goal is that addressee who is last to leave. But in any case, what the immediate responses by indirect targets show is that there is no close relation between illocutionary goal and conversational responder, which would seem to make the whole concept of illocution not a possible basis for a theory of discourse structure.

A central question about such indirectly targetted utterances is this: given that features of address in such utterances are not indications of the intended recipients, how does the recipient know that he is being targetted, and how do we as observers and analysts make such judgements? Recognition seems to be based on regular features of such utterances. Firstly, they occur in certain specific sequential environments; for example, in the political panel sessions

investigated a typical pattern was as follows:

- T1 A [*says something employing the description D*]
 T2 B [*while addressing C but not A,
 challenges the description D*]
 T3 A [*addressing B, defends the description D*]

Turn 2 is thus typically tied back to T1 by a repetition of some key lexical item or phrase (as will be illustrated in <21> below).

In addition to such sequential clues, recipients of indirectly targetted utterances may recognize that they are recipients by features of the turn (or turn part) – although addressed to others. It will concern them (typically, as above, by being an attack on what they have previously said); though lacking address, there may be third-person reference to themselves, or else they may find a description that includes themselves (e.g. ‘anybody who talks about [keyword] . . .’). Finally, immediately at the end of the indirectly targetted turn, the recipient will note that he is being monitored by speaker and audience to see just how he is taking it. Thus we get momentary glances, or even full gaze, at just that point. If there were no such systematic clues, such indirect targettings would of course be indiscernible, and miss their targets.

The example in <21> is perhaps unusually explicit and transparent, but will thus serve well to illustrate the phenomenon. Here PJ (Peter Jenkins, well-known journalist) addresses a participating studio audience in a BBC panel-discussion series called *Question Time* – on this occasion the discussion takes place in Ulster (N Ireland) with a local audience. PJ tells the audience that they are not like the English (which becomes the keyword), gesticulating to himself and thus disaffiliating himself from the Northern Irish audience. His opponent, MR (Mervyn Rees, ex-Northern Ireland Secretary) then utilizes the sequence of upgraded out-louds that we have discussed in order to obtain an allocation of turn from the chairman: in that turn he purposely turns towards the audience, and while gazing at them gestures at PJ – however he is drowned by continuing audience applause and laughter and turns back to the table; on its subsiding, he turns again to the audience and delivers the indirectly targetted utterance ‘There you heard the complete English view of Northern Ireland!’, complete with keyword. The TV editor instinctively and immediately selects a picture of PJ (just as any interactant would naturally look to him at this point to see how he was taking the indirect attack) – but he fails to produce a quick retort and instead

produces a facial display of discomfiture or embarrassment. Meanwhile there's audience applause at the jab.

<21> Question Time: (Ulster VHS 1 JVC 310)

PJ = Peter Jenkins; *MR* = Mervyn Rees

PJ [gazing at audience throughout] . . . it's no good complaining to Westminster and saying why
 → don't - complaining to the English [indicates self]
 and saying 'Why don't you treat us like everybody else?' You're not like everybody else!

MR Nonsense {*sotto voce outloud*}
 [audience laughter and applause]
 [*PJ* glances round table to find source of out-loud]

MR Nonsense [louder out-loud]

CH Mervyn? {pointing to *MR*}
 [*MR* turns to Audience and gestures to *PJ*]

MR Well the - (2.0) [*MR* turns away as if to blow nose]
 [drowning audience laughter]

→ [gazing at audience] there you heard the complete

→ English view of Northern Ireland!

→ of Northern Ireland [gaze to Audience]

PJ [Visual display of embarrassment]
 [Audience crescendoing applause]

MR [gazing at *PJ*] because Peter as much as er
 (.) it used to strike me sometimes
 that a large number of people didn't like me
 very much and maybe not Jim and maybe
 others I tell you that people of Northern
 Ireland are the same sort of people Catholic
 or Protestant as the other side of the [turns to
Aud] water

Audience [Applause]

MR [gaze to *PJ*] I really feel that

MR [turning to *Aud*] Except in one respect
 [Laughter]

[*MR* talks on, gazing at Audience]

. . . I want nobody to be in the United
 Kingdom to be there by force they must be

there because they want to be there and that is not something that I could support, I am fervently against integration [*turns towards PJ*] but Peter for heaven's sake they may have different sorts of politics but this English view that you put forward is one reason why the English will never ever solve it [*turns to Audience*]

Audience [A Welshman by birth [*points to self*]
 [*Applause*]

The recurrent features of indirectly targetted utterances (as they occur in such panel discussions) are here instantiated:

- 1 the target-to-be produces the offending description, with the keyword 'English';
- 2 the indirectly targetted utterance appears in second position, although not strictly in second turn given the constraints of the allocated turn-taking system in such panel discussions, which require the prior negotiation of the right to reply;
- 3 the indirectly targetted utterance contains the offending keyword, and although it lacks any features of address to PJ (gaze being directed at the audience) there was an abortive gesture towards him; further, the implied description ['the articulator of the English view of Northern Ireland'] clearly applies to PJ;
- 4 immediately at the end of the indirectly targetted turn, the two normal events occur: (a) the target is monitored for signs of discomfort, brave comportment or retaliation; and (b) audience appreciation is expressed; and
- 5 although the target fails to retaliate, that response may be held to have been 'conditionally relevant' in the sense that a slot is provided for it (MR stops after the indirectly targetted utterance), and its absence constitutes an acknowledgement of 'defeat'.

The rest of the extract is provided here partly because it contains further evidence for the underlying mechanisms involved in recognizing an indirectly targetted utterance. As noted, the original offending turn by PJ affiliated PJ with 'the English' and disaffiliated him from the 'Irish' audience. MR's attack then made use of this affiliation, by including PJ amongst those with the English view of

N Ireland – and thus by implication excluding MR from the affiliation. Note then that MR ends the extract with a gesture to himself, accompanying the utterance ‘A Welshman by birth’, which precisely mirrors PJ’s gesture to himself accompanying ‘the English’.

The remainder of the extract also makes the point that a skilled orator can make considerable use of rapid switches of participant role assignments. As MR continues after the indirectly targetted utterance, there are a series of switches of reception roles, six in all, so that at one moment the audience is being addressed with PJ as indirect target, the next PJ is being addressed with the audience as indirect target, with these switches being indicated both by swivelling of the body and determinate gaze movements. Once again it is clear that the notion of an utterance event as that unit of speech with a constant constellation of participant roles (and incumbents of them) has the consequence that a single turn may consist of multiple utterance events. Note incidentally that applause is appropriate from the audience (in the speech-event sense) when in either addressee role (as after the utterance ‘the complete English view . . .’) or in indirect target role (as after the utterance beginning ‘Because Peter . . .’) – the right to applaud being apparently indifferent to various kinds of reception role.

The example in <21> serves to indicate, I hope, that an utterance can have a recipient clearly distinct from the addressee, and we – whether as analysts or participants – can be left in no doubt about who is indirectly targetted. Sometimes, though, the participants themselves can indeed be in doubt. For example, <22> illustrates that the misattribution of *indirect target* role can sometimes be suspected by participants. Thus P’s ‘anyone who has genuine compassion’ (arrowed) is a response to T, but also a possible follow up of earlier attacks on C (see <10>, which comes some eight minutes earlier in the same discussion; just prior to that extract there is a characterization of C as [‘hating Thatcher’] which is part of what C is responding to in <22>). It may therefore be interpreted as an indirectly targetted utterance. C jumps in with a retort, but the chairman (CH) intervenes to question whether C was really the indirect target rather than T (‘I don’t think he was aiming his views at you Bernard . . . he had Laurie in his eye when he was speaking’).

- <22> Stop the Week (Aiwa 425: 8/5/82)
 CH = Chairman, Robert Robinson,
 C = Bernard Crick, socialist and philosopher

F = Antony Flew, conservative and philosopher

T = Laurie Taylor

T . . . I suppose that there was an acknowledged war [in Vietnam] and America seemed involved in it and saw the issue of world communism as a threat .hh

F → I think that anyone who has any genuine compassion for human beings as opposed to being a doctrinaire socialist and pro-Soviet figure .hh would have some sympathy [for the victims of the:]

C [Oh I very much resent these silly things like my hatred of Thatcher - I hate her policy towards unemployment I think her policy on Ireland is excellent so don't impute

CH [the things - the stereotypes
I don't think he was aiming (his views) at you Bernard =

C = no I mean this is a stereotype of intellectual socialism and I'm speaking [as a philosopher

CH → [He had Laurie in his eye [when he was speaking
C [and you huhuh

C and you are ranting as a-a-a::: Tory

T As Milton will tell you I'm a well known pro-Soviet advocate

F [Well

F Look =

CH = You must have a point to make

F [I'm sure Anthony
[We are threatened-

we are threatened, you may not worry about it because you may be a CND supporter I am worried about it

C [because I care for my country
[Well no we've heard the () of both parties

F We are threatened by the ever-

C [extending Soviet emp-
[mocking stereotypes

F empire(.) now people in the Kremlin are watching this as they are watching everything

else (.) if we do not back up the marines who were overrun if we do not do that they will think 'What about West Berlin?' and I'm sure that Bernard Crick will be saying 'Why should one have a conflict over West Berlin - just let the Russians have it', then they'll make the next move

CH Oh I don't think you can make up his argument for him

?	[	he's perfectly competent at it	[
F	[	huh huh	Just-

CH Now Bernard

The fact that whom F was 'aiming at' can be explicitly a conversational issue suggests that participants are indeed monitoring utterances for more participant roles than just speaker and addressee. This is of course a more direct line of argument that participant role assignment is an ongoing task that preoccupies participants, and is not just a problem of *post-hoc* analytical categorization. The other line of argument that we have been developing is less direct, but more powerful if it can be sustained: namely, we can attempt to show that 'out-louds', 'indirectly targetted utterances', etc., are utterances with particular interactional and sequential properties which follow directly from their characteristic participant role projections.²²

I offer now a final example of the second kind of argument. Can we show that participants are constantly alert to the possibility that they will be cast by the speaker into one or another reception role, where each such role has different consequences for action and displays of participation? Consider the following conventional peculiarity of English vocatives: normally, names can only figure in vocative expressions if they occur as first names alone, or title-plus-last name. (There are exceptions of course: those bred at English private schools, or serving in the armed forces, may feel able to use last names alone in vocative expressions - but the sociolinguistic value of such usages would appear to be precisely in their contrastive nature.) Thus in saying, for example, 'Bruce Kent' in the presence of Bruce Kent, there will be a point during the production of the phrase where what is coming might be a vocative of direct address (namely 'Bruce'), that possibility evaporating with the appearance of the initial consonant of 'Kent' ('Bruce Kent' not being, outside

roll-calls and the like, a possible English vocative²³). A second relevant point is that although vocatives have remarkably free syntactic placement, as a major indicator of address they perhaps normally occur in utterance-initial position. Now consider the following extract:

<23> Question Time (II: VHS 1: JVC 595)

BB = Betty Boothroyd, Labour MP

LM = Lord Mayhew, BK = Bruce Kent, CND

WC = Winston Churchill, CH = Chairman

A = Audience

BB [gaze at A] . . . this is where the United Nations has an enormous role to play in monitoring that withdrawal in seeing to it that we also withdraw our forces from around that area and for them to move in and I believe very sincerely that this is our only salvation

CH [gaze at BK] Bruce Kent?

BK [gaze at A] Well of course one has to move if - if you get into intransigent positions, you have to shift because life goes on and there will be a solution. In ten years time we'll look back and say 'I wonder how did we get into this jam?'. Everybody has to move. General de Gaulle er was the saviour of Algiers for the French er colonists but in a few years he'd worked around and he left and all was done. Of course we have to compromise [slight head nod to BB]

→ I'm just amazed to hear Betty talking about this upholding of the United Nations [turns back to A] but precisely what we're doing is in violation of the United Nations =

BB [gaze at A] = No

BK That is the critical [point

BB [at A] No no [out-loud]

WC [gazing at BK] [shakes head]

LM [gazing at BK] No

BK [gazing at A] That is to be got over very strongly =

BB = No [upgraded out-loud]

BK We asked for a resolution we got a resolution and now we are on this madcap course which

puts our fleet at grave peril. One doesn't – you don't have to be a pacifist or non-pacifist to think that this operation has no intelligent end. What can victory actually mean? We succeed in killing another couple of thousand to put people ashore on the Falkland Islands and then what? What is that victory mean that is what I'm asking

BB → [gazing at BK?] No Bruce K- [BK looks at BB]
[BK takes a drink]

You know Bruce Kent is quite wrong, we are not in violation of the United Nations charter

[BB moves gaze from BK round table and back]

we must not allow [them to get away with this
BK [to A?]] (there's a) resolution
resolution

BB No you – you talk about the resolution. I have it in front of me [in breath] Article – Article 51

Here BK attacks BB ('Betty') in the first arrowed utterance in the third person, with body position and gaze firmly away from BB and to the audience. In response BB produces *Nos* that seem to be out-louds (low amplitude, vague gaze) – finally getting in a proper response at the second arrowed utterance. Here, though, she starts off with a term of reference that could be a term of address ('Bruce') – precisely at this point Bruce Kent rapidly glances up at BB, presumably to check if she is gazing at (and thus addressing) him. He starts to turn away again after the initial 'K-' that indicates that 'Bruce' was in fact the first part of a third-person reference form and not a possible vocative. But simultaneously BB, presumably monitoring that glance, does a self-repair and abandons that utterance-initial placing of the name: 'No Bruce K- you know Bruce Kent is quite wrong'. Now, Goodwin (1981: 60ff.) has shown that such re-starts are closely involved in the search for addressees, and even where addressees are attending may request the attention of further addressees (1981: 61, n. 8). Thus it seems certain here that BB is engaged in deft work to undo the apparent address of 'Bruce', the re-start being reinforced by gaze movement around the panel. Incidentally, a factor that predisposes BK to think he may be being addressed is the tendency we have noted, and which is exemplified at the end of this extract, for an indirect target to respond with direct

address to the targetter, and he (BK) had just previously indirectly targetted BB (first arrowed utterance).

In any case, it is through examples of this sort that one may hope to make the argument that utterances are constantly monitored by participants for the participant roles that they project, and that deft footwork may be required to make mid-stream adjustments consequent to signs that the projections have been misunderstood.

Turning away from indirect targets, let me just point out that further kinds of reception role are amenable to study. For example, there are many ways in which utterances can be designed for overhearers. (Good clues are provided by the use of sociolinguistic 'markers', e.g. address forms – thus academics may switch from a first name to a title plus last-name exchange in the presence of students.) Nowhere is this more obvious than on the radio, where interviews often have a curious quality in that the interviewer states what the interviewee clearly already knows well (for example an interviewer addresses a newly elected mayor of humble origin with 'You were a very good milkman, you did a double round'), and in so doing reveals a depth of knowledge about the subject matter that makes his questions clearly only for the purpose of obtaining answers of benefit to overhearers. This curious quality is best appreciated by contrasting it to the whole series of conversational devices that seem precisely designed to avoid the possibility of telling people what they already know – e.g. pre-announcements (like 'Did you hear the wonderful news?') that make a telling conditional on its newsworthiness (see Terasaki 1976; Levinson 1983: 349ff.; see also Sacks 1971: 19 October, p. 9; Levinson 1986). Thus, talk for overhearers is recognizable not only because of the subject matter (where e.g. A tells B about B-events, to use the terminology of Labov and Fanshel 1977), but also because it lacks many conversational devices that either seek to establish in advance what may be 'news' or serve to acknowledge the newsworthiness of an informing (see Heritage 1985).

My purpose in bringing up these rather *ad-hoc* and grossly under-analysed examples is simply to make the point that having a set of participant role categories is one thing – but working out *who* stands in *which when* can be quite another, on a vastly greater plane of complexity. But such problems of category assignment, I hope to have shown, are not only the self-imposed difficulties of analysts, but also occasionally problematic for participants, and there is at least *prima facie* evidence that advances in this area would significantly aid our understanding of interactional process.

CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, I have tried to show, following suggestions by Goffman in particular, that 'Speaker' and 'Hearer' are not sufficient categories for the analysis of participant role. Instead, both the producing and the receiving end of an utterance can be broken down into constituent categories of some complexity. It then becomes clear that, in the dyadic dialogues we tend to think of as the canonical situation of utterance, where S and H (and the corresponding grammatical categories (first and second person) will almost do as analytical notions, these complex categories are actually collapsed onto just two incumbents: so sponsor = 'ghostor', source = speaker, speaker = author, etc., while target = addressee, and addressee = interlocutor, etc.²⁴ Thus the apparently simplest situation of utterance may in this perspective actually hide an enormous complexity more clearly revealed in situations where these roles are distributed over more parties to an exchange of talk, as in specialized institutional settings or the panel discussions that I have especially drawn on.

Issues of participant role would seem to have a central importance to many different branches of linguistics. In the first place, concepts of participant roles underly the key grammatical distinctions of person deixis. Since person deixis is at the heart of all the deictic systems of natural languages the concepts of participant role are fundamental to an understanding of the context dependence of meaning, and constitute the very foundations of pragmatics. That we might incidentally get better grammatical descriptions of deictic categories in languages is of course an important payoff of developing our understanding of this area. Secondly, in the study of verbal interaction, there has been undoubtedly some bias towards the study of dyadic interaction. But many of the world's social settings do not afford the privacy that makes the dyad triumph in the Western world. Further, in all societies there are institutionalized multi-party gatherings for which at present we lack the proper investigative techniques. Thus having the proper distinctions between different kinds of participant role is essential to the ethnography of speaking and the comparative description of speech events. Thirdly, it can be argued that the processual study of verbal interaction in multi-party settings equally requires an understanding of the underlying distinctions in participant role. For all these reasons (and others, like the importance to the study of child language), as I have tried to illustrate, the whole area is one that

demands further serious attention from linguists and discourse analysts.

For raising all these issues, and making concrete proposals for the analysis of participant role, we owe a special debt to Erving Goffman. Whether his own ideas on the subject will survive future intensive research it is surely too soon to know, but linguistics is certainly the beneficiary of his provocative suggestions. We have, after all, been within the straightjacket of first and second persons for a couple of millenia.

NOTES

This paper has been long in the gestation, and in various matters of conception and execution I am still unhappy with it; I publish it in the hope that further help may be elicited. It arises directly from some sessions of the Working Group on Language and Cultural Context, Australian National University, 1981, and in particular from a seminar on multi-party conversation led by John Haviland (see Haviland, 1986a); I am grateful to all the participants, especially Penelope Brown, Sandro Duranti, John Haviland, Judith Irvine, Elinor Ochs, Bambi Schieffelin and Michael Silverstein for the stimulus for, and some of the ideas in, this paper (I shall try to acknowledge specific contributions below). At the time I had no access to Goffman (1981b), and this explains to some extent the language of independent invention; but I drew heavily on Goffman (1976), Comrie (1976), Hymes (1974), Goodwin (1977), Fillmore (1975), Lyons (1977). Subsequent versions were given at the University of Sussex, and the Working Conference on the Sociology of Language, Plymouth Polytechnic, April 1983, each benefiting from comments and encouragement (I single out John Lyons, Anita Pomerantz and John Heritage for special thanks). My thanks also to Nigel Vincent for much needed help at a critical stage. This version has benefited from comments by participants at the conference from which this volume derives – especially those from Emanuel Schegloff, Paul Drew, Sue Ervin-Tripp, Adam Kendon, Christian Heath, Jurgen Streeck and others. Dick Hudson, Paul Drew, Peter Matthews and Emanuel Schegloff also supplied copious written comments which for reasons of space I have scarcely been able to take into account – I owe them all further elaboration at some point. Finally, the editors of this volume have helped greatly in the partial abbreviation of an overlong text; I have had to cut, amongst other things, some suggestions about the relation of stigma to limited participation rights, but I shall be happy to supply the longer version on demand.

1 Incidentally, his role in the founding of the systematic study of social interaction is curious, as other commentators have had reason to note: it

could hardly be said that he made the subject respectable (that was surely never his aim); nor that he made it systematic or scientific (from his writings one might get the impression that he lived before the days of recording equipment). What he did do was make the systematization conceivable by showing the kind of analytical distinctions that might be necessary; also, he released the study of interaction from the clutches of the back-room specialists, whether aberrant linguists, ethologists or kinesiologists, by demonstrating its general sociological pertinence. Finally, by sketch treatments of so many ecological niches of everyday life, he inspired more detailed explorations of the collaborative effort beneath each smooth interactional surface.

- 2 In that paper (p. 128) Goffman draws attention to his earlier 'initial statement' in *Frame Analysis* (1974: 496-559). However, perhaps the most useful earlier reference is in fact the 1953 dissertation (especially part 4), where many of the ideas about participation are clearly laid out.
- 3 So suggests Silverstein; I have not actually been able to find anyone to attribute such traditional wisdom to, except for Jakobson's famous essay on shifters (1971; see especially 133-6). Similar in spirit is Hymes (1972: 58, 60-1).
- 4 In this emphasis there is an interesting convergence at about the same time between ethnographers of speaking (e.g. Fisher 1976; Hymes 1972, 1974; Silverstein 1976) and Goffman's own work. Those who have not seen Goffman's (1953) dissertation might be forgiven for thinking that Goffman borrowed this concern from the ethnographers; but perhaps the influence was the other way as Hymes' (1972: x) acknowledgement suggests; most likely though it was a happy confluence.
- 5 For those unfamiliar with this mode of categorization, borrowed from phonology, let me point out a few of its properties: (a) for n features you obtain up to 2^n categories; (b) one may specify redundancy rules, so that feature $F1$ implies $F2$, etc. (this will reduce the theoretical maximum); and (c) one may define superordinate categories, subsuming a number of basic ones, by leaving some features unspecified. (See e.g. Fischer-Jorgensen 1975: 150ff., and the following footnote.)
- 6 The effect of these two redundancy rules is to reduce the potential set of 2^4 (16) categories to six sensible reception roles, by (a) knocking out all eight possible non-channel-linked parties as non-participants (since the first redundancy rule has the de Morgan equivalent - *CHANNEL-LINK* - *PARTIC*), (b) eliminating the possibility of (two kinds of) non-participants being addressed (remember that these are *utterance-event* categories: in contrast, in *speech-event* categories a heckler at a meeting being derided by a speaker might be thought of as an addressed non-participant; but at the utterance-event level, just by being addressed the heckler becomes a participant, as the second redundancy rule requires).
- 7 Emanuel Schegloff (personal communication) objects to the characterization of the turn-taking system as 'dyadic'; while it is true, he points

out, that it is organized in terms of an opposition between 'current speaker' and 'next', whether 'next speaker' is drawn from a pool restricted in kind or number makes all the difference between, say, a press conference (a two-party system) and talk at the dinner table (where there are as many parties as individuals). A lot hinges here on having a proper analysis of specialized turn-taking systems, which we still largely lack. Even if 'dyadicity' is not the relevant dimension of contrast between the turn-taking system and systems of participant role, yet it is clear (Schegloff would I think concede) that the systems are distinct but cross-cutting.

- 8 Otherwise, given a redundancy rule + *PARTICIPANT* → + *CHANNEL-LINK*, one could not be a participant to a conversation conducted in a language one does not understand. Perhaps, though, that is right: it may only be through a shared kinesic code (of nods, smiles, body position, etc.) that one can participate in such a conversation at all.
- 9 Although cultural relativists will take heart at finding that those troublesome Ojibwa treat stones (which are grammatically animate in Ojibwa) as participants (Hymes 1974: 14); and of course one of our cultural peculiarities is the treatment of pet animals as possible participants, indeed addressees. There are ethnographic reports of special registers and special pronouns of address for use to animals.
- 10 Note that there may not be any attributed source at all, as in the 'ravings' of a lunatic in our culture; such 'ravings' being attributed to spiritual sources in many other cultures.
- 11 I owe to Michael Silverstein some forceful reminders of the importance of this distinction.
- 12 But compare Hymes: 'serious ethnographic work shows that there is [only] one general, or universal, dimension to be postulated, that of participant' (1972: 58-9). If he's right then the present enterprise is of dubious validity; there is no way to construct a set of *a priori* categories. But this seems suspicious; for, at least prior to the technology of modern recording and communications, there did seem to be intrinsic constraints on the nature of participant roles to do with the underlying dimensions illustrated in tables 7.3 and 7.4. However, we can grant that in the long run any set of categories ought to be based on empirical work, whether on detailed work on the analysis of multi-party talk in our own society or comparative analysis of talk in 'exotic' societies. The issue then will be whether we can formulate an 'etic' level of description, of universal application, within which 'emic' descriptions of local practices can be properly captured.
- 13 The term grammaticalize is used throughout this paper in the broad (post-Chomskyan) sense inclusive of *lexicalize*, *phonologize*, etc., as well as *syntactize*. See e.g. Brown and Levinson 1978, section 8.0, for a clarification of what one might understand by functions performed by means of the structure of some languages, but by means of the use of utterances in others.

- 14 But not the analysis of number in pronouns, it should be added, which in many cases at least is best analysed in the minimal/augmented manner devised by Conklin and illustrated in Dixon (1980: 351ff).
- 15 Peter Matthews points out to me that the intimate interconnection between mood and participant role was noted early in the Greek tradition (see Appoloniou's discussion of the verb in *Syntax*, book 3).
- 16 Tamil -*TTum* might be claimed not to mark a separate sentence type since it co-occurs with (unmarked) declarative and the polar question morpheme. However with the question particle -*aa* it has a specialized meaning, a request for permission, where it occurs with (predominantly?) the first person. A good case can therefore be made for considering the form to be homophonous, and in the third-person non-interrogative form to be a specialized hortative. See Andronov 1969: 175f. (who calls it the 'optative') and Asher 1985: 166, 170.
- 17 Mention should also be made here of systems like that in Sre (and a similar system in Quileute) with (a) a near-S form, (b) a near-A form, (c) a form indicating that S and A are close and the object referred to is distant, and (d) a form indicating that the object is remote or out of sight, presumably to all ratified participants (Anderson and Keenan 1985: 287f.). The third form is perhaps properly glossed as [not close to ratified participants'].
- 18 For example, even if utterance events are the units for which participant roles are assigned, such assignment is not necessarily based on units of that sort. Certainly, the process of assignment recognition and signalling inevitably requires, for its study, the analysis of sequential positioning of turns and many ethnographic considerations, e.g. about expectable role assignments in certain cultural events – see e.g. the suggestions about examination in a British court of law below, or Heritage's (1985: 113ff.) remarks about the institutional background to news interviews.
- 19 *elēma* is formed from the present imperative *sama*, ['speak/say'] and the deictic element *ele*, ['like this']: thus *elēma* glosses as ['Say like this'] (Feld and Schieffelin 1982). Since *elēma* contrasts with *tolema*, ['speak words'], it is possible that (as Silverstein has suggested) *elēma* is essentially performative in contrast to *tolema* which is essentially reportive. In that case *X elēma* should gloss as ['Assert right now X']. However this is unclear from Feld and Schieffelin's description.
- 20 There are of course some general connections here, that need exploring, between questions of quotation and implied past and future utterance events.
- 21 I believe I take this term from Goffman, but have mislaid the reference. In the paper 'Response cries' (1981b: ch. 2 [1978], Goffman distinguishes true 'response cries' (non-lexemes but conventional vocalizations like 'Oops') from imprecations (taboo lexemes) and lexical talk, while showing how they have much in common. For these, I use the term 'out-louds' as a cover term.

- 22 Emanuel Schegloff (personal communication) notes that the sequential properties of 'indirectly targetted turns' might be accounted for not in terms of participant role but directly in terms of being utterances built to take a third-turn response, thus:

A: Turn 1: [*indirectly targetted utterance with C mentioned in third person*]

B: Turn 2: [*audience appreciation*]

C: Turn 3: [*target's response*]

He also points out that panel discussions might not be the best locus of research for this phenomenon, since political affiliations and the like so overdetermine 'targets' that we are not clearly enabled to see the methods more generally used for selecting a 'target' to respond.

- 23 In example <13> the chairman's use of the full name (at the top of p. 219) is precisely such an exception: Bruce Kent is called upon to speak – the call being an announcement, addressed to all participants as much as to Bruce Kent himself, of whose turn it is.
- 24 Emanuel Schegloff (in conference) made the point that talk of 'conflation' or 'mapping' of many participant roles onto only two interactants in dyadic dialogue would seem to presuppose the omni-relevance of the more finely discriminated set of roles. Can this, he asks, be shown? Or should we rather consider those discriminated roles as only pertinent to other kinds of setting, or multi-party talk? To demonstrate the omni-relevance we would need to show that, for example, a speaker in dyadic interaction needs always to be monitored for changes in 'footing'. Streeck (n.d.) in effect attempts to argue this, suggesting that *relayed* utterances might not permit certain responses (e.g. other repair), but it is not clear that this is generally true. Another kind of possible evidence is provided by Schegloff's (1984) demonstration that some utterances in dyadic conversation are demonstrably treated as 'ambiguous' as to source (a point for which I am indebted to Gail Jefferson).