Deutsch
 
Hilfe Datenschutzhinweis Impressum
  DetailsucheBrowse

Datensatz

DATENSATZ AKTIONENEXPORT
Zur Ablage hinzufügen
 DetailsÜbersicht
  Delay as a Political Technique under Divided Government? Empirical Evidence from Germany, 1976-2005

Manow, P., & Burkhart, S. (2008). Delay as a Political Technique under Divided Government? Empirical Evidence from Germany, 1976-2005. German Politics, 17(3), 353-366. doi:10.1080/09644000802300650.

Item is

 

einblenden: alle ausblenden: alle

Basisdaten

einblenden: ausblenden:
Datensatz-Permalink: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0012-47B3-3 Versions-Permalink: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0009-79C0-6
Genre: Zeitschriftenartikel

Dateien

einblenden: Dateien
ausblenden: Dateien
:
GP_17_2008_Manow.pdf (beliebiger Volltext), 330KB
 
Datei-Permalink:
-
Name:
GP_17_2008_Manow.pdf
Beschreibung:
Full text
OA-Status:
Sichtbarkeit:
Eingeschränkt (Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, MKGS; )
MIME-Typ / Prüfsumme:
application/pdf
Technische Metadaten:
Copyright Datum:
-
Copyright Info:
-
Lizenz:
-

Externe Referenzen

einblenden:
ausblenden:
externe Referenz:
https://doi.org/10.1080/09644000802300650 (Verlagsversion)
Beschreibung:
Full text via publisher
OA-Status:
Keine Angabe

Urheber

einblenden:
ausblenden:
 Urheber:
Manow, Philip1, Autor           
Burkhart, Simone1, Autor           
Affiliations:
1Politik und politische Ökonomie, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society, ou_1214551              

Inhalt

einblenden:
ausblenden:
Schlagwörter: -
 Zusammenfassung: This article analyses whether the majority situation of Germany’s second
chamber has an impact on the duration of the legislative process. While it is
often assumed that diverging majorities between Bundestag and Bundesrat
delay law-making, the little empirical research that exists could not confirm
such an effect of divided government. We therefore seek to discover whether
and how an oppositional majority in the Bundesrat can credibly threaten to
delay the legislative process for an undue length of time. Our study is based
on a comprehensive dataset featuring a wealth of information on all bills
adopted between 1976 and 2005. We show that divided government delays legislation,
but to a somewhat lesser extent than often assumed. We show that under
divided government the federal government loses some of its power over the parliamentary
calendar – with possible consequences for its ability to implement its
political agenda. Interestingly, this finding is not limited to bills that require the
consent of the second chamber, but applies to all bills.

Details

einblenden:
ausblenden:
Sprache(n): eng - English
 Datum: 2008-09-092008
 Publikationsstatus: Erschienen
 Seiten: -
 Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: -
 Inhaltsverzeichnis: Introduction
Political control of the parliamentary calendar
Operationalisation data and summary statistics
Testing the hypotheses
Summary
Footnotes
 Art der Begutachtung: Expertenbegutachtung
 Identifikatoren: eDoc: 402148
DOI: 10.1080/09644000802300650
 Art des Abschluß: -

Veranstaltung

einblenden:

Entscheidung

einblenden:

Projektinformation

einblenden:

Quelle 1

einblenden:
ausblenden:
Titel: German Politics
Genre der Quelle: Zeitschrift
 Urheber:
Affiliations:
Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: -
Seiten: - Band / Heft: 17 (3) Artikelnummer: - Start- / Endseite: 353 - 366 Identifikator: ISSN: 0964-4008
ISSN: 1743-8993

Quelle 2

einblenden:
ausblenden:
Titel: Between Consensus and Conflict: Law-Making Processes in Germany
Genre der Quelle: Heft
 Urheber:
Affiliations:
Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: -
Seiten: - Band / Heft: - Artikelnummer: - Start- / Endseite: - Identifikator: -