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Abstract

This article analyses whether the majority situation of Germany’s second
chamber has an impact on the duration of the legislative process. While it is
often assumed that diverging majorities between Bundestag and Bundesrat
delay law-making, the little empirical research that exists could not confirm
such an effect of divided government. We therefore seek to discover whether
and how an oppositional majority in the Bundesrat can credibly threaten to
delay the legislative process for an undue length of time. Our study is based
on a comprehensive dataset featuring a wealth of information on all bills
adopted between 1976 and 2005. We show that divided government delays legislation,
but to a somewhat lesser extent than often assumed. We show that under
divided government the federal government loses some of its power over the parliamentary
calendar – with possible consequences for its ability to implement its
political agenda. Interestingly, this finding is not limited to bills that require the
consent of the second chamber, but applies to all bills.