Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Punishment Regimes for Collusive Bribery

Engel, Christoph; Goerg, Sebastian; Yu, Gaoneng

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Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Punishment Regimes for Collusive Bribery

Engel, C., Goerg, S., & Yu, G. (2016). Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Punishment Regimes for Collusive Bribery. American Law and Economics Review, 18: V00 N0 2016, pp. 506-556.

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Item Permalink: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002A-51B3-7 Version Permalink: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002D-F340-2

Genre: Journal Article

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Creators:
Engel, Christoph¹, Author
Goerg, Sebastian¹, Author
Yu, Gaoneng¹, Author

Affiliations:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688

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Dates: Accepted: 2016Published Online: 2016Date issued: 2016

Publication Status: Issued

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Rev. Type: Peer

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Title: American Law and Economics Review

Source Genre: Journal

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Publ. Info: Oxford University Press

Pages: - Volume / Issue: 18 Sequence Number: V00 N0 2016 Start / End Page: 506 - 556 Identifier: -