English
 
User Manual Privacy Policy Disclaimer Contact us
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT

Released

Journal Article

Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Punishment Regimes for Collusive Bribery

MPS-Authors
/persons/resource/persons183106

Engel,  Christoph
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

/persons/resource/persons183121

Goerg,  Sebastian
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

/persons/resource/persons183222

Yu,  Gaoneng
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

External Ressource
No external resources are shared
Fulltext (public)
There are no public fulltexts stored in PuRe
Supplementary Material (public)
There is no public supplementary material available
Citation

Engel, C., Goerg, S., & Yu, G. (2016). Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Punishment Regimes for Collusive Bribery. American Law and Economics Review, 18: V00 N0 2016, pp. 506-556.


Cite as: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002A-51B3-7
Abstract
There is no abstract available