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  Quality contests

Serena, M. (2017). Quality contests. European Journal of Political Economy, 46(January), 15-25. doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.10.008.

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 Creators:
Serena, Marco1, Author           
Affiliations:
1Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society, ou_830552              

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Free keywords: Optimal contest design; Expected effort of the winner; Contestants’ exclusion; Leveling the playing-field
 Abstract: In noisy contests where only the winner's entry will eventually be implemented, the suitable objective is to maximize the expected quality of the entry of the winner. We compare the optimal set of rules in contests under such an objective to the one under maximization of the sum of contestants’ efforts, which is commonly assumed in the literature, and find that it may be beneficial to exclude weak contestants, unlevel the playing field, and weaken the underdog.

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Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2017
 Publication Status: Issued
 Pages: -
 Publishing info: -
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: -
 Identifiers: DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.10.008
 Degree: -

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Title: European Journal of Political Economy
Source Genre: Journal
 Creator(s):
Affiliations:
Publ. Info: Munich : North-Holland
Pages: - Volume / Issue: 46 (January) Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: 15 - 25 Identifier: ISSN: 0176-2680
ZDB: 1491120-6
CoNE: https://pure.mpg.de/cone/journals/resource/954926233419