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  The Constrained Politics of Local Public Investment Under Cooperative Federalism

Bremer, B., Di Carlo, D., & Wansleben, L. (2023). The Constrained Politics of Local Public Investment Under Cooperative Federalism. Socio-Economic Review, 21(2), 1007-1034. doi:10.1093/ser/mwac026.

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 Creators:
Bremer, Björn1, Author           
Di Carlo, Donato2, Author           
Wansleben, Leon3, Author           
Affiliations:
1Politische Ökonomie, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society, ou_3363015              
2Politische Ökonomie der europäischen Integration, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society, ou_1856345              
3Soziologie öffentlicher Finanzen und Schulden, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society, ou_3035385              

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Free keywords: public investment, local politics, fiscal federalism, partisanship, Germany
 Abstract: Public investment spending declined steadily in advanced economies during the last three decades. Germany is a case in point where the aggregate decline coincided with growing inequality in investments across districts. What explains the variation in local investment spending? We assembled a novel data set to investigate the effects of structural constraints and partisanship on German districts’ investment spending from 1995 to 2018. We find that the lack of fiscal and administrative capacity significantly influences local investment patterns. Yet, within these constraints, partisanship matters. Conservative politicians tend to prioritize public investment more than the left. This is especially the case when revenues from local taxes are low. As the fiscal conditions improve, left-wing politicians increase investment more strongly and hence the difference between the left and the right disappears. Our findings are indicative of how regional economic divergence can emerge even within cooperative federal systems and show that, even when decision-makers operate under various institutional and structural constraints, partisanship matters for how these actors allocate discretionary spending.

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Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2022-06-022023
 Publication Status: Issued
 Pages: -
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 Table of Contents: 1. Introduction
2. Germany’s divergent patterns of local public investment and the political economy of subnational fiscal policymaking
3. Structural constraints and partisan choices: public investment in a multilevel polity
4. Data and methodology
5. Empirical results
6. Concluding discussion
Footnotes
Acknowledgments
Supplementary material
References
 Rev. Type: Peer
 Identifiers: DOI: 10.1093/ser/mwac026
 Degree: -

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Title: Socio-Economic Review
Source Genre: Journal
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Pages: - Volume / Issue: 21 (2) Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: 1007 - 1034 Identifier: ISSN: 1475-1461
ISSN: 1475-147X