hide
Free keywords:
Computer Science, Computer Science and Game Theory, cs.GT
Abstract:
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of $m$ indivisible goods to a
set of $n$ agents. Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) criteria -- which
requires that no agent prefers the bundle of another agent after removal of any
single good -- is known to be a remarkable analogous of envy-freeness when the
resource is a set of indivisible goods. In this paper, we investigate EFX
notion for the restricted additive valuations, that is, every good has some
non-negative value, and every agent is interested in only some of the goods.
We introduce a natural relaxation of EFX called EFkX which requires that no
agent envies another agent after removal of any $k$ goods. Our main
contribution is an algorithm that finds a complete (i.e., no good is discarded)
EF2X allocation for the restricted additive valuations. In our algorithm we
devise new concepts, namely "configuration" and "envy-elimination" that might
be of independent interest.
We also use our new tools to find an EFX allocation for restricted additive
valuations that discards at most $\lfloor n/2 \rfloor -1$ goods. This improves
the state of the art for the restricted additive valuations by a factor of $2$.
