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  Gatekeeper's Potential Privilege – the Need to Limit DMA Centralisation

Hoffmann, J., Herrmann, L., & Kestler, L. (2024). Gatekeeper's Potential Privilege – the Need to Limit DMA Centralisation. Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 12(1), 126-147.

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Genre: Zeitschriftenartikel

Externe Referenzen

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externe Referenz:
https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnad040 (Verlagsversion)
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Keine Angabe
externe Referenz:
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4316836 (Preprint)
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Also published as: Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 23-01
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Keine Angabe

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 Urheber:
Hoffmann, Jörg1, Autor           
Herrmann, Liza1, Autor           
Kestler, Lukas1, Autor           
Affiliations:
1MPI for Innovation and Competition, Max Planck Society, ou_2035291              

Inhalt

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Schlagwörter: European Union, Digital Markets Act (DMA), principle of subsidiarity, gatekeepers, SMEs, platform economy, digital economy, digital single market, legislative process, enforcement, pre-emption of national laws, privileging of gatekeepers
 Zusammenfassung: The Digital Markets Act (DMA) aims at promoting contestable and fair markets for core platform services by setting out obligations for designated gatekeepers. As the DMA does not clearly define these two objectives, it comes into conflict with national legislation with overlapping objectives. This may include unfair competition laws and sector-specific regulation. Art. 1(5) DMA addresses this conflict by stipulating that Member States may not impose further obligations on gatekeepers for the purpose of ensuring contestable and fair markets. The effect this has is that national provisions vis-à-vis gatekeepers may not be applicable anymore and competences are centralised on the European level more broadly than potentially envisaged by the European legislature. This centralisation of competences runs the risk of inadvertently privileging gatekeepers by blocking national laws that are, however, still applicable to SMEs and other firms competing with gatekeepers. This paper suggests solutions to mitigate such risk.

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Sprache(n): eng - English
 Datum: 2024
 Publikationsstatus: Erschienen
 Seiten: -
 Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: -
 Inhaltsverzeichnis: -
 Art der Begutachtung: -
 Identifikatoren: -
 Art des Abschluß: -

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Quelle 1

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Titel: Journal of Antitrust Enforcement
Genre der Quelle: Zeitschrift
 Urheber:
Affiliations:
Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: -
Seiten: - Band / Heft: 12 (1) Artikelnummer: - Start- / Endseite: 126 - 147 Identifikator: ISSN: 2050-0696
ZDB: 2711626-8