Exploiting ultimatum power when responders are better informed: Theoretical and 
experimental analysis of conflict resolution

Güth, Werner; Marazzi, Francesca; Panaccione, Luca

doi:10.1177/0022002723116784

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Exploiting ultimatum power when responders are better informed: Theoretical and experimental analysis of conflict resolution

Güth, W., Marazzi, F., & Panaccione, L. (2024). Exploiting ultimatum power when responders are better informed: Theoretical and experimental analysis of conflict resolution. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 68(2), 381-403. doi:10.1177/0022002723116784.

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Item Permalink: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-000D-78FC-1 Version Permalink: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-000E-A3FC-E

Genre: Journal Article

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Creators:
Güth, Werner¹, Author
Marazzi, Francesca, Author
Panaccione, Luca, Author

Affiliations:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688

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Dates: Published Online: 2023-04-11Date issued: 2024-02

Publication Status: Issued

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Rev. Type: Peer

Identifiers: DOI: 10.1177/0022002723116784

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Title: Journal of Conflict Resolution

Source Genre: Journal

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Pages: - Volume / Issue: 68 (2) Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: 381 - 403 Identifier: -