Shifting Punishment on Minorities: Experimental Evidence of Scapegoating

Bauer, Michael; Cahlíková, Jana; Chytilová, Julie; Roland, Gérard; Želinský, Tomáš

doi:10.1093/ej/uead005

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Journal Article

Shifting Punishment on Minorities: Experimental Evidence of Scapegoating

MPS-Authors

Cahlíková, Jana
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

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http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3891611
(Preprint)

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Citation

Bauer, M., Cahlíková, J., Chytilová, J., Roland, G., & Želinský, T. (2023). Shifting Punishment on Minorities: Experimental Evidence of Scapegoating. The economic journal, 133(652), 1626-1640. doi:10.1093/ej/uead005.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-000F-1A30-E

Abstract

Do members of a majority group systematically shift punishment onto innocent members of an ethnic minority? We introduce an experimental paradigm, punishing the scapegoat game, to measure how injustice affecting a member of one's own group shapes punishment of an unrelated bystander. When no harm is done, we find no evidence of discrimination against the ethnic minority (Roma people in Slovakia). In contrast, when a member of one's own group is harmed, the punishment ‘passed’ onto innocent individuals more than doubles when they are from the minority, as compared to when they are from the dominant group.